File: 970613_ww32_90c_D_txt_0001.txt
Page: 0001
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[b.2.] /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ SUBJECT: AFMIC SPECIAL WEEKLY WIRE 32-90(C) (U) 1. (U) GENERAL (U) THIS MESSAGE CONSISTS OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, 4ND GENERAL MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE. IT IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A TIMELY SUMMARY OF CURRENT DISEASE INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSES. THE REMARKS ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT AN AGREED DOD POSITION. CLINICAL REVIEW HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE AFMIC-SG, [b.6.] 2. (U) THIS SPECIAL WIRE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION AND FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE ON A SUBJECT OF CURRENT INTEREST. 3. TABLE OF CONTENTS A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) CAPABILITIES B. IRAQ: LASER ASSESSMENT C. IRAQ: MEDICAL IMPACT OF AGENT GF D. IRAQ: MILITARY MEDICAL ASSESSMENT 4. INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CBW) CAPABILITIES AFMIC ANALYSTS ASSESS THAT IRAQ HAS A MATURE OFFENSIVE BW PROGRAM. SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF BOTULINUM TOXIN LIKELY HAVE BEEN PRODUCED AND PROBABLY ARE WEAPONIZED. IN ADDITION, BACILLUS ANTHRACIS (ANTHRAX), VIBRIO CHOLERAE (CHOLERA), STAPHYLOCOCCUS ENTEROTOXIN B (SEB), AND CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS BACTERIA OR ITS TOXIN MAY BE IN THE ADVANCED STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OR AVAILABLE FOR WEAPONIZATION. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] IRAQI FORCES USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. IT IS ASSESSED THAT IRAQI FORCES WILL USE BW ONLY AS A LAST RESORT. THE BW RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION FACILITY AT SALMAN PAK (33-04-30N 44-35-01E) IS BELIEVED TO BE THE MAJOR PRODUCTION AND STORAGE FACILITY FOR BW IN IRAQ. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] THE IRAQI ARMY FACILITY AT TAJI (33-31-40N 44-16-20E), A FACILITY AT ABU GHURAYB (EAST OF BAGHDAD), AND THE IRAQI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FACILITY AT TUWAITHA (NEAR BAGHDAD) ALSO ARE SUSPECTED OF ENGAGING IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND POSSIBLY PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS. AGENT TESTING HAS BEEN REPORTED AT A FACILITY LOCATED IN THE MARSHES SOUTHEAST OF AN NASIRIYAH (31-02-41N 46-16-21E). VARIOUS MECHANISMS ARE AVAILABLE TO IRAQ FOR DISSEMINATION OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS: AEROSOL GENERATORS WHICH CAN BE TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK, BOAT, HELICOPTER, AND OTHER CONVEYANCES; CLUSTER BOMBS; SPRAY TANKS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT; ARTILLERY SHELLS; AND VARIOUS MISSILES. THE USE OF SUBMUNITIONS FOR INCREASED AREA COVERAGE IS LIKELY. IRAQ IS NOT EXPECTED TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN AREAS OF CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THEIR OWN TROOPS. THESE WEAPONS LIKELY WILL BE DEPLOYED AT NIGHT OR IN THE EARLY MORNING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS PROBABLY WILL BE DELIVERED IN AEROSOL FORM. MASKS ALONE PROBABLY WILL OFFER SUFFICIENT PROTECTION AGAINST KNOWN AEROSOLIZED WET OR DRY BW AGENTS; HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY FOR RE-AEROSOLIZATION OF THE AGENT EXISTS. COMPLETE DECONTAMINATION BEFORE MASK REMOVAL IS CRITICAL. DELIVERY OF BIOLOGICAL TOXINS OR INFECTIOUS AGENTS BOUND TO A SILICA MATRIX [b.1. sec. 1.5.(a)] MAY BE WITHIN IRAQI CAPABILITY. SUCH AN AGENT POSSIBLY COULD WORK ITS WAY THROUGH THE FABRIC OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND BECOME IMBEDDED IN THE SKIN. [b.6.] B. IRAQ: LASER ASSESSMENT ) IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT LASER EYE INJURIES OCCURRED IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, BASED ON NUMEROUS REPORTS OF SUCH INJURIES AND THE KNOWN PURCHASE OF LASERS FOR THE IMPLIED PURPOSE OF WEAPONIZATION. THE TYPES OF LASERS PURCHASED ARE AMENABLE TO ANTIPERSONNEL OR ANTISENSOR APPLICATIONS. THE INJURIES, DESCRIBED AS RETINAL BURNS AND HEMORRHAGES, REPORTEDLY WERE CAUSED BY A LASER DEVICE ASSOCIATED WITH IRAQI TANKS. THE REPORTED INJURIES COULD HAVE BEEN INFLICTED BY A VISIBLE OR NEAR- INFRARED LASER, MOST LIKELY A TANK-MOUNTED RUBY OR NEODYMIUM/GLASS LASER RANGEFINDER. OUR OVERALL ASSESSMENT IS THAT LASER EYE INJURIES PROBABLY OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF TANK-MOUNTED LASER RANGEFINDERS OR OTHER LASER SYSTEMS. THESE SYSTEMS POSSIBLY WERE USED IN AN OFFENSIVE, ANTIPERSONNEL MODE, WITH THE EXPLICIT PURPOSE OF BLINDING TROOPS. HAND-HELD LASER RANGEFINDERS AND DESIGNATORS ASSOCIATED WITH ARMOR OR ARTILLERY COULD BE USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DAZZLE, DISORIENT, OR BLIND PERSONNEL IN LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT (FIXED AND ROTOR WING). LASERS ALSO HAVE BEEN PURCHASED BY IRAQ PRESUMABLY FOR MILITARY APPLICATION. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] REPORTED THAT IRAQ FIELDED THESE LASERS AS ANTISENSOR OR ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS; HOWEVER, NO [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] CONFIRMATION EXISTS TO SUPPORT THIS REPORT. [b.6.] C. IRAQ: MEDICAL IMPACT OF AGENT GF [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] CLAIMED THAT AGENT GF (CYCLOHEXYLMETHYLPHOSPHONOFLUORIDATE) WAS USED BY THE IRAQIS DURING THE AL-FAW OFFENSIVE. THIS REPRESENTED THE FIRST REPORTED USE OF GF IN COMBAT. IRAQ LAUNCHED MORE THAN 1,500 ROCKETS CONTAINING SARIN (GB) AND GF ON THE IRANIAN TROOPS DURING THE 2-DAY ATTACK, CAUSING AN ESTIMATED 5,000 CASUALTIES AND MASS FLIGHT OF IRANIAN TROOPS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD (A PHENOMENON THAT DID NOT OCCUR IN EARLIER BATTLES). GF IS A "G" SERIES NERVE AGENT PREVIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE U.S. THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS, THERAPY, AND METHODS OF PROTECTION AND DETECTION ARE THE SAME AS FOR SARIN. SOAP AND WATER IS RECOMMENDED /****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/ FOR DECONTAMINATION. THE EFFECTS OF GF DIFFER FROM SARIN IN TWO MAJOR RESPECTS: GF IS MORE PERSISTENT AND MORE READILY ABSORBED THROUGH THE SKIN. GF IS A LIQUID AGENT THAT WILL REMAIN IN THE TARGET AREA FOR SEVERAL HOURS (AT 20 DEGREES CENTIGRADE, VAPOR PRESSURE IS 0.06 MILLIMETERS AND VOLATILITY IS 600 MILLIGRAMS/CUBIC METER), WHILE SARIN WILL DISSIPATE IN A FEW MINUTES (VAPOR PRESSURE 2,200 MILLIMETERS AT 25 DEGREES CENTIGRADE AND VOLATILITY 40.000 MILLIGRAMS/CUBIC METER AT 35 DEGREES CENTIGRADE) AT THE TEMPERATURES FOUND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. GF IS NOT AS TOXIC AS SARIN BY INHALATION, BUT IS MORE TOXIC BY PERCUTANEOUS ABSORPTION (ESTIMATED PERCUTANEOUS LETHAL DOSE 50 FOR GF IS 45 TO 50 MILLIGRAMS/90 KILOGRAM MAN, AND FOR SARIN IS 1,700 TO 3,500 MILLIGRAMS/MAN). BASED ON THE SEVERAL-HOUR PERSISTENCE OF GF, WE BELIEVE THIS AGENT WOULD BE USED IN AREAS THAT ARE NOT TARGETED FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION. HOWEVER, SINCE GF WILL ONLY PERSIST IN THE AREA FOR HOURS, WE ASSESS THAT THE AGENT WOULD LIKELY BE USED ON TARGETS IRAQ INTENDS TO OCCUPY WITHIN ONE DAY. SINCE THE PERSISTENCE OF GF WILL NECESSITATE THAT FORCES REMAIN IN PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR FOR LONGER PERIODS THAN FOR SARIN, PERSONNEL WILL EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT HEAT STRESS AND DEGRADATION OF PERFORMANCE. [b.6.] [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]?| First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Back to Text |