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 	22 March 1991

	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

Biological and Chemical

	Prior to the war, Iraq had the most extensive and 

sophisticated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs in 

the Middle East. The objective of the Coalition air campaign was 

to prevent production of additional chemical and biological 

weapons and to destroy as many stored weapons as possible.

	The bombing campaign against the CBW target set progressed in 

	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

                         three overlapping stages. The first stage 

targeted both biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) 

research and development (R&D) and production and the CW 

munitions-filling capability. The second stage targeted BW and CW 

storage. During the second stage, most of the remaining CBW R&D 

and production capabilities were restruck and destroyed. The third 

stage targeted delivery systems in the field as well as targets 

not destroyed in the first two stages. These stages were not 

clearly delineated or distinct.  For example, the BW-associated 

bunkers at Salman Pak were destroyed before the R&D and production 

buildings at that facility, and at least one significant CW 

production bunker at Samarra survived the entire bombing campaign.

	Biological. The BW program was at five facilities at Salman 

Pak, Taji, Abu Ghurayb (two plants), and Latifiyah. Collectively 

the facilities were capable of BW R&D and production of anthrax 

spores and botulinum toxin.

	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

Munitions are believed to have been filled with these agents, but 

the precise types and numbers are unknown. Prior to the war, Iraq 

was assessed to have at least 1 metric ton of dried anthrax spores 

and 20-30 kilograms of botulinum toxin in its arsenal. The 

location of munitions-filling equipment is unknown.  Two 

environmentally controlled storage bunkers at Salman Pak were the 

most likely candidates for BW storage, whereas 19 other similar 


scattered throughout Iraq were capable of storing BW as well as 

other heat-sensitive materials; the Coalition attacked all of 

these bunkers.

	Initially four facilities were associated with BW R&D and 

production - the Salman Pak Chemical and Biological Warfare 

Production Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Suspected BW Production 

Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Suspected BW Production Facility 

(Vaccine Plant), and the Taji BW Production Facility. A fifth 

facility, the Latifiyah Suspected BW Plant Storage Facility, was 

identified in February 1991. Thirteen buildings at these five 

facilities were assessed to be associated with BW R&D and 

production. As a result of Coalition bombing, 11 of the 13 

buildings were destroyed and 2

were severely damaged. All five facilities are assessed to be 

unable to support

BW R&D or production. Activities during the bombing campaign at 

suspected BW production facilities indicate that Iraq made a 

deliberate attempt to salvage BW related equipment after the 

attacks. Some equipment probably was removed before the bombing 


	Potential BW storage facilities initially consisted of 19 

12-frame refrigerated bunkers at 11 locations and the Taji 

Suspected BW Storage Facility. In February 1991,2 additional 

12-frame refrigerated bunkers were identified, bringing the total 

to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19 refrigerated 

bunkers and the Taji Suspected BW Storage Facility all were 

destroyed. The final two refrigerated bunkers were identified too 

late in the campaign to be attacked. DIA cannot confirm whether BW 

material was stored in any of the bunkers, which also were 

suitable for storing chemical weapons, electronics, smart weapons, 

or fuel-air explosives.

	All known BW R&D/production and storage facilities were 

destroyed with the exception of 2 12-frame refrigerated bunkers. 

Reproducing the entire BW system as it existed on 15 January 1991, 

including the facilities at Salman Pak, Abu Ghurayb, Taji, and 

Latifiyah and all the destroyed

	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

bunkers, would require $100-200 million and 5-8 years. However, 

Iraq's complete BW system had multiple, redundant R&D and 

production facilities.  In addition, not all the refrigerated 

bunkers would be required to store a militarily significant amount 

of BW agents. Therefore, without duplicating the prewar system, 

Iraq could reestablish a significant BW capability with dedicated 

laboratories, containment facilities, and a storage and filling 


pacity within 3-4 years for less than $100 million. [      (b)(1) 

sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]. A BW agent production capability technically 

could be established in a matter of weeks to months using 

equipment at pharmaceutical facilities such as Samarra Drug 

Industries; however, production would be at a much reduced 

capacity and would be less safe than production at dedicated BW 


	Chemical. Iraq's prewar CW capability included production of

nerve and mustard agents deliverable by aerial bombs, spray 

devices, air-to-ground rockets, tube and rocket artillery, and a 

limited number of missile warheads. CW agents were synthesized at 

the only known production facility at Samarra, where munitions 

also were filled and stored. The Iraqis were striving aggressively 

for a self-sufficient CW production capability by building three 

CW agent precursor plants at Habbaniyah. By early 1990 one of the 

plants was producing the nerve agent precursor phosphorus 

trichloride.  The only missing link in attaining self-sufficiency 

was a white phosphorus plant that was contracted for but never 

built. Overall, the Iraqi CW infrastructure consisted of 10 CW 

agent production plants with a combined production capacity of 

2,500-3,000 metric tons per year. In addition, there were 3

	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

munitions-filling lines at Samarra, 3 precursor plants at 

Habbaniyah, and 30 storage bunkers scattered throughout the 


	Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions 

filling; all three were destroyed. At least one of these buildings 

may have been empty at the time of its destruction, raising the 

possibility that Iraq has retained at least part of its chemical 

munitions filling capability. All three precursor production 

facilities were destroyed at Habbaniyah. To produce CW agents,

Iraq now must import almost all of its precursor chemicals.

	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

	Iraq is believed to have stored its CW munitions in 8 

cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 S-shaped bunkers at 14 other 

locations. Of the eight cruciform bunkers, one was destroyed and 

the remaining seven sustained apparently only superficial damage. 

Of the 225-shaped bunkers, 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered 

serious damage. Iraq does not need to reproduce the 225-shaped 

bunkers to reconstitute a CW storage capability because chemical 

weapons can be stored in virtually any secure building or bunker.

	The objective of preventing production of chemical agents and

additional chemical weapons was not totally achieved. 

Nevertheless, CW

	[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

agent production has been severely degraded, with about 70 percent 

of Samarra's production capacity destroyed. The equipment 

necessary to produce 50-70 metric tons of nerve agent per month 

and about 5 metric tons of precursor material or mustard agent per 

month remain intact at Samarra - assuming electric power, 

precursor chemicals, and personnel are available.

	Iraq would need at least 3-5 years and several hundred 


dollars to restore the Samarra facility to its prewar status. To 

rebuild the three Habbaniyah facilities would take $200-400 

million and 3-5 years, assuming Iraq has access to the required 

materials on the international market.

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