File: 961031_950811_006me_94.txt
Page: 94
Total Pages: 1
Responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94 Filename:006me.94 2 Mar 94 From: DIA/PAGAlD To: ASD(AE) Subj: Responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94 The following responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94 are provided for review and forvarding to [ (b)(6) ] ASDaPRfaIRM). Q1. What constituted the Iraqi chemical/biological arsenal? Chemical A: Iraq was assessed to,possess roughly 1000 MT of chemical agent equally split between the blister agent mustard and the nerve agents sarin (GB) and GF. Small amounts (tens of tons) of the persistent nerve agent VX were assessed as probably available. The nerve agent soman (GD) and the psychochemical BZ were assessed to be in the R&D stage. Much of the above 1000 MT of agent was assessed to be weaponized in the following munitions with the remainder stored as bulk agent: Artillery Mortars Aerial Missiles 155mm * 82mm 25Okg bomb SCUD 152mm 120mm SoOkg bomb Al Husayn 130mm Cluster bombsAl Abbas 122mm rocket * 90 mm rocket Note: (1) * Preferred weapon for artillery (2) Landmines were assessed as possible. (3) Frog missiles are capable of CW delivery but no evidence existed for such a warhead in Iraq. (4) The above table and notes are Biological A: Biological agents assessed to have been developed by Iraq are Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax; botulinum toxin; and Clostridium perfringens. assessed that Iraq had weaponized Bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin in missile warheads and aerial bombs. The number of BWafilled munitions held by Iraq is unknown. Q2. What were Iraq's chemical/biological capabilities, including ability to produce, deliver and weaponize biological agents? Chemical A: Iraq was assessed to be capable of producing as much as 300 MT. .of chemical agent per month equally divided between mustard and nerve agent. This production took place at the enormous $amarra CW facility about 60 Em northwest of Baghdad. Historically- Iraq had purchased empty napalm and white phosphorus munitions which it filled with CW. However, there were many reports that Iraq was purchasing equipment to indigenous ly produce many of the above munitions. As a result, it was fairly safe to assume that Iraqi CW munitions were a combination of both imported and indigenously produced munitions. Finally, Iraq was capable of delivering CW with munitions listed in Ql. Biological Iraq was producing biological warfare (BW) agents at the Salman Pak BW facility, located approximately 32 km southeast of Baghdad. Other sites suspected of producing BW agents were the Taji suspect BW Facility just north of Baghdad, the Abu Ghurayb Vaccine Plant, Al Kindi in the west Baghdad suburbs, and a plant at Latif iyah, within the Al QaQaa Military Complex just southwest of Baghdad. Iraq had the capability to deliver BW munitions by aircraft or by missile. Q3. Where were these chemical/biological agents stored? In what form were they stored? Chemical and Biological A: At least 22 sites, located all over Iraq, were identified as suspected chemical and biological agent storage areas. This number does not include additional sites where chemical and biological weapons were assessed to be produced. With the exception of two suspect storage locations these sites were all attacked. All sites attacked were either significantly damaged or destroyed. As stated above, much of the Iraqi CW agent was believed, to be weaponized and stored in the munitions listed in Q1. Assessed BW agents' would have been stored as liquids or solids either in bulk or in munitions. It was not" known to what extent the BW agent stocks were weaponized, but. Iraq was assessed to have BW bombs. and SCUD warheads. Q4. Were any biological agents stored in the sites bombed by Allied Forces? A: There is insufficient information to determine if BW agents were stored in the sites referenced in Q3 which were bombed by coalition forces. It is known however that Iraq moved key BW agent production equipment out of $alman Pak, Taji, Abu Ghurayb and Latif iyah prior to bombing of those sites. We assess that BW agents a& as well as some CW production and filling equipment from Samarra AA also were moved from these sites to unknown locations. Q5. Could any chemical/biological agents have been accidently or purposefully released? Chemical A: Regarding chemical agents, there is no intelligence that indicates CW was accidently released. However the evidence surrounding the Czech detection of 19 and 24 Jan 9l, i.e. the meteorological conditions, the low concentration and short duration of the detection, the extremely localized area affected, the absence of other detections by other units nearby, the topography of the area and the fact that no military action took place anywhere near the area allow us to rule out the possibility that the agents detected were released as a result of combat operations. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Biological A: At this juncture, there is no intelligence information that BW agents were accidentally or purposefully released during the Persian Gulf War. Additionaly, the effects of any such releases were not observed either in Iraqi civilian or military populations or in coalition forces or civilian populations. In our opinion, no such incident could have occurred without animal and human casualties. Q6. Could biological/chemical agents stored in Iraqi sites bombed by Allied forces have been carried by wind patterns to troop locations? Chemical and Biological A: Based on meteorological data, the distance from Iraqi CBW sites to Allied positions, the fact that no Iraqi or Coalition CBW casualties (military, civilian or animal) were observed between the bombed sites and troop locations, and that no conf irmed detections of CBW were made, we assess that CBW agents were not carried by wind to troop locations. As stated in QS, we believe that no such incident could occur without related casualties or conf irmations of the presence of agent. Q7. What were US/Allied forces capability in detecting biological agents? When were these detection capabilities deployed? A: There were three countries that fielded biological detection capabilities, US, UK, CA. Canada had the simplest capability, which was comprised of one or several mobile aerosol detection stations. Each station had an aerosol particle sampler (APS) designed to detect increases in the amount of respirable particles in the air. A diagnostic lab would then be used to identify suspect air samples. The UK fielded roughly eight mobile BW reconnaissance systems. This system included a range rover as a platform, APS, an enzyme based manual test to determine the presence of biological material vs. dust in air samples, and an immunodiagnostic machine for identifying BW agents. The US detection capability and when the equipment was deployed will be addressed by Operational Forces. Q15. What is/was known to DoD about Iraqi chemical/biological capabilities based on US export licenses to Iraq? A: Prior to Desert Storm, the CBW intelligence community did not routinely review export license applications. Additionally, nearly all of the equipment, seed stocks, or precursor chemicals imported by Iraq have legitimate civilian uses and, at the time, would very likely have been approved. Today, a much more stringent review regime is in place. APPENDIX I Salman Pak BW Facility 33-l9-26N/O44-lO-22E R&D, storage and Production (Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, Clostridium perfringens) Taji suspect BW Production Facility 33-33-l6n/044-l7-46E Possible site of anthrax spore production Abu Ghurayb Vaccine Plant, Al Hindi 33-l8'-28N/O44-l5-49E Probable site of botulinum toxin production Latifiyah 33-OO-56n/O44-l3-l7E Possible Production (agent unknown) Abu Ghurayb suspect BW Facility 33-l9-26N/044-lO-22E Possible Production and Munition filling Note: The Iraqis reportedly were not successful in filling artillery shells with BW agents at this site. APPENDIX II BW TARGETS ATTACKED DURING DESERT STORM Facility Geo Coords Date Salman Pak BW Research and Production (#) 335ON 04348E 1/17 Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production 3319N 04410E 1/23 Abu Ghurayb BW Production 3318N 04412E 2/3* Taji Suspect BW Storage 3330N 04414E - 2/l0* Taji Suspect BW Production 3333N 04418E 2/8* Latifiyah Suspect BW Production 330lN 04413E 2/8* KEY: (#) Multiple Targets, Multiple Attack Dates * Approximate date of attack Note: 12-Frame Storage Bunkers bombed are denoted on DIA list CBW Targets Attacked During Desert Storm" furnished to Dr. Deutch'S office by [ b.6. ] | First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Back to Text |