SENATOR SHELBY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF SYNDROME (Senate - March 17, 1994)
[Page: S3104]
In Prague, I met with members of the Czech chemical detection unit that served in the Persian Gulf, including: Col. Kozak, Chief of the Chemical Troops; Lt. Col. Smehlik, Senior Chemical officer in the Persian Gulf; Maj. Zilinsky and Capt. Ferus, leaders of the Czech chemical detection units on the Persian Gulf during the operations.
Initially, the Czechs' chemical detection unit deployed to the Persian Gulf with 169 members, but increased to approximately 190 members and included chemical, medical and other support personnel. In addition, we were told that this unit was under contract to the Saudi government to provide chemical weapon and/or agent detection to the Saudi government during the Persian Gulf War.
Lt. Col. Smehlik informed us that on January 19, 1991, Czech chemical units, that were working approximately 20 kilometers apart with 4th and 20th Saudi brigades, made three nearly simultaneous detections of a low concentration of G-series nerve agent in the air. The Czechs condsider these detections to have resulted from one event that occurred in the late afternoon which lasted approximately 40 minutes. At ground level, at the time of the event, they said the wind was blowing from the northwest--a direct contrast to what Department of Defense officials said to the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier when they claimed that the prevailing winds were blowing from the northeast.
The Czechs took air samples from two of the three locations and verified that the samples contained G-series nerve agent. While they were not able to distinguish between sarin or soman, Lt. Col. Smehlik indicated that they had excluded the existence of V-series agents. These air samples were sent back to then Czechoslovakia, and are no longer available. An air sample from the third location was not taken for the purpose of verification because the Czech chemical detection unit was moving at the time of the alarm.
As discussions continued, Capt. Ferus, a leader of one of the Czech chemical units, informed us that on January 24, 1991, he was summoned by Saudi officials to an area 10 kilometers north of KKMC to test the area for chemical agents. Using a portable laboratory kit, he detected mustard agent in the sand--the on-site detection made the retention of samples unnecessary.
According to Lt. Col. Smehlik, another detection of mustard agent in the air near the Engineer School in KKMC had been made two to three days prior to the detection January 24. He indicated that an air sample was taken, verified by the mobile laboratory and forwarded to Czechoslovakia; this sequence of events was confirmed for the group by the Czech warrant officer who reported the actual detection. It is important to note that these detections had not been made public previously. In discussion with Czech officials, we were able to determine that until recently there had been no discussion between Czech units stationed with Saudi troops near Hafar-Al-Batin and those stationed in KKMC. The Czechs believe that both detections of mustard agent and nerve agent were at levels that presented no danger to the health and safety of the troops in the area, and were, therefore, militarily insignificant.
Although they were unable to provide any documentary evidence to support certain events, I believe that it is necessary to acknowledge that the Czechs claim that an air sample of the mustard agent detected in the air in KKMC prior to January 24, 1991, was given to a U.S. special forces member. In subsequent discussions with our group, Lt. Col. Smehlik indicated that the individual in question may have been an intelligence officer.
The Czech units did not have any chemical agents in the Persian Gulf, according to Col. Kozak, and did not use live agents during their training with the Saudis. Their chemical detection equipment, which we examined and watched as it was demonstrated, was 1970s and 1980s Czech and Russian. However, according to the Czechs, the equipment has much lower threshold for chemical detection than does U.S. chemical detection equipment. In addition, we were informed that the equipment would be shipped to Edgewood Arsenal for testing.
While in London, we met with Dr. Graham Pearson, Director General of the Chemical & Biological Defense Establishment; Mr. Brian Pitts from the Surgeon General's Office; Ms. Jill Ferguson; Lt. Col. John Esmonde-White and Col. Christopher Box. We were informed that approximately 42,000 British soldiers served in the Persian Gulf War. Apart from this information, the representatives of the British government the group met were not very helpful.
Officials in the British government do not believe that the Czech units detected the presence of any chemical weapons, nerve or mustard agents in the Persian Gulf and they spent a considerable amount of effort attempting to find plausible means of discrediting the Czech reports.
In addition, the British government does not recognize the possible of any connection between service in the Persian Gulf and any illness that cannot be explained by conventional medical diagnosis. The British government has about 30 veterans from the Persian Gulf who have reported medical problems and does not consider these medical conditions peculiar to service in the Persian Gulf.
Furthermore, the British government does not recognize
Multiple Chemical Toxicity/Sensitivity as a valid concept. The
representatives with whom we met believe the Persian Gulf
Syndrome is the result of American veterans attempting to
increase their
medical and disability benefits and we were advised that the
United States did not have to invent a new environmental disease
to explain the symptoms being experienced by American veterans.
Aside from the British government's lack of cooperation, or acknowledgement of these existing conditions, British citizens have set up a Persian Gulf Families Hot Line, located in Glouchester, England, that serves as a clearing house for those who believe they have illnesses related to their service in the Persian Gulf. I met with Mr. Raymond Donn, a solicitor from Manchester, England, who is in the process of filing a class action suit against the British government to obtain compensation for these veterans. He told me that there could be as many as 500 British veterans afflicted with the Gulf War Illness.
While in Paris, we met with Lt. Col. Gerrard Emile Ferrand, a French Army infantry officer who served in the Persian Gulf. He informed us that the French had detected nerve and mustard agent at a Logistics Facility approximately 26 or 27 kilometers south of KKMC on the evening of January 24 or January 25 and he indicated that the wind at ground level had been from the north (from Iraq). French chemical alarms were activated at two locations approximately 100 meters apart and Colonel Ferrand, who arrived at the location about 30 minutes after the initial alarm, indicated that litmus badges on the protective suits worn by French troops registered the presence of mustard agent. A Czech chemical detection unit was contacted to verify the presence of chemical agents, confirmed as both mustard agent and nerve agent--either Soman or Tabun, and the area was decontaminated.
Lt. Col. Ferrand also noted that approximately two or three days later, the French chemical alarms were again activated in the same area. This time, the wind had shifted and was from the south. Unable to determine what chemical agent was present, the French again asked the Czech chemical detection units for assistance, but none responded. Lt. Col. Ferrand reported both these events to the French command located at Riyadh and believes these reports were forwarded to CENTCOM headquarters.
It is interesting to note that the Czech chemical detection unit did not mention any contact with the French concerning a detection of either or both nerve agent or mustard agent during our discussions with them, and the French had no knowledge of previous Czech chemical agent detections.
Although the trip to Europe was productive, our investigation remained incomplete. It was necessary to travel to the Middle East to meet with our coalition allies stationed in the areas in question to resolve key questions about the presence of chemical agents in the theater of operations and the possible causes of the Persian Gulf Syndrome. Unanswered questions we set out to answer included the following:
Did any of the coalition allies serving in the Persian Gulf have chemical weapons in the theater of operations or conducted chemical weapons training using live agent or stimulants.
Did representatives of any of the coalition allies receive any air samples from the Czechs while in the Gulf?
Did a U.S. Special Forces soldier or Intelligence Community member receive an air sample from the Czech chemical defense unit?
Did any member of the allied coalition receive reports, other than the report of the January 19 event, from any coalition partner of a detection of chemical agents including any reports of chemical agents at a level considered to be militarily insignificant and no threat to the safety or health of U.S. troops or other coalition personnel?