SENATOR SHELBY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF SYNDROME (Senate - March 17, 1994)
[Page: S3102]
On January 9, the Codel traveled to Cairo, Egypt. While in Cairo, the Codel received a country team briefing from U.S. Embassy personnel. Senator Shelby met with President Mubarak.
On January 10, the Codel met with Lieutenant General Salah Halaby, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces, and his staff. General Halaby advised the Codel that Egypt had its own chemical defense unit, which was very good, but he had no recollection that they had detected any chemical agents during the Persian Gulf War.
General Halaby indicated that Egypt's chemical defense equipment is from Eastern Europe and from the West, and that their detection equipment is more sophisticated than the Czech equipment. The Egyptians use an American chemical agent alarm (the M-1) and a Russian chemical agent detector (the bulb and probe). The Egyptians also use chemical agent detection strips. He further indicated that the Egyptian chemical defense unit took air samples every day and night to check for changes.
He suggested that the chemicals detected were not chemical warfare agents, but industrial chemicals or substances used in the construction and structure of the A-10 aircraft. (An A-10 crashed near KKMC during the time frame when the KKMC detections were made). He did not believe the aircraft carried chemical weapons or chemical agents.
General Halaby and his staff commented that Egypt has no chemical weapons, only chemical defense equipment (protective gear). He said that, although Egyptian troops conduct chemical defense training, they do not use chemical stimulants in their training other than tear gas. General Halaby was not aware of the Syrians having had chemical agents/weapons in the theater. He was certain that no Iraqi aircraft or artillery (which could have been used to deliver chemical agents) had crossed the border.
He asked whether the illnesses suffered by the U.S. troops resulted from their exposure to depleted uranium.
The Egyptian troops were located approximately 6 miles north of the French troops in KKMC. At one point, General Halaby said they were not aware of the detection of chemical agent by the Czech chemical defense unit, but later in the interview, he acknowledged that they were aware of the detections but did not verify any chemical agents or equipment. General Halaby commented that he knew that chemical agent alarms could be tripped off by cigarette smoke. He suggested that the French and Czech detections could have been false alarms because the atmosphere was so full of petrochemical smoke.
President Mubarak
President Mubarak acknowledged that Egypt has some chemical weapons. He speculated that perhaps the chemical agents about which the Codel was concerned came from Iran. He then discussed with Senator Shelby general foreign policy issues related to U.S. relations with Egypt, the peace process between Israel and Syria, as well as Egypt's relations with Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War.
In Jerusalem, the Codel met with an intelligence officer of the Israeli Defense Force. He indicated that he was aware of chemical agents being used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and did not understand why they were not used in the Gulf War. He believed that it was very significant that no chemical weapons or delivery systems were found in theater following the war. He surmised that there had been no preparation for their use or they were withdrawn prior to D-Day.
The Israeli Officer indicated that he did not believe the Iraqis had a chemical weapons project underway but cautioned that they could restart one at any moment.
The Israeli Officer also noted that the symptoms of the Persian Gulf Illness did not fit any of the symptoms traditionally associated with exposure to chemical agents. He offered that, perhaps, the United States should focus some attention on biological agents. He was convinced that the Iraqis had a small biological weapons capability but indicated that no biological weapons or delivery systems had been found.
He indicated that the Israelis believed the Czech chemical units to be very proficient and that their equipment is very good. He noted, however, the prevalence of false alarms.
He suggested that we study the symptoms of those exposed to chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War and that we discuss the Persian Gulf Syndrome with Iranian doctors.
Contrary to information provided to the Codel in other countries, the Israeli Officer indicated that all the Coalition forces, especially Egypt and Syria use chemical agent simulants in their training.
On January 13, the Codel traveled to Rabat, Morocco. In preparation for our meetings with Moroccan government officials, the U.S. Embassy conducted a country team briefing and informed us that during the Persian Gulf War, Morocco and Saudi Arabia had a bilateral agreement which placed Moroccan military personnel under the authority of the Saudi military. Morocco sent a motorized infantry unit from the Western Sahara to the vicinity a petrochemical facility north of Jubail about 50 kilometers from the Kuwait border.
In Rabat, the Codel met with Colonel Major Mohamed Beuboumaudi, Inspector, Military Health Services. He indicated that no Moroccan military personnel saw any chemical weapons or equipment. He mentioned that, on one occasion, his troops went to check the location in which an artillery shell exploded for chemical agent. There were no indications of any chemical agents present.
The Moroccan troops did not experience any illnesses symptomatic of exposure to chemical agents. Additionally, he pointed out that Moroccan troops were acclimated to service in the desert. The inference here being the possible psychological or environmental origin of the Persian Gulf Syndrome.
With regard to the origin of Moroccan military chemical defense equipment, he indicated that they used chemical detection badges and gas masks provided by the Saudi military. He noted that Morocco was a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CC).
In response to questions regarding the presence of chemical agents or weapons in the theater of operations, and knowledge as to whether coalition allies possessed chemical weapons or agents, Colonel Major Beudoumaudi provided negative responses. He indicated that he was not aware of Moroccan troops participating in chemical defense training with simulants during the Persian Gulf War.
The Codel also met with deputy minister of foreign affairs, who reiterated the comments made by Colonel Major Beudoumaudi regarding the Morocco military personnel's not being aware of the presence of chemical weapons/agent in the theater of operations and not having any knowledge of other coalition allies in possession of chemical weapons/agent in the theater of operation.
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After numerous Congressional hearings, after many meetings with official of the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans officials and after two trips abroad I have come to the following conclusions regarding the possible presence of chemical/biological weapons agents in the theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, and possible connection between service in the Persian Gulf War and the illness among U.S. veterans referred to as the Persian Gulf Syndrome.
1. Chemical agents were present in the theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War. These chemical agents were accurately verified by the Czech Chemical Units and reported to CENTCOM Headquarters.
On this vital issue I have no doubt. Czech and French forces detected both nerve gas and mustard agent at low levels during the early days of Desert Storm. In each instance these chemical agents were verified by Czech equipment. The Codel had the opportunity to view this equipment and received a demonstration. Department of Defense officials have informed us that the Czech detection equipment, which is more sensitive than U.S. equipment, is more than adequate and that Czech personnel are well trained.
2. The origin of these chemical agents cannot be determined.
Although I have also concluded that we may never be able to determine the origin of these chemical agents there are several plausible scenarios. I believe that we can rule out Iraqi Scud or Frog missiles. We can also rule out Iraqi artillery--the distance from the Iraqi border is too far. The presence of low-level chemical weapons agents could have resulted from U.S. or coalition forces bombing either Iraqi chemical weapons facilities or caches of Iraqi weapons on the Saudi border. Hafar-Al-Batin is approximately 100 miles from the Saudi/Iraqi border. A cloud of nerve agent, dissipating in intensity, could possibly have traveled under the correct climate conditions to Hafar-Al-Batin. There is also the possibility of an accident involving chemical agents among coalition forces. Finally, it has been offered that these detections, especially those in Hafar-Al-Batin and the detection of the mustard agent on the ground north of KKMC, were the result of Saudi Officials attempting to test the abilities of the Czechs who they had engaged to assist Saudi troops in chemical detections.
3. While a direct connection between the existence of low-levels of chemical agents in the theater of operations and the Persian Gulf Syndrome cannot be established based on the information available at this time, such a connection cannot and should not be discounted.
This is the most difficult issue that confronted my investigation. There is very little information available on studies of exposure to low-levels of chemical agents. I am confident that the work being accomplished under Major General Ronald Blanck, USA, Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center is on the right track. I urge the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to finalize a case definition for the Gulf War Syndrome. The Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs should initiate a serious project which focuses on the long term effects of exposure to low-levels of chemical agents. Additionally, the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs must cut through bureaucratic red tape and seek all possible medical treatments for the Gulf War Syndrome.