Environmental Factors & Other Related Topics
Eyewitness accounts from numerous personnel, as well as notations in NMCB-24 command logs, relate the presence of ammonia and sulfur odors in the air and give a general impression of Al Jubayl's environment. Some of these accounts are cited below:
A Boatswains Mate Third Class (BM3) assigned to Port Security Unit (PSU) 301-B said that Al Jubayl was the dirtiest port he had ever seen. He attributed this to smoke from the oil well fires in Kuwait, crude oil floating in the water, and the various industrial plants located in the area.[60]
A Port Securityman Second Class (PS2), assigned to PSU-301-B, recalls the heavy concentration of black smoke from the oil well fires: "Sometimes the smoke layer was so heavy it would obliterate the sun." When asked about the general conditions of Al Jubayl, he indicated that the port was as clean or cleaner than many ports he has seen in the United States.[61]
A Chief Builder (BUC) assigned to NMCB-24 stated that the "Camp 13 area smelled like a giant Port-O-Let (portable toilet)."[62]
During the pre-deployment phase of ODS/DS, military planners became aware of the heavy concentration of industry in Al Jubayl. The large number of industrial complexes located within a relatively small geographic area was of special concern. Many of these facilities used, produced, or stored industrial chemicals that could pose a serious health risk to military personnel, if they were exposed. The large number of personnel and equipment that were scheduled to deploy and redeploy through Al Jubayl compounded the problem.
Beginning early in the deployment phase of Desert Shield and continuing through the post Gulf War period, the issue of exposure to toxic industrial chemicals in the city of Al Jubayl was an item of concern to the IMEF command element. As a result, several studies (which are cited throughout this section) were conducted to determine the state of day-to-day environmental protective actions taken by the Saudi government; to identify the chemicals involved; and to determine what action(s), if any, could be taken to reduce the likelihood of a large scale chemical exposure.
Despite its heavy industrialization, studies have confirmed that the Saudi Arabian Government had stringent environmental standards in place long before the commencement of ODS/DS. The city of Al Jubayl, together with Yanbu, "are believed to be among the most environmentally clean of any comparable urban concentrations in the world."[63] Within the Kingdom, environmental protection standards were developed by the Saudi Meteorological and Environmental Protection Agency (MEPA). Enforcement of these standards was the responsibility of a Royal Commission that was established to oversee operations within Al Jubayl and the surrounding area (see Tab F). It has been reported that the Saudi environmental standards parallel those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).[64] A comparison of a small portion of U.S. EPA and Saudi (the Royal Commission) Air Quality Standards are provided in Table 1.[65]
Table 1. Comparison of a Cross-section of U.S. and Saudi Environmental Standards
Pollutant | Time |
U.S. |
Saudi |
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2); |
1 hour |
NA |
.49 |
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) |
1 hour |
NA 1 |
.30 |
Nitrogen Oxide (NO2) |
1 hour |
NA |
.35 |
Ozone (O3) | 1 hour |
.12 |
.12 |
NMOC | 0600-0900 |
NA 2 |
.25 |
Carbon Monoxide (CO) |
1 hour |
35.0 |
35.0 |
ISP PM10 3 | 24 hours |
150 (ug/m3)
|
150 (ug/m3) |
Lead 3 (Pb) | 3 months |
1.5 (ug/m3) |
1.5 (ug/m3) |
1. No Federal Standard has been established. However, the State of California established an individual state standard of .03.
2. No Federal Standard has been established. However, the State of New York established an individual state standard of .24.
3. Standards are expressed in micrograms per cubic meter.
The Saudi Arabian Government strictly monitored and enforced environmental standards and closely controlled the licensing of businesses within the Kingdom. This was done mainly for social and religious reasons, but the Saudis also recognized the need to maintain a strong environmental protection program.
Before any business could establish an industrial operation in Al Jubayl, it had to prove that its facility could adhere to established environmental and pollution control standards. The Saudi government required businesses to submit an Environmental Evaluation Report (EER). For example, the applications for several paper mills were rejected because the applicants could not demonstrate the ability to comply with environmental and pollution regulations. Obtaining a license did not signify an end to a businesss compliance responsibilities -- it was only the beginning. In order to ensure compliance, businesses that established operations were subject to continuous monitoring.
As a result of their efforts, the United Nations awarded the Saudi Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu the "Sasakawa Award" in 1988 for their "excellent planning and implementation of environmentally sound management of the two industrial complexes."[66]
Analysis of Industries Located in Al Jubayl
Prior to the Gulf War, the Center for Naval Analysis conducted for IMEF a detailed analysis of every industry located in Al Jubayl.[67] The study identified each industrial plant that produced, used, or stored potentially dangerous chemicals, as well as the names of the individual chemicals involved. The location of these industrial plants is shown in Figure 11. This study also included the development of several exposure scenarios simulating the leakage of chemicals due to sabotage or direct destruction. Table 2 identifies the primary industrial complexes and the industrial chemicals they use or produce.[68]
Figure 11. Identification of Industrial Plants Located in Al Jubayl
Table 2. List of the Primary Industrial Chemicals Found in Al Jubayl
Chemicals Found Within Al Jubayl City |
||
Name of Complex | Chemical | Hazard |
Saudi Methanol Co. | Methanol | Highly Flammable Liquid |
Gas | Nitrogen Oxygen |
Asphyxiant gas Increases Fire Risk |
Fertilizer 1 (Ibn baytar) |
Anhydrous Ammonia | Toxic liquefied gas |
Sabic (Ibn Hayyan) |
Caustic Solution Chlorine Ethylene dichloride Hydrochloric acid Vinyl chloride monomer |
Corrosive liquid Toxic liquefied gas Highly flammable liquid Corrosive liquid Flammable gas |
Sabic (Ibn Sina) |
Methanol | Highly flammable liquid |
Sabic (Ibn Zahr) |
Butane Isobutane Butane-2 Methanol Methyl t-butyl ethanol |
Flammable liquefied gas Flammable liquefied gas Flammable liquefied gas Highly flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid |
Al Jubail Petro-chemical Co (Kemya) |
Butane-1 Hexane-1 |
Flammable liquefied gas Highly flammable liquid |
Arabian Petrochemical Co | Caustic Solution Diethylamine Ethylene |
Corrosive liquid Highly flammable liquid Flammable gas |
Arabian Petrochemical Co (cont.) | Propane Wash Oil |
Flammable gas Flammable liquid |
Petromin Shell | Benzene Caustic solution Di-isopropanolamine Gasoline Kerosene Oils, low volatility Naptha Sulfur, molten |
Highly flammable liquid Corrosive liquid Flammable liquid when dissolved in water. Highly flammable liquid Flammable liquid Flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid Flammable liquid at high temperature |
Saudi Petrochemical Co. Benzene
Highly flammable liquid (Sadaf) |
Caustic Solution Chlorine Ethanol Ethyl benzene Ethylene Ethylene dichloride Hydrochloric acid Oils, low volatility Phosphoric acid Propane Styrene Sulfuric acid |
Corrosive liquid Toxic gas Highly flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid Corrosive liquid Flammable liquid Corrosive liquid Flammable gas Highly flammable liquid Corrosive liquid |
Al Jubayl Fertilizer Co. (Samad) |
Anhydrous ammonia | Toxic gas |
Eastern Petrochemical Co.
Monoeyhylene glycol Flammable liquid (Sharaq) |
Dietheylene glycol Triethylene glycol Vinyl chloride monomer Ethylene Styrene Ethyl alcohol Methanol Ethylene dichloride Ammonia Caustic solution Ethylene glycol |
Flammable liquid Flammable liquid Flammable gas Flammable gas Highly flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid Highly flammable liquid Toxic gas Corrosive liquid Flammable liquid |
After the industrial chemicals were identified, they were grouped into three different classifications. Flammable substances, which encompassed the majority of the chemicals identified, were classified as Petrochemicals; ammonia and chlorine were classified as Toxic gases; and the remaining chemicals were classified as Corrosive liquids. Corrosive liquids received no further attention.
The petrochemical companies located in Al Jubayl had disaster plans in place, and possessed varying capabilities to deal with explosions, leaks, etc. It was reported, however, that an explosion of a petroleum storage tank would have had serious consequences. Due to the percussion or impact of the explosion itself, extreme heat generated by the ensuing fire, and the rapid consumption of oxygen at ground level by the fireball, anyone within 500 feet of the blast would not have survived. Beyond the 500 foot zone the danger would have come from smoke, sulfur compounds, and airborne acids. In addition to explosion, a second danger would have been direct exposure to the petrochemicals themselves. This hazard would most likely have been the result of a major liquid petrochemical spill. [69]
Toxic chemicals (gaseous forms) were the second category of hazardous substances to be studied. As with their petrochemical company counterparts, each company that dealt with toxic chemicals reportedly had disaster preparedness plans. Three toxic substances were studied: ammonia, chlorine, and hydrogen sulfide. Each is discussed separately in the following paragraphs.
Ammonia was stored at facilities located in both the city and at the port. Two companies stored ammonia in the city -- Fertilizer 1 and the Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company. Both companies reportedly reduced their holdings at the beginning of the Gulf crisis. For example, before the crisis Fertilizer 1 normally stored 22,000 metric tons (MT) of ammonia but reduced their holdings to 1,000-8,000 MT as the crisis progressed. The Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company stored up to 5,000 MT. When the quantity being stored reached 5,000 MT, the excess would be transferred to Fertilizer 1s tanks. The largest ammonia storage facility, operated by Fertilizer 1, was located in the port area. Their holdings at the port ranged between 5,000 to 20,000 MT between shipments, which normally occurred every two or three weeks.
Chlorine was located only within the industrial area of the city. The Saudi Petrochemical Company stored most of the chlorine. They voluntarily reduced their holdings to 110,000 MT at the beginning of the crisis.
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) was the third toxic gas that could have been injurious to coalition forces. H2S could have emanated from any one of the numerous oil wells that dotted the area, or any one of the many oil pipelines that crisscrossed the area. If a pipeline or well head developed a leak or burst, H2S could have been released into the environment.
Would the M17A1 mask and MOPP suit have protected individuals if they had been exposed to petrochemicals or any of the aforementioned toxic gases? According to the U.S. Armys Field Manual 3-4, the M17A1 mask, when properly fitted, would have protected individuals against field concentrations of all known chemical and biological agents in vapor or aerosol form. The M17A1 mask would not have protected individuals from ammonia. When the oxygen level in the air is displaced by another gas (e.g., the air becomes saturated with chlorine after a rupture in a chlorine storage tank), the mask would not have protected the wearer. The MOPP suit, more commonly referred to as a Battledress Overgarment, would have protected the wearer against contact with chemical agent vapors, aerosols, and droplets of liquids. It was noted, however, that neither the mask nor MOPP suit could have provided protection if the air became saturated with either gas. Finally, both the mask and MOPP suit would have provided protection from exposure to hydrogen sulfide.[70]
Considering the findings of the original studies, contacts between representatives of IMEF and local officials were made in order to determine what actions could be taken to reduce the risk of exposure. At that time, IMEF representatives learned that businesses in Al Jubayl had voluntarily reduced their holdings of toxic substances at the beginning of ODS/DS. These meetings were also useful because they provided a forum to build a spirit of cooperation among the various parties involved. As a result, plans were developed that ensured proper notification of military authorities in the event of a disaster. These plans also included mutual aid agreements which would have involved military resources should the need arise.
Many Gulf War Veterans deployed in Al Jubayl have expressed concern about the substances they could have been exposed to in such a heavily industrialized environment. The environmental data included in this narrative indicates that Al Jubayl is no worse (or better) than comparable industrialized sites in the United States. Environmental standards were in place in Al Jubayl, but chemical substances could have been inadvertanlty released-- causing the T-Shirts to turn purple and causing the Seabees to seek medical attention. That noxious could reported at Camp 13 could well have been such a release. The release could have come from the fertilizer plant (or some other nearby factory). We continue to search for information that will shed light on its origin.