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                         KEY JUDGMENTS

Iraq maintains the most extensive chemical and biological warfare
capability in the Third World.  Baghdad's forces have a range of 
chemical agents and delivery means, as well as the experience and 
training needed to use chemical weapons effectively.  Biological 
weapons have only been developed recently.

Iraq is likely to use CW as an integral part of tactical 
operations to protect key political, military, or economic 
strategic areas.  One such area is the northern portion of the 
Kuwait Theatre of Operations (KTO).

At present, Iraq is not prepared to launch an offensive against 
allied forces in Saudi Arabia supported by chemical weapons.  Iraq 
is prepared to defend some strategic assets in the KTO with 
chemical weapons including the Rumailah oil field and Warbah and 
Bubiyan Islands in response to an attack in southern Kuwait.

The effectiveness of long-range chemical weapons against deep 
targets is unpredictable.  We believe Iraq calculates chemical use 
against these targets, especially from aircraft, as an 
unacceptable risk.

Iraq is assessed to have some biological delivery capability.  The 
use of BW weapons by Iraq would probably be strategic, prior to 
the initiation of hostilities. [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

(U) Iraq's CBW Capabilities

Chemical Agents (See Table 1.)  Iraq's CW agents used in the war 
with Iran include the persistent blister agent mustard, the 
semipersistent nerve agents tabun (GA) and GF, and the 
nonpersistent nerve agent sarin (GB).  After the war, Iraq 
investigated and may have subsequently produced small amounts of
the persistent nerve agent VX.  The nerve agent soman (GD) and the
psychochemical BZ may also be under development, and Iraq may have 
an interest in cyanide agents and phosgene oxime.

Iraq has produced chemical agents impregnated on a carrier 
material, usually a fine dust.  These dusty agents, are 
disseminated as a dry aerosol and may be difficult to detect.  
They can cause casualties more rapidly than the agent alone and 
have the ability to penetrate semi-permeable protective suits 
under certain conditions.  In 1984, Iraq used weapons containing a 


impregnated with mustard against Iran.  Iraq has the technology to 
develop dusty forms of nerve agents and possibly other toxic 
materials, but we do not believe they have done so.

Biological Weapons  Iraq has developed anthrax and botulinum toxin 
as biological agents.  Other agents such as staphylococcal 
enterotoxin, clostridium and cholera may also have been 

(U)   Chemical Weapons Iraq has a variety of chemical weapons 
systems available (See Table 2.)

         Biological Weapons Iraq is assessed to have weaponized 
anthrax and botulinum toxin.  The type and number of weapons or 
dissemination systems Iraq has are not known.  Candidate systems 
include cluster bombs, missile warheads and spray systems.

(U)   Binary Weapons

In April 1990, Saddam Husayn announced that Iraq had binary 
chemical weapons.  DIA assesses that Iraq has produced at least 
some binary weapons, most likely containing agent GB or GF.  VX, 
an agent under development, is also a candidate for a binary 
configuration.  Iraq's unitary chemical stockpile is assessed to 
have low agent purity and therefore limited storage life; this is 
an especially serious problem for their nerve agents.  Since the 
component chemicals in binaries are easier to purify than finished 
chemical agent due to their lower toxicity, binaries would help 
extend the shelf life of Baghdad's CW stocks.  Binary fills 
simplify production and storage of chemical munitions, but binary
rounds deliver relatively less agent per round than unitary 

(U) CBW Delivery

Baghdad used several means of chemical delivery in the war with 
Iran: aerial bombs, air-to-surface rockets, artillery and mortar 
rounds, and multiple rocket launchers (MRL).  After the war, Iraq 
added cluster bombs and missile warheads to its arsenal.  Iraq 
also increased the size of the MRL warhead, tripling its agent 
content.  Iraq is the only country known to have helicopter 
rockets with chemical fills.

         Chemical Tactics

Iraqi forces made effective use of their chemical superiority in 
the final offensives in the war with Iran.  During the spring 1988 
campaigns, Iraq had carefully rehearsed its scheme for attacks 
against Iranian offensives.  The Iraqi battle plans called for use 
of chemicals against selected targets.  Using chemicals at 
advantageous times, forward targets were neutralized using
nonpersistent nerve agent, while deeper targets were saturated 
with persistent agents.  Since Iran had only limited protective 
means, these attacks were often effective.  Also, there was no 
credible threat of Iranian retaliation with chemical weapons.  
Prior to these 1988 offensive uses, Iraqi chemical attacks were 
not as effective due to inexperience which was manifested in a 
poor choice
of weather conditions and improper weapons delivery.  While Iraq 
used chemicals often, their effectiveness was also reduced by 
restrictive control of the weapons.  When chemical release 
authority was delegated to field commanders later in the war, the 
effectiveness of chemical attacks improved.

        Biological Tactics  There is no reliable information on 
how Iraq might use their BW weapons.  The most suitable way to use 
these weapons is in a clandestine manner prior to the outset of 
hostilities.  The incubation period of hours to days that occurs 
between the initial exposure and illness or death make BW an 
unreliable tactical weapon.  BW does have the potential to Case 
injury and death to a large population over widely dispersed 

(U)  Current Deployment

        Iraq is prepared to use chemical weapons in some parts of 
the KTO.  Iraq has concentrated its CW support activity in that 
portion of the KTO where the Republican Guards and supporting 
artillery are deployed.  Based on the current defensive posture of 
Iraqi ground forces, any near term Iraqi chemical attack in the 
KTO would most likely occur in response to an allied incursion 
an area of strategic importance to Iraq.  Accordingly, Iraq has 
been doing CW training and establishing decontamination stations 
in critical locations to support chemical weapons use in defense 
of strategic areas.

(U)  Ground Forces

        Iraqi disposition in Kuwait is to defend on successive 
lines from the Saudi border to the northern portion of Kuwait.  
Disposition of ground and air forces indicates that the northern 
area, including the Rumailah oil field and Warbah and Bubiyan 
islands will be the final defensive line.  The disposition of
CW units and instances of CW-related activity show that Iraq has 
prepared an area in Southeastern Iraq/Northern Kuwait which 
coincides with this line.  The assessment that Iraq is likely to 
use CW in this area is based on the presence of GFC units, 
emphasis on CW training, CW training sites, and deployment of 
preferred systems for chemical delivery.

        Republican Guards, probably Iraq's most experienced units 
in conducting combat operations with chemical weapons, have been 
deployed in the northern KTO.  Numerous instances of CW training 
and chemical unit field deployments have also been noted in these 
areas.  Chemical munitions may already be fielded with these 
units; if not, they could be supplied with chemical ammunition 

        Iraq regards its 155mm artillery as the weapon of choice 
for ground force delivery of CW due to its extended range of about 
38-40 km.  Over half of the 155mm artillery battalions in the KTO 
are located within Republican Guard Assembly areas and near 
decontamination sites.
      Authority for initial offensive or defensive use of CW 
probably rests with Saddam Husayn; however, during the Iran-Iraq 
war authority for ground force CW employment was subsequently 
delegated to individual Corps Commanders.  The Republican Guard 
Forces Command (RGFC) would probably be the first corps level
organization to receive this authority and likely has integrated 
CW into operational plans.

        Iraqi chemical capabilities along the Iraq-Turkey-Syria 
border have also been improved.  One decontamination site has been 
located in this area.  CW training for units in this area as well 
as other chemical-related activity along the Turkish border 
suggest a high degree of readiness to operate in a chemically 
contaminated environment in order to protect to the northern 
border.  At present
Iraq does not have significant force deployments, extensive CW 
capable artillery systems, or other CW assets in the north and, 
therefore, is much less prepared to conduct CW operations there 
than in the KTO.

(U)  Air Force

        CW-related activity at airfields and at CW bunkers near 
airfields indicates that Iraq has prepared for air delivery of 
chemical weapons.  Since the start of the current crisis 
CW-related activity, air-delivery systems, and chemical bunkers 
have been noted at the following airfields: H3, Mosul, Qayarrah 
West, Kirkuk, Al Taqqadum, Tallil, Ubaydah bin Al Jarrah, and 
Shuaybah (a
helicopter base).  For an air delivered CW attack in the KTO, Iraq 
would likely stage aircraft from Tall iI and An Nasiriyah because 
of their proximity to the front.

        Prior to a chemical attack during the Iran-Iraq War, 
stake-bed trucks, special canisters and crates, and 
decontamination vehicles handled chemical munitions at special 
bunkers and airfields.  Once use of CW had been authorized, the 
munitions were loaded onto CW-capable aircraft, primarily Fitters 
and HIP
helicopters.  This activity has not yet been noted at any of the 
above airfields.

(U)  Missiles

        DIA believes Iraq has chemical warheads for its modified 
SCUD-B short range ballistic missiles (SRBM).  Due to the poor 
accuracy and limited chemical payloads of the missiles they have 
only limited military effectiveness.  However, they could be used 
as terror weapons against civilian population centers.  
Chemical-related activity has been noted near SCUD launch sites at 
H2 in Western Iraq and at the two launch positions northwest of Al 
Basrah in Southern Iraq.

(U)  Logistics

        DIA believes that most of Iraq's chemical munitions remain 
in Iraq.  Few indicators of chemical weapons deployment have been 
observed in the KTO.  The special storage bunkers used to store 
chemicals at other locations in Iraq have not been established in 
Kuwait.  The Ras Al Qulayah naval base has a decontamination unit 
and an associated decontamination site, and the Al Jaber airfield 
has some hardened hangarettes.  If Iraq deploys chemicals to the 
KTO, these sites could be storage or staging areas for chemical 

         Recently, some CW decontamination trenches have been 
prepared in Kuwait.  There are also indications that some chemical 
defense units may have deployed to Kuwait at key points in the 
Iraqi defensive scheme.

(U) Likelihood of CW use

        Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the allied forces in 
Saudi Arabia or Israel is less likely than was the continued use 
of these weapons during the war with Iran.  The allied forces have 
significantly greater military capabilities than Iran had  during 
the Iran-Iraq war.  Before initiating chemical warfare, Iraq must 
consider several factors: quality of opposing forces, uncertainty 
of results, reliability of supply, and possible retaliation.

        Compared with the poorly trained and equipped Iranian 
troops, Iraq now faces forces with effective chemical protective 
equipment and training.  Iraqi intelligence has concluded that 
allied force protective measures are ineffective, however.

        During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used its air superiority to 
deliver bombs on virtually any target.  In the Desert Shield 
situation, allied air defenses and air superiority will make 
delivery by Iraqi aircraft difficult at best.  Deep targets could 
be attacked by missiles, but such attacks would be of questionable
reliability due to limited payloads and accuracy.

        The generally poor quality of chemical agent in Iraq's 
arsenal will probably reduce the reliability of Iraq's chemical 
attacks.  Iraq is trying to improve agent quality by introducing 
binary weapons into their inventory, but the extent of this 
substitution for unitary munitions is unknown.

        If CW production facilities are destroyed, Iraq could be 
forced into a decision to use their deployed chemical weapons 
quickly before losing a chemical option.  On the other hand, they 
might conserve use of CW until a crucial need existed.  Due to the 
poor quality of at least some of their chemical stocks, Iraq could 
be forced into a "use it or lose it" situation with their 

        Chemical use against the allied forces would risk 
retaliation in kind.  Syria, Egypt and the United States have 
chemical arsenals, and could retaliate with chemicals.  The 
United, Kingdom has threatened a nuclear response to chemical 
attacks.     [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(5)   ]              

        Use of biological agents, if confirmed and traced to Iraq, 
could lead to severe retaliation.

(U)   Possible Targets

        Airbases, supply centers or assembly areas in Saudi Arabia 
could be targets for chemical attacks.  Such attacks would have a 
low probability of halting military operations, however.  Iraq 
would face a determined, capable air defense system which would 
make it difficult to achieve reliable delivery of aerial bombs.  
The only reliable means of penetrating these defenses would be the
use of missiles.  However, Iraq's missiles are inaccurate, and 
have limited agent payloads; launching enough missiles to assure 
commanders that airbase operations could be halted or reduced 
could not be done with the present number of Iraqi missile 
launchers.  This problem is most severe for the extended range Al 
Husayn and Al Abbas missiles.

A variant of an all-out attack on an airbase would be launching a 
few missiles at the base in an attempt to force use of protective 
ensembles.  This less certain course could result in a lower level 
of activity at the airbase, reducing sortie rates and overall 
effectiveness of airbases defenses.  Such a tactic could make the 
base more vulnerable to a later attack since the personnel manning 
the base would suffer a significant degradation of long and short 
term performance through heat stress as well as undetermined 
psychological effects.

Special forces attacks using chemicals or possibly biological 
agents are another means of introducing these agents against 
targets in the rear area.

Terrorists use of chemicals against civilian or military targets 
could be a more likely way to employ chemicals.  Such use might be 
difficult to trace to Iraqi origins.  Iraq has threatened to use 
terrorism against Western forces and may calculate that such use 
is an acceptable risk.  Supply of chemical or possibly biological 
agents to terrorists could be part of Iraq's strategy.


Iraq is expected to retain its significant chemical and biological 
capability, and will likely attempt to improve its capability to 
deliver both chemical and biological agents.  As a result of 
Iraq's use of chemicals in the war with Iran, Baghdad recognizes 
the utility of chemical arsenal.  Since their BW arsenal is a new 
development, the probable effectiveness of biological weapons 
cannot be assessed.

While Iraq has shown that it can use chemicals effectively, use of 
chemicals against allied forces in Saudi Arabia or against Israel 
is not certain.  Compared to Iran, the allied forces in Saudi 
Arabia are much better prepared to cope with chemical attacks.  
Also, the threat of allied force retaliation with conventional, 
chemical or nuclear weapons will have to be an important 
consideration in Iraqi war planning for chemical strikes.

Iraq is not prepared to launch an offensive supported by chemical 
weapons at this time against allied forces in Saudi Arabia.  Their 
force disposition and deployment will to be changed significantly 
to support such a course.

DIA assesses that chemical attacks against deep targets in Saudi 
Arabia have only limited changes of success as long as air defense 
systems, protective training and discipline are maintained in a  
high state of readiness.  The Iraqi chemical arsenal will have to 
achieve further improvements in weapons accuracy and performance 
to assure Baghdad's commanders that chemical attacks are 

The recent introduction of biological weapons into Iraq's arsenal 
is difficult to assess.  The potential of biological weapons to 
cause death and injury is greater than that of chemical weapons 
due to their greater toxicity and lethality.  However, the agents 
Iraq has selected for weaponization are most suitable for 
strategic use prior to the outset of hostilities.

At present, Iraq is not ready to take advantage of any 
vulnerabilities created by a biological attack, and is therefore 
unlikely to use these weapons.

[   (b)(6)   ]



Mustard		Confirmed		Vesicant		Persistent
Sarin		Confirmed		Nerve		Nonpersistent
Tabun		Confirmed		Nerve		Semipersistent
GF			Confirmed		Nerve		Semipersistent
Dusty Mustard	Confirmed		Vesicant		Nonpersistent
VX			Probable		Nerve		Persistent
Soman		Possible		Nerve		Semipersistent

* Dusty Mustard is a dissemination means, not a different agent.  
This material is a chemical agent impregnated on a carrier 
material.  The persistence of dusty mustard depends on the 
carrier's physical characteristics, while its toxity is a result 
of the mustard agent on the dust.



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