SENATOR SHELBY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF SYNDROME (Senate - March 17, 1994)
[Page: S3101]
1. In order to complete the investigation of possible presence of chemical/biological agents in the Persian Gulf and the possible causes of the Persian Gulf Syndrome, it is necessary for me to visit with members of the allied coalition and meet with the appropriate representatives of their foreign and defense ministries. Coalition allies stationed in the area in question includes Morocco, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, it would be useful to meet with appropriate defense and intelligence community representatives from Israel regarding any information they might have about the possible use of chemical weapons. I believe it would be in the Committee's interest for me to travel to the Middle East for this purpose during the first two weeks of January 1994.
2. Prior to my travelling to the Middle East, the Department of Defense should provide maps to the Committee showing the locations of battalion-level and above units during the period from January 17, 1991, through February 1, 1991. Additionally, the Department of Defense should provide maps showing the dates, times, and locations of all bombings of chemical production or storage facilities and ammunition storage areas.
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U.S. SENATE,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, February 28, 1994.
Memorandum Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond.
From: Senator Shelby.
CC: Senator Coats.
Subject: Report on trip to Middle East to continue the
investigation into the Persian Gulf syndrome.
Upon the completion of my trip in December to Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom and France to investigate issues related to the possible presence of chemical/biological weapons agents in the theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, and any possible connection between service in the Persian Gulf War and the illness among U.S. veterans referred to as the Persian Gulf Syndrome, I informed you that I believed the investigation would not be complete without meeting with other coalition allies stationed in the theater of operations. On January 3-15, I travelled to Riyadh, King Khalid Military City, and Jubail, Saudi Arabia, Damascus, Syria; Cairo, Egypt; Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Israel; and Rabat, Morocco to continue my investigation into this matter.
Members of the Codel included two members of my personal staff who serve as S. Res.' to the SASC (Terry Lynch and Tom Young), four members of the SASC staff with responsibilities in the areas of manpower, personnel and chemical/biological defense (Charles Abell, Monica Chavez, P.T. Henry and Frank Norton), and a representative from the Department of Defense (Major General Ron Blanck, Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center).
I believe the investigation of this issue has been productive and is complete, to the extent that the Congress can conclude the investigation. This report summarizes our meetings and discussions in the Middle East and North Africa with coalition allies on the possible presence of chemical agents in the theater of operations and the possible causes of the Persian Gulf Syndrome.
On January 4-6, we visited Riyadh, King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and Jubail, Saudi Arabia and met with several high ranking members of the Saudi Arabian military, and civilian representatives of the firms located in the Jubail industrial region.
Riyadh
Major General Nazir Abd-Al Azziz al-Arfaj, Director of Military Intelligence and Security, advised the Codel that, on January 19 and 24, the dates when very low levels of nerve agent and mustard agent were detected and verified by the Czech chemical units, the Czechs reported this to the Saudi Arabian military. In the absence of any evidence of a delivery vehicle (missile, bomb, etc.), the Saudi's determined that these low levels did not pose a threat to the public health or to animals. He provided the following additional information:
To date, no Saudi military personnel or civilians have complained of illnesses that can be attributed to service in the theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War.
The Saudi Arabian government has no evidence of the use of biological agents during the Persian Gulf War, although the United Nations subsequently discovered evidence of research and development on biological agents.
On January 24, 1991, the French reported a possible chemical agent detection to the Saudis (the `wet spot' north of KKMC) who then contacted the Czech chemical defense unit. The Czechs detected and verified the presence of mustard agent on the ground. This incident was reported by the Saudis to CENTCOM Headquarters. U.S. personnel were sent to the area in question but were unable to detect a chemical agent.
Saudi intelligence had no information to offer regarding the possible source of the low-level chemicals.
When the wet spot was located (later determined by the Czech chemical defense unit to be mustard agent), the Saudi troops did not don chemical defense gear.
The Saudis do not believe the symptoms suffered by the U.S. soldiers are a result of exposure to chemical weapons. Major General Nazir Abd-al Azziz al-Arfaj indicated that the Saudis did not have chemical agents or simulants and did not know if the other Coalition forces had chemical agents in the theater. It is possible that the Egyptians and Syrians could have had chemical agents/weapons, but the Saudi military personnel do not have offensive chemical weapons in the area and did not conduct defensive chemical weapons training. He did, however, believe the reports of the Czech and French detections.
With regard to assistance from the Chinese, Major General Nazir Abd-Al Azziz al-Arfaj indicated that, while the Saudis have a relationship with the Chinese government because of the CSS-2 missiles, the Chinese Military had no liaison in the theater of operation during the Persian Gulf War.
General Mohammed Saleh al Hammad, Chief of Staff, Minister of Defense Education, had very little to offer regarding the subject of the Codel's inquiry. He expressed confidence in the reliability of the Czech and French detections. When asked about from where the nerve agent and mustard agent could have come, he stated that he had no idea. He speculated, however, that they could have come from either friendly or aggressor forces. He also speculated that perhaps the U.S. military brought it.
King Khalid Military City (KKMC)
On January 6, the Codel flew to King Khalid Military City, where mustard agent had been detected in two locations. The Codel met with Major General Al Alhami, Northern Area Commander, who commanded KKMC during the Persian Gulf War.
General Al Alhami indicated that, during the war, he received no evidence of any detections of chemical agents nor of any medical problems that could be viewed as `unusual.' He indicated that, every time the Iraqis fired SCUDs, all troops donned MOPP chemical protective gear (MOPP gear includes a full body suit and mask with hood). Additionally, he had no recollection of the French reporting their detection of mustard agent to the KKMC Headquarters.
He has no knowledge of the Saudis, U.S. or Syrians, or any other Coalition forces, having chemical agents/weapons with their forces during the Persian Gulf War.
Jubail Industrial Center
Also on January 6, the Codel travelled to the Jubail Industrial Center to discuss the possibility of industrial chemical releases during the Persian Gulf War. The Codel met with Mr. Terry Velanzano of the Jubail Planning Group and a number of officials from the various civilian industrial concerns located at Jubail. Most of those with whom the Codel met were present at Jubail during the War.
The industrialists advised the Codel that there were no instances in which industrial chemicals were released either intentionally or unintentionally during the periods of time when coalition forces were located in the Jubail region. They specifically denied the intentional release of chemicals from pressurized systems in response to warnings of SCUD attacks.
The industrialists also advised the Codel that there were no and are no instances of medical ailments among the Jubail work force and their families that could be construed as `unusual' or in any way linked to chemical agents during the War.
In Damascus, the Codel met with Major General Mohmend Zughaybi, Chief of Medical Services, Ministry of Defense; General Yaff, Director, Shrian Hospital; Mr. Assan, Assistant Director; and Mr. Amur, Director, Department of Americas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Nejdi Jazzar, Assistant Secretary for American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Chief of Medical Services initially emphasized that he had no knowledge of Syrian chemical agents, weapons, their capabilities or of a Syrian chemical defense program. However, toward the end of the meeting, he responded affirmatively that Syrian troops conducted chemical defense training, but do not use chemical agents/weapons or simulants in that training. He later told the Codel that Syrian chemical defense equipment was of Eastern European origin. He indicated that the Syrians did not conduct any chemical defense exercises training in the theater of operation using chemical agents or chemical simulants.
General Zughaybi indicated that Syrian troops were stationed near Hafir al Batin. He remarked that U.S. troops panicked when the chemical alarms went off. He also indicated that, when the Syrian troops responded to the chemical alarms, they only put on masks, not protective suits.
He advised the Codel that, to his knowledge, the Syrians were not aware of any coalition allies having chemical weapons in the theater of operation, and that, although other Arab countries have chemical weapons, he did not think Syria has chemical weapons.
General Zughaybi was not aware of the Egyptians or Saudis being informed of chemical agent detections, or whether they complained that they were not informed.
The diseases suffered by the Syrian military personnel who participated in the Persian Gulf War are similar to symptoms of illnesses that occur in peacetime.
General Zughaybi asked General Blanck whether the diagnosis was PTS (post traumatic stress), or psychological. General Blanck replied that he believed it was organic. Additionally, General Zughaybi added that he did not know about the long term effects of exposure to chemical agents--or rather, the occupance of symptoms long after exposure to low levels of chemical agents. He did add, however, that Syrian military personnel have different psychological mindset to the desert. The underlying inference to be drawn is that, in his opinion, the Persian Gulf Syndrome may in fact be psychological in origin.