CZECH CW REPORT Filename:0401pgf.93 INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE GULF For the Defense Science Board investigating the Desert Storm Syndrome Presented by [ (b)(6) ] [ (b)(2) ] PRINCIPAL ISSUES * WEATHER CONDITIONS FROM THE 17TH THROUGH 19 JANUARY 1991 * CZECH REPORTING * FRENCH REPORTING * COALITION ACTIONS AGAINST CW/BW TARGETS * REPORTS OF EXPOSURE OF COALITION PERSONNEL * DEARTH OF OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND REPORTING CHEMICAL AGENT REPORTING * U.S. REPORTING....M8A1,MM1,M256A1 * FRENCH REPORTING * CZECH REPORTING....[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS * DELIBERATE USE BY THE IRAQIS - OVERT OR COVERT * ACCIDENTAL RELEASES - "LEAKERS" * UNINTENTIONAL RELEASE RESULTING FROM COALITION ACTIONS * DELIBERATE RELEASE UNRELATED TO MILITARY OPERATIONS PARAMETERS OF CZECH DETECTIONS * "ISOLATED" LOCATIONS IN DESERT AREAS * ALL UNITS UNDER SAUDI COMMAND * NO IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TIMING OF DETECTIONS * NO SAMPLES TAKEN FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS * EQUIPMENT, PROCEDURES, AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT ASSESSMENT THAT DETECTIONS ARE CREDIBLE PARAMETERS OF IRAQI TARGETS * AN NASIRIYAH LOCATED 150 MILES FROM HAFR AL BATIN * OTHER TARGETS AROUND BAGHDAD AND NEAR NORTHERN KUWAIT * TARGETS WERE BOMBED ALMOST 48 HOURS BEFORE CZECH DETECTIONS * THERE WERE NO MASS CASUALTIES SURROUNDING THE CW/BW TARGETS WEATHER CONDITIONS JANUARY 1991 * 17TH THRU 19TH: PREVAILING WINDS ARE FROM THE SOUTH-SOUTH EAST * 18TH: OF JANUARY WAS WIDESPREAD PRECIPITATION * 19TH: FRONT MOVED THROUGH THE AREA WITH WINDS VARIABLE DURING MID-DAY * 20TH: WIDE-SPREAD SHOWERS THROUGHOUT AREA CONCLUSIONS * IRAQ DID NOT RELEASE ANY CW OR BW WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION FORCES DURING ANY PHASE OF DS/DS * ANALYSIS OF IRAQI CW AND BW TARGETS INDICATES THAT COALITION ACTIONS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CZECH DETECTIONS * CZECH DETECTIONS OF GB AND H ON TWO OCCASIONS IS CREDIBLE REPORTING * SOURCE OF THE AGENTS DETECTED REMAINS UNKNOWN, BUT THE FACTS INDICATE DELIBERATE AND LIMITED RELEASES IN VERY RESTRICTED AREAS. * THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS ALLEGATIONS OF ANY CW OR BW EXPOSURES BY COALITION BRIEFING FOR THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD DELIBERATIONS ON THE GULF WAR SYNDROME [ (b)(2) ] TOPIC: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN GULF SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: * AT THIS TIME, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL AGENTS WERE EMPLOYED BY THE IRAQI FORCES DURING ANY STAGE OF DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, * AT THIS TIME THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTIONS BY THE CZECH FORCES DURING JANUARY 1991 WERE THE RESULT OF ANY COALITION ACTION(S) AGAINST IRAQI PRODUCTION, FILLING, STORAGE, OR TRANSSHIPMENT SITES, * DETECTION OF SARIN (GB) AGENT BY THE CZECHS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF A SMALL (APPROXIMATELY 4 FLUID OUNCE) RELEASE OF AGENT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE UNIT MAKING THE DETECTION, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO POSITIVE CONFIRMATION, CZECH DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENT MUSTARD (H) APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE CONTAMINATION OF A LIMITED AREA IN A RELATIVELY REMOTE AND ISOLATED LOCATION IN THE DESERT, * AT THIS TIME THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF CONFIRMED CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTIONS BY ANY COALITION MEMBER, * COALITION INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REPORT THERE IS NO INFORMATION OF ANY KIND THAT SUPPORTS THE ALLEGATION THAT CHEMICAL AGENTS AND/OR WEAPONS WERE EVER USED. TEXT: The evaluation of the allegations of chemical agent use during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm by the Intelligence Community has been a thorough and broadly based effort. Elements of the US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], and DIA have collaborated on this effort since late September. A team has been formed which has [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] , to review the data and to meet with the specialists which have first hand information and experience with these matters. In addition, the US Air Force and the US Navy have assisted In providing detailed information on weather conditions during the period of operations which are of interest, and in locating the exact positions of troops on those occasions. The US Army has been extremely helpful in providing logistical information, and also in providing data from log books detailing the communications which dealt with field reporting of chemical agent detections during these periods. DIA has hosted inter-agency meetings at the Defence Intelligence Analysis Center for all parties to have an opportunity to discuss the data and to evaluate theories. This effort, led by DIA, has formed the foundations for the following assessment. The nature of this problem intrinsically involves many variables and uncertainties which combine to create a lens through which it becomes very difficult to focus on the individual elements of information, and consequently can lead to blurred and sometimes erroneous conclusions. The main example of this latter point is association of the reported Czech detection of chemical agents in mid-January 1991 with coalition bombing actions hundreds of miles distant of suspected Iraqi CW/BW sites and alleged exposure of coalition forces to unspecified "low-levels" of chemical agents for undetermined periods of time. The analysis of this difficult Issue therefore has been done In a series of parallel operations. The results of each of these separate efforts have then been overlaid to provide a complete view of the data, Its Interpretation, and subsequent conclusions regarding chemical agent and/or chemical weapons presence In Iraq, and more Importantly in the occupied areas of Iraq and Kuwait as well as Saudi Arabia. This briefing will follow that methodology, and will present each element separately, and then combine those elements into a single macroscopic overview of the region. The principal issues which are discussed In this briefing are: * the prevailing weather conditions prior to the 19th of January, 1991 when the Czech units reported the detection of cholinesterase Inhibiting chemicals, and the determination that one of those detections was In fact the nerve agent GB, * the actual Czech detections for both GB and H in terms of location, situation, reporting, and protocol, * the bombing of suspected or known CW and BW targets during the air campaign against Iraq, * French reporting of chemical agent detection, * the reports of chemical agent detection by US Naval units stationed In Jubayal, and the lack of any physical evidence or confirmed Information relating to the presence and/or use of chemical agents or biological agents during the Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. WEATHER CONDITIONS: During the beginning of the air campaign against Iraq on the 17th of January 1991, the prevailing winds were from the south and east blowing to the north and west. Also during this period a frontal system was moving through the area, and on the 18th of January there was wide spread rain throughout the area. During the 19th the wind directions changed and began blowing from the north and west to the south and east; two days after known/suspect CW and BW targets were struck In Iraq. Following the change in wind direction associated with the frontal system, there were wide spread showers on the 20th. During the period from the beginning of the air campaign until the reports of the Czech units in the desert north and east of Hafr Al Satin the prevailing winds were blowing in a direction which would have carried any plume of chemical or biological agent back into Iraq rather than into Saudi Arabia. Therefore, if the bombing had resulted In a release of chemical agent from the bunker at An Naslriyah the resulting agent would have had to have reached Saudi Arabia through diffusion into a moving air mass travelling in the opposite direction as well as overcoming the effects of rain. Modelling of agent releases from such a distant site as An Nasirlyah under ideal conditions eliminates the likelihood of such an event being responsible for the agent detections on the 19th. The prevailing weather conditions are just one of the Important facts which supports the assessment that such an event could not have In any way been associated with these detections. CZECH DETECTIONS The reporting of the Czech detections of Sarin and Mustard during January of 1991 occurred during different times, locations, and followed different paths. The CENTCOM records, press reports, and [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] falls Into two categories: UNCONFIRMED and REPORTED, and UNCONFIRMED and UNREPORTED. The detections Involve Sarin (GB) agent detected north and east of Hafr Al Satin, and mustard (H) agent detected north of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). UNCONFIRMED AND REPORTED: The unanimous conclusion of the team [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] was that on the 19th of January two separate Czech detachments each made detection s of an active, cholinesterase inhibiting compound(s), of which compounds such as the organophosphate GB is a member. The Czech NBC detachment assigned to the 4th Brigade was in convoy and made two detections, approximately 1-2 miles apart at nearly the same time, each of which lasted for about 1 hour. These detections were made [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] detectors which is sensitive to and specific for this type of chemical. The chemical agent detection equipment, however, cannot provide specific Information on the exact nature of the chemical beyond the fact that It was such an inhibiting chemical. As a result of the operating characteristics of this equipment It was, however, possible for the Czech specialists to bracket the concentration levels at which the active chemical had to be, and that is reported to be between .05 and .003 mg/m3. Some 40 kilometers distant, the second Czech NBC detachment made a similar detection, but in addition to the information from the non-specific detectors alarms, an air sample was also taken and analyzed in a field mobile laboratory. The analysis of this third sample is reported to be positive for GB. A more detailed description of this is provided in the attached annexes 1-6. [ (b)(2) ] Is prepared to discuss the actual functioning and capabilities of the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] equipment, as well as the actual protocols which were executed. The results of these detections of cholinesterase Inhibiting chemicals, and GB, were reported through the command network. Following the receipt of this information at CENTCOM, US teams were sent to the area to conduct chemical agent testing and analysis. It is estimated four hours elapsed from the initial Czech unit detections until US specialists arrived to conduct testing, which proved to be negative for chemical agents. Given the non-persistent nature of the agent sarin, the time elapse which occurred, and the extremely low levels detected and apparent localized nature of the plume of chemical(s), it Is not surprising that no confirmation of chemical agent resulted from the US team investigation. Additionally, there were Syrian, Egyptian, French, and English units throughout the immediate area where the Czech units were assigned, each of which was equipped with different, but equally sensitive, equipment to that of the Czechs. Also at this time the large scale redeployment of forces had begun, and there was heavy traffic throughout this region, including many US forces moving West. Not a single one of these forces reported any confirmed detections of chemical agents during this period. There were no offensive military actions associated with this area at the time of the detections, to Include SCUD missiles attacks, artillery exchanges, Iraqi air sorties, etc. The distance from the Czech positions to the Iraqi border was over 40 km. During the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that the agent which was detected was airborne residues of coalition attacks against CW related targets within Iraq. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] also indicated that the wind was blowing from the north-northeast at the time. This latter point seems to contradict the general weather information provided by the US Air Force, but can be explained. The macroscopic weather patterns were as reported by the Air Force, however, the Czech Unit which was in convoy was operating In a wide, deep wadi, or river valley, some 100 to 200 feet below the desert terrain on either side of the valley. It is conceivable that the micro meteorological conditions in that wadi were influenced by the topography, and were in fact quite different from the large scale conditions observed for the region as a whole. The micro conditions in any event would not influence the assessment that the weather conditions were unfavorable for the transport of chemical agent plume(s) from bombed suspect CW or BW sites deep within Iraq. Other possible explanations of these detections Include detection of crop protection chemicals such as insecticides; false alarms from interferents such as petroleum products; localized use of pesticides by the coalition forces, and fugitive emissions from chemical plants. Each of these possibilities was ruled out systematically by a thorough review of the area for Industry, crop production, etc. The area is a sparsely populated desert region with no agriculture, no industry, and no logical source of such unique manmade chemicals. The only petrochemical facility at all in this vicinity is a fuel storage area which supplies oil to an adjacent power plant. Based on information received from the Czechs, and which is supported by our own preliminary analysis of the equipment, chemistry, and procedures used, the detection of such an cholinesterase inhibiting chemical would not be interfered with by petroleum products, exhaust gases from heavy equipment, etc. Also, the possibility that the use of pesticides by coalition forces for the positive detection made by the one NBC detachment which was not in convoy, was ruled out the team and by other specialists who have participated in this exercise; there is no possible other explanation for the Czech "confirmed" detection of GB by the second NBC unit. UNCONFIRMED AND UNREPORTED: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that on the 24th of January, a third Czech NBC detachment attached to Saudi forces based in KKMC was approached by a Saudi liaison officer and requested to investigate an area outside of KKMC for possible chemical agent. They did so, under the direction of this liaison officer, and found, several kilometers to the north and outside of KKMC, a small area of what appeared to be wet desert soil. As they approached the area the team was asked by the liaison officer if they shouldn't "suit up" which they did before actually approaching the area. The contaminated area measured only about 60 cm by 200 cm. Using two separate protocols, they determined that the area had been contaminated with the mustard agent. The Czech units filed a situation report with the Saudi forces, however there is no record of that report being filed with CENTCOM, and there is no record that any other units were called to provide Independent confirmation of this find. Further because of the extremely limited nature of the contamination, the remoteness of the site, and the absence of any personnel stationed anywhere in the immediate location, the site was left as is, without even marking; no other samples were taken for additional testing at the field laboratory. FRENCH DETECTION: As noted previously the Czech units did report the events of the 19th through channels. Additionally there are CENTCOM log entries which indicate that French forces stationed in KKMC during the period of 20-21 January also detected mustard, and that they contacted the Czech unit there to confirm. There is no situation report filed by the Czech units on their participation in this incident. During the investigation of the Czech unit's detections in Prague In October of this year they were insistent that there were no other "detections or confirmations" made by them. However, during the Senator Shelby delegation trip to Prague In December, they did allege that they remembered this additional detection. The CENTCOM log data indicate that the French liaison officer reported that the Czech unit detected several agents, including nerve agents, as well as blister agents. However, there is nothing to substantiate this claim, and unlike the other Czech reports, this one is contradicted by what they "remember", what the log entry indicates, and the lack of any casualties or verifiable presence of chemical agents In KKMC during this period. CENTCOM assessed that this report was a false positive, and the Intelligence community concurs. There is no new information which has been uncovered which would change that assessment. COALITION ACTIONS: During the initiation of the air campaign, suspected and known CW and BW targets were on the first list of targets for destruction. They include: CW TARGETS ATTACKED DURING DESERT STORM TARGET NAME GEO COORD 1. SAMARRA 3350N 04348E 1/17 2. HABBANIYAH 3333N 04338E 2/1 3. HABBANIYAH 3329N O4340E 2/1 4. HABBANIYAH 3329N 04349E 2/1 5. AL QAIM 3422N 04110E 2/10 6. KIRKUK 3533N 04358E 2/8 7. HABBANIYAH 3322N 04331E 2/17 8. TIKRIT 3443N O4339E 2/13 9. KARBALAH 3223N O433OE 2/3 10. FALLUJAH 3313N 04341E 2/21 11. QABATIYAH 3353N 04239E 1/19 12. ASH SHUYABAH 3029N 04739E 1/29 13. AD DIWANIYAH 3158N 04454E 2/3 14. AN NASIRIYAH 3O58N 04611E 1/17 15. MOSUL AIRFIELD 3618N 04309E 1/28 16. TAJI 3333N O4414E 2/10 17. H-3 AIRFIELD 3256N O3945E 2/9 18. K-2 AIRFIELD 3455N 04324E 2/9 19. KIRKUK AIRFIELD 3528N 04421E 2/15 20. AL TAQQADUM AIRFIELD 3320N 04336E 2/4 21. AL JARRAH AIRFIELD 3229N 04546E 2/5 22. QAYYARAH 3552N 04307E 2/10 23. TALLIL AIRFIELD 3056N 04606E 2/9 Of these targets the closest was An Nasiriyah located over 150 miles from the positions of the Czech unit detections north of Hafr Al Batin. On the 17th of January a single bunker was struck at An Nasiriyah with 2000 pound bombs. The prevailing weather conditions from the time of the bombing until after the detections were made included winds blowing from the south-south east, and heavy rains on the 18th. The other targets were around Baghdad, and near Kuwait, In regions of heavy populations of civilians and military personnel. Predictive models indicate that under ideal conditions, to include favorable winds, terrain, etc., approximately 80 tons of GB would have had to have been released during this bombing to have resulted in levels comparable to those recorded by the Czechs. This quantity of agent would have resulted in an area of total fatalities to protected personnel measured In 10's to 100's of square kilometers, and In total area of casualty producing concentrations measured In 100's to 1000's of square kilometers for unprotected personnel. However, factors such as prevailing winds, precipitation, and topography, would have had a synergistic effect, greatly increasing the amount of agent necessary to obtain the measurements made by the Czech units, which in turn would further Increase the area over which human casualties would have occurred. There were no mass casualties observed around, or downwind from An Naslriyah, or from any other known or suspected CW or BW target struck during any phase of Desert Storm. Coalition forces stationed around the area of the Czech detections made no detections or confirmations of chemical agent detections on the 19th, even though they were In relatively close proximity to them, and had comparable equipment to that employed by the Czech units. If a large plume emanating from a point source at An Nasirlyah had been the source of this chemical agent, it Is unlikely that the plume could have been as well defined in terms of length and width as to be only detectable over the immediate area where the Czech units were located, and no where else in the vicinity. Taken together, all these facts argue against any unintentional release of chemical agent in Iraq as being the explanation for the detection of agent by the Czech units. Modelling of the facts, elapsed time of duration of the detection of the nerve agent, relative concentration of the agent, and using Ideal conditions, it appears that the chemical or chemical agent detected by the Czech units was released in close proximity to their positions. Estimates of the quantity range upwards of 10's of fluid ounces of chemical, however, the best estimate given current Information is about 4 fluid ounces. This quantity of GB would be expected to produce a plume of agent with the desired concentrations, for the desired length of time, without posing a significant risk of being detected by other units in adjacent areas, or to pose a health threat to personnel in the area any distance from the point of the release. [ (b)(2) ] PERSONNEL REPORTING EXPOSURE: There Is only one known instance of a coalition soldier reporting Injury believed at the time to be the result of exposure to chemical agent. This report was investigated thoroughly and is considered to be a false report of a chemical agent exposure. The intelligence community followed up closely on the results of this soldiers claims, and bases it conclusions on the expert analysis of clothing and body fluid samples obtained from this person immediately following the claimed exposure. While there is no doubt that this person experienced some injury as a result of exposure to some caustic substance, however the body of scientific evidence and intelligence information does not support the conclusion that the chemical was a chemical warfare agent. OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE: During and after the conflict there was intense examination of all sources of information which might shed light on the extent of the chemical and biological weapons Iraq had in place, what their plans were for theIr use, and how and where they were stored and handled. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Therefore, the Intelligence community Is well aware of the plans and operations of the Iraqi government as relates to chemical warfare, and to a lesser extent, biological warfare. The nature of the chemical and biological agents which Iraq had developed and produced are unique, all cause death or injury over periods of minutes to days, and all are well known In the International community. There were or are no known or suspected "special agents" which could cause surprise or confusion on the part of the attacked force. There were, as has been stated, no known chemical Injuries which are attributed to chemical warfare agents of any kind. Iraq has three known nerve agents, GA. GB, and GF. None of these is persistent, all are well known, and troops are protected against all three by their standard Issue protective equipment. Each of these three nerve agents Is readily identifiable In the field using a variety of confirmation test methods and equipment which all of the coalition partners had. There is some preliminary evidence that they may also have been developing a production capability for, or fielded, the persistent agent VX, however at this time there is no confirmation of this. They elaborate the same physical symptoms, and the field medics, doctors, and personnel were instructed to look specifically for those symptoms during the war. There were no reported Instances of any troop elaborating symptoms of nerve agent poisoning. The only blister agent Iraq if assessed to have is mustard agent, which it used In its war with Iran. Again, with the sole exception of the soldier who claimed injury to his arm, there were no individuals any where in the theater of operations which developed physical injuries which could be attributed to blister agents. The Iraqi military is accredited with having developed three biological agents for use in warfare. However, there were no known or suspected uses of this during any portion of the operation. Further, there were air sampling devices which were located throughout the theater, and which were regularly serviced and analyzed for presence of chemical toxins or agents which might have been released against the coalition forces. There was not a single sample which showed any positive result for biological agent or toxin release in the theater. There were reports of dead animals during operations DS/DS, however these reports were fully investigated and found to be the result of endemic disease in the region. Some animal samples were collected and tested in laboratories in the U.S. and the test results corroborated the information obtained by trained specialists at the site of some of these instances. ANNEX: I. Questions and Answers provided to Dr. Deutch Question: From the 19-24 Jan 91 time frame, the Iraqi CW targets attacked by allied forces, winds, distances and downwind modelling with regard to the Czech detection's. Answer: There were only three CW targets struck by the coalition air operation prior to the 24th: Samarra CW production north of Baghdad which was bombed on the 17th of January, the Qabatiyah Ammo and Storage located about 60 miles 17th of January, the Qabatiyah Ammo and Storage facility, located over 100 miles to the west of Baghdad which was bombed on the 19th, and the An Nasiriyah Storage facility located over 150 miles north of the Saudi border, which was bombed on the 19th. Of these, the closest was An Nasiriyah, the other two were hundreds of miles further removed from the Saudi border. The weather conditions during these operations were as follows: From the 17th through the morning of the 19th the winds were from the South and East, blowing to the North and West, when a front moved through the area. From the afternoon of the 19th through the 22 the winds were variable from the East North East to North East, and returned to blowing from the South and East on the 23rd. On the 18th there was general rain throughout the region, and again, there was scattered and sporadic rain from the 20th through the 23rd. These weather conditions would have by themselves prevented any release of chemical agent, which resulted from the bombing of targets deep Inside of Iraq, from reaching the Saudi border. Sarin vapors would have been blown back Into Iraq, and the rain conditions would have had a significant "decontaminating" effect on the gas, further reducing the spread of the escaping vapors had that occurred. Nonetheless, modelling of a chemical release from An Nasiriyah has been done to determine what quantities of sarin would have to be released in order for the Czech units to be able to detect the agent In the quantities recorded. Using models developed for the purpose of modelling the deliberate release of chemical agents, it has been determined that under ideal conditions of wind, temperature, etc., and an ideal surface topography, over 80 tons of sarin would have to have been released to effect this detection as a result of the bombing of An Nasiriyah. Had this release actually occurred, then all humans downwind of the target in an area of about 100 square kilometers, would have been killed regardless of access to protective clothing and masks, and the area downwind of the release where causalties would have occurred for unprotected personnel would have exceeded 1000 square kilometers. The plume which would be detectable to the limits the Czechs detected this gas would extend over an area 240 kilometers downwind, and would be about 10 km wide! Given the wind and weather conditions, however, it is impossible to model any conceivable scenario in which a release from this target, or any of the other two targets, singly or in conjunction, could have resulted in the detections made by the Czechs without catastrophic loss of life within Iraq. This is known with certainty not to have happened. Additionally, it should be noted, that had such an improbable release of chemical agent occurred and been the cause of the agent detected by the Czech units, then the plume of agent would have been so large that many of the other coalition units in the region would have had similar detections of this agent. This did not occur. Question: What suspected storage areas might have ben close to Saudi Arabia? Answer: The only two sites which are known or suspected were those at An Nasirlyah and at Al Basrah. There are no other depots, staging areas, or storage facilities closer than those. Question: How far south did the Iraqis bring chemical weapons? Answer: The Iraqis have claimed to have had chemical agents/weapons as far south as An Naslrlyah. There has been no confirmation of chemical weapons, agents, etc., anywhere within the Kuwait Theater of Operations. There have been no weapons found in any bunker, storage location, etc., anywhere within the captured areas which resulted from the Operation Desert Storm. ANNEX II: Initial report on the Czech findings 26OCT93 SUBJECT: CZECH CW REPORT 1. Responding to a Czech report of chemical agent detection during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DIA fielded a special team comprised of experts from FSTC, [ b.2. ], and DIA, who visited Prague, Czech Republic, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] coordinated discussion on the Czech findings of chemical agents. 2. Incident 1: a. On 19 January 1991 two Czech NBC detachments detected nerve agents at their positions north and northwest of Hafr Al Batin. Each unit was operating [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] detectors, which use the active biochemical butyryl cholinesterase (BChE). Following the initial alarm, each unit then used [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] units, which also use Bche, and determined through sampling protocol, the presence and limits of the concentration of the agent. One detachment also collected an air sample which was analyzed in a mobile field lab and determined to contain the nerve agent Sarin (GB). b. The concentration of Sarin In the air sampled was determined through basic sampling protocols to be between 0.05 and 0.0005 milligrams per cubic meter. The elapsed time from the Initial alarm to the all clear was about 40 minutes. GB is considered a "non-persistent agent," which dissipates in the air In various periods of time. c. This detection was made during a period in which there were no SCUD missiles launches, artillery exchanges, or other military action(s) observed by the Czechs in the area. Further, there were no CW detections reported by other units In this area. The Czechs observed that there were no identifiable physiological manifestations (such as eye, nose, or breathing problems) which might be associated with such an exposure to this chemical agent dosage. d. The nearest location of any known Iraqi storage or production was some 150 km away from the area where the agent was detected. In order for the detection that was made to have resulted from a collateral release of GB from this area, large amounts of agents would have had to have been released, which would then have drifted over troop concentrations causing casualties. Other units would have detected the presence of agents in these amounts. No such events were reported. e. The Czechs did not see any physical evidence that the chemical agents detected were the result of offensive or hostile actions by the Iraqi forces. The Czechs filed a sitrep on their detection. 3. Incident II: a. Approximately five days after the detection of the GB agent, a Saudi liaison officer approached the 3rd Czech NBC detachment subordinated to the Saudi Royal Forces In King Khalid Military City and requested that they Investigate a "suspicious" area in the desert. The liaison officer directed the NBC detachment from KKMC to a locatIon a few kilometers north-northwest of KKMC. As they approached the area he queried them if they shoudn't don their protective gear, which they did. Upon arriving at the site, they found a wet area on the desert floor, measuring about 60 cm by 200 cm In dimension. They tested this with two separate methods, and determined that the soil was contaminated with sulphur mustard agent. b. The Czech officers who had been on the scene said that there were no munitions fragments, craters, or other Indications of military Involvement with this site. The Czechs also said there were no SCUD alerts for this area immediately prior to this finding. Following the determination of the presence of mustard, the detachment left the area. A sitrep was filed with the Saudi Command of the Joint Forces North Area HQ In KKMC. 4. The only units to have detected and confrmed the presence of chemical agents during Desert Shield/Desert Storm were the three Czech detachments, all of which were subordinated to the Joint Forces North Area under the command of the Royal Saudi Liberation Forces. The detectlons Involved each of the three units, and occurred within a single five day period. No prior or subsequent detections were made, or confirmed by the Czech detachments. 5. [ (b)(2) ] 6. At this juncture, the facts do not tie any known Iraqi or Coalition offensive military actions to these CW detections. ANNEX III: Technical procedures used by the Czech NBC UnIts Subject: Technical procedures used to Detect Chemical Agent during Desert Shield/Desert Storm 1. Detection of nerve agent during Desert Storm was accomplished using a biochemical technique, while determination of mustard agent depended on wet chemical qualitative analytical procedures. 2. Detection of nerve agent on the 19th of January, 1991 occurred at three separate locations by two separate Czechoslovak NBC Detachments. The first Chemical detachment detected a G-type agent while on convoy about 37 kilometers north west of Hafr al Batin and 40 kilometers from the Iraqi boarder. This unit detected chemical agents at two separate location. The second NBC detachment was located approximately 45 kilometers north east of Hafr al Batin and 40 kilometers from the Kuwait border. 3. Both units detected the Initial presence of nerve agent using the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] monitor/alarm which detects only organophosphate type agents. These units were of [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] manufacture, and were operating In a semi-continuous mode: This unit uses a wet chemlcal/colorlmetrlc procedure by which the enzyme system Butyryl Chollnesterase (Bche) containing solution Is deposited on a cotton tape, whIch Is then drawn through an air aspiration port exposing the enzyme to the possible agent. Following this exposure, the tape Is then transported to another station, where a solution with the Indicator phenyl red Is deposited on the tape. Presence of a chemical agent In the air Inhibits the enzyme from further reaction which results In no color change; absence of an agent causes a reaction which is registered as a color change from red to yellow. As operated, this unit has a reported sensitivity to nerve agent of 0.003 mg/M3 (of air sampled). 4. Following the initial alarm by the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], the troops donned their protective gear and made follow up tests using the Czechoslovak manufactured CHP-71 unit. While this unit also uses Bche enzyme Inhibition for subsequent Identification, the unit is somewhat more sensitive due to the means of air sampling. However, because the basic chemistry Is identical to the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] system, this test does not independently confirm the first nerve agent. This system could register a positive result for any cholinesterase inhibiting organophosphate compound, which would include many agricultural Insecticides. There were no other independent tests performed at the site of the detection to indicated that the chemical detected was in fact a nerve agent. An air sample was collected on a- dried silica gel substrate and preserved for subsequent testing at a field laboratory located in King Kahlid Military City (KKMC). There, two analytical procedures were used to show that the organophosphate compound in question contained fluorine and isopropyl groups. 5. The [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] could be operated for [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] . When the Czechoslovaks Initially attempted to verify the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] alarm using the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], the results were negative, and It was only after subsequent air sampling [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that they obtained the positive results. This would place the concentration of the suspected nerve agent in the air between 0.05 - 0.0005 mg/M5. These concentrations are so low that they are not felt to represent any threat to personnel. 6. Following the initial alarm, there were four subsequent tests using the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] unit. Each test was conducted for [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], minutes, and subsequent processing and refitting the unit lasted perhaps [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. The first three of these tests continued to register positive for chemical agent. The fourth test was negative, at which point the all clear was sounded. A total time of approximately 40 minutes elapsed between the Initial alarm and the all clear. The time between the initIal detectlons at the 1st and 2nd NBC detachments was about 30 minutes. 7. The reporting of these determinations was made through proper channels, up through the brigade headquarters to the joint command in KKMC. A situation report was also forwarded through Saudi military to Riyadh. 8. Some four to five days following the detection of the nerve agents north of Hafr al Batin, the 3rd detachment located at KKMC was approached by the Saudi Liaison Officer with a request for them to bring their reconnaissance vehicle out Into the desert to inspect an area. The location which they were taken to was about one to two kilometers north or west of KKMC. When approaching the actual location, they were asked by the Saudi Liaison Officer If they shouldn't suit up in their protective gear. The Czechoslovaks thought this was strange but they did suit up. Upon disembarking their vehicles they found a "wet area" on the desert floor which was irregular in shape and measured about 60 centimeters by 200 centimeters (60 cm x 200 cm), much like a "puddle" of liquid which Is poured onto the ground and then seeps Into the earth. This area was tested using the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] and mustard agent was identified as present. They then used the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] portable laboratory which used a complex chemical molecule based on benzoic acid, phenol, and other aromatic chemicals. This test confirmed the Initial detection of the mustard agent by the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. Because these tests used different chemical Indicators for the determination, it Is likely that this detection of mustard was accurate and that the contamination of this oil was with mustard age. 9. The situation report of this action was forwarded through the joint headquarters KKMC, as were the previous reports. There were no indications that this contamination was the result of any military action; there was no debris, impact crater, or any other visible evidence that anyone had been to this site previously. There was no previous, nor subsequent, request like this one by the Saudi's. There was no follow up action beyond the filing of the SITREP, and the notification of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense. 10. Czechoslovak unit did not experience any problems with their detectors, in particular the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], as a result of environmental contaminants. The Czech unit tested this equipment subsequently to determine its sensitivity after the time of the burning oil fires. However, the chemical agents were detected prior to the oil fires. Moreover, In a test, the Czechoslovaks set up the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] and the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] on a lab bench located less than 2 feet from the top of a 55-gallon oil drum containing burning oil. The results of this test Indicated that there were no problems with the equipment, and that the emissions caused from these units did not result In any false positive detections. Annexes IV-VI are [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. [ b.2. ] 1st: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF CHEMCAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE GULF For the Defense Science Board investigating the Desert Storm Syndrome Presented by [ (b)(6) ] [ (b)(2) ] DIA unclassified 2nd: - PRINCIPAL ISSUES * WEATHER CONDITIONS FROM THE 17TH THROUGH 19 JANUARY 1991 * CZECH REPORTING * FRENCH REPORTING * COALITION ACTIONS AGAINST CW/BW TARGETS * REPORTS OF EXPOSURE OF COALITION PERSONNEL * DEARTH OF OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND REPORTING 3RD: CHEMICAL AGENT REPORTING * U.S. REPORTING....M8A1, MM1, M256A1 * FRENCH REPORTING * CZECH REPORTING....[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 4TH: POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS * DELIBERATE USE BY THE IRAQIS--OVERT OR COVERT * ACCIDENTAL RELEASES- - "LEAKERS" * UNINTENTIONAL RELEASE RESULTING FROM COALITION ACTIONS * DELIBERATE RELEASE UNRELATED TO MILITARY OPERATIONS 5TH: PARAMETERS OF CZECH DETECTIONS * "ISOLATED" LOCATIONS IN DESERT AREAS * ALL UNITS UNDER SAUDI COMMAND * NO IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TIMING OF DETECTIONS * NO SAMPLES TAKEN FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS * EQUIPMENT PROCEDURES 6TH: PARAMETERS OF IRAQI TARGETS * AN NASIRIYAH LOCATED 150 MILES FROM HAFR AL BATIN * OTHER TARGETS AROUND BAGDAO AND NEAR NORTHERN KUWAIT * TARGETS WERE BOMBED ALMOST 48 HOURS BEFORE CZECH DETECTIONS * THERE WERE NO MASS CASULITES SURROUNDING THE CW/BW TARGETS 7TH: CONCLUSIONS * IRAQ DID NOT RELEASE ANY CW OR BW WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION FORCES DURING ANY PHASE OF DS/DS * ANALYSIS OF IRAQI CW AND BW TARGETS INDICATES THAT COALITION ACTIOS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CZECH DETECTIONS * CZECH DETECTIONS OF GB AND H ON TWO OCCASIONS IS CREDIBLE REPORTING * SOURCE OF THE AGENTS DETECTED REMAINS UNKNOWN BUT THE FACTS INDICATE DELIBERATE AND LIMITED RELEASES IN VERY RESTRICTED AREAS. * THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS ALLEGATIONS OF ANY CW OR BW EXPOSURES BY COALITION FORCES