SENATOR SHELBY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF SYNDROME (Senate - March 17, 1994)
[Page: S3105]
On January 3, 1994, I, accompanied again by Maj. Gen. Ronald Blanck, staff members from both my personal office and the Committee on Armed Services, left for the Middle East. Our first stop was in Saudi Arabia where we visited Riyadh, KKMC and Jubail and met with several high ranking members of the Saudi Arabian military and civilian representatives of the firms located in the Jubail industrial region.
According to the director of Military Intelligence and Security, on January 19 and 24, 1991, the Czechs chemical detection units detected and verified low levels of nerve agent and mustard agent and reported this to the Saudi Arabian military. In the absence of any evidence of a delivery vehicle (missile, bomb, etc.), the Saudi military determined that these low levels did not pose a threat to the public health or to animals. In addition, he substantiated this claim by explaining that to date, no Saudi military personnel or civilians have complained of illnesses that can be attributed to service in the theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, and the Saudi Arabian government has no evidence of the use of biological agents, even though the United Nations subsequently discovered evidence of research and development on biological agents.
In addition, on January 24, 1991, the French reported the possible detection of chemical agents (the so-called `wet spot' north of KKMC) to the Saudis who did not don protective chemical defense gear, but contacted the Czech chemical detection unit. The Czechs detected and verified the presence of mustard agent on the ground and the incident was reported by the Saudis to CENTCOM Headquarters. U.S. personnel were sent to the area in question but were unable to detect a chemical agent.
Saudi intelligence had no information to offer regarding the possible source of the low-level chemical agents.
The Saudis do not believe the symptoms suffered by the U.S. veterans occurred as a result of exposure to chemical weapons, according to the head of Saudi military intelligence. He said that the Saudis did not have chemical agents or stimulants and was not aware if the other Coalition forces had chemical agents in the theater. He indicated that it is possible that the Egyptians and Syrians could have had chemical agents and/or weapons, but the Saudi military personnel did not have offensive chemical weapons in the area, not did they conduct defensive chemical weapons training. He did, however, believe the reports of the Czech and French detections.
We also met with Mohammed Saleh al Hammad, Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense Education, He had little to offer regarding the subject of our inquiry, but be expressed confidence in the reliability of the Czech and French detections. When asked about the origin of nerve and mustard agents, he said he did not know, but he speculated that they could have come from either friendly or aggressor forces. He also speculated that the U.S. military might have brought it.
On January 6, our group flew to KKMC, where mustard agent had been detected in two locations. The base commander, Major General Al Alhami, indicated that during the war he received no evidence of any detections of chemical agents nor of any medical problems that could be viewed as unusual. He indicated that every time the Iraqis fired SCUDs, all troops donned MOPP chemical protective gear (which includes a full body suit and mask with hood). Additionally, he had no recollection of the French reporting their detection of mustard agent to the KKMC Headquarters, nor any knowledge of the Saudis, U.S., Syrians or any other Coalition forces having chemical agents and/or weapons with their forces during the Persian Gulf War.
On January 6, we travelled to the Jubail Industrial Center to discuss the possibility of industrial chemical releases during the Persian Gulf War. Our group met with Mr. Terry Velanzano of the Jubail Planning Group and a number of officials from the various civilian industrial interests located at Jubail. Most of those with whom we met were present at Jubail during the War.
The industrialists advised us that there were no instances in which industrial chemicals were released either intentionally or unintentionally during the periods of time when coalition forces were located in the Jubail region. The specifically denied the intentional release of chemicals from pressurized systems in response to warnings of SCUD attacks.
In addition, they advised us that there have been no instances of medical ailments among the Jubail work force and their families that could be construed as unusual or in any way linked to chemical agents during the War.
Our group continued its investigation in Damascus, Syria where we met with a series of Syrian military and Foreign Ministry officials. While the Chief of Medical Services initially emphasized that he had no knowledge of Syrian chemical agents, weapons, or of a Syrian chemical defense program, near the end of the meeting, he admitted that Syrian troops conducted chemical defense training, but do not use chemical agents and/or weapons or stimulants in that training and did not conduct any chemical defense exercise training in the theater of operation using chemical agents or chemical stimulants. Later, he told us that Syrian chemical defense equipment was of Eastern European origin.
We were informed that Syrian troops were stationed near Hafir al Batin. He remarked that U.S. troops frequently panicked when the chemical alarms went off. He also indicated that when the Syrian troops responded to the chemical alarms they only put on masks, not protective suits. Furthermore, he advised the Codel that the Syrians were not aware of any coalition allies having chemical weapons in the theater of operation and that, although other Arab countries have chemical weapons, he did not think Syria has chemical weapons. According to him, the Syrians did not know whether the Egyptians or Saudis has been informed of chemical agent detections.
President Mubarak, with whom I met in Cairo, acknowledged that Egypt has some chemical weapons. During our discussion, he speculated that the chemical agents we were concerned about may have come from Iran. Additionally, we discussed foreign policy issues related to U.S. relations with Egypt, the peace process between Israel and Syria, as well as Egypt's relations with Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War.
We also met with Lt. Gen. Salah Halaby, Chief of Staff for the Egyptian Armed Forces, and his staff. Gen. Halaby advised us that Egypt had its own chemical defense unit, which was very good, but he did not recall their having detected any chemical agents during the Persian Gulf War. When asked about the chemical detections that were made, he suggested that they were not chemical warfare agents, but industrial chemicals or substances used in the construction and structure of the A-10 aircraft. An A-10 crashed near KKMC at the approximate time of the KKMC detections; however, he did not believe the aircraft carried chemical weapons or chemical agents.
Lt. Gen. Halaby and his staff commented that Egypt has no chemical weapons, only chemical defense equipment (protective gear). He said although Egyptian troops conduct chemical defense training, they do not use chemical stimulants, with the exception of tear gas, in their training. Gen. Halaby was not aware of the Syrians having had chemical agents/weapons in the theater. He was certain that no Iraqi aircraft or artillery (which could have been used to deliver chemical agents) had crossed the border.
At one point, Lt. Gen. Halaby said they were not aware of the detection of chemical agents by the Czech chemical detection unit, but later in the interview, he acknowledged that they were aware of the detections but did not verify any chemical agents or equipment. Lt. Gen. Halaby commented that he knew that chemical agent alarms could be tripped off by cigarette smoke. He suggested that the French and Czech detections could have been false alarms because the atmosphere was so full of petrochemical smoke.
In Jerusalem, we met with an intelligence officer of the Israeli Defense Force. He indicated that he was aware of chemical agents being used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and did not understand why they were not used in the Gulf War. In addition, he believed that it was very significant that no chemical weapons or delivery systems were found in the theater following the war and he surmised that there had been no preparation for their use or they were withdrawn prior to D-Day. The Israeli Officer indicated that he did not believe that Iraq had a chemical weapons project underway but cautioned that they could restart one at any moment.
He continued by saying that the Israelis believe the Czech chemical detection unit to be very proficient and that their equipment is very good. He noted, however, the prevalence of false alarms. In addition, he suggested that we study the symptoms of those exposed to chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War and discuss the Persian Gulf Syndrome with Iranian doctors. Contrary to information provided to us in other countries, the Israeli Officer indicated that all the Coalition forces, especially Egypt and Syria, use chemical agent stimulants in their training.