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File: 120596_aacmu_02.txtRECOMMENDATION Much more emphasis must be placed on the use-of secure voice on tactical missions. -All tactical training missions SHould use secure voice. Annual check rides should evaluate aircrew knowledge and use of secure radio procedures. Install a VHF/FM compatible radio during the SCNS upgrade, or outfit tbe Army witb UBF radios. lf we are serious about secure voice, ensure all deployed aircraft have the capability. ALCC needs to procure better state-of-the art HF communications equipment and ensure operators are properly trained. Better coordination of COMSEC procedures for all players in the theater is required. - OBSERVATION: Tactical airlift had such a low priority during the pre war and air campaign tbat components of tbe Tactical Air Control SyGtem (TACS) bhd little time to work witb our aircraft. AWACS, ABCCC' and CRCs were generally busy working higher priority fighter resources and conse- quently didn't have much timeto update airlift crews on current situation al information. This waS not a show-stopper but tended to lull tbe controI system into an unfamiliar situation. For example, wben an 8 ship C-130 formation checked in for information on their ingress route through south- ern Iraq, ABCCC passed a mission abort code to the lead aircraft. After trying to confirm with ALCC that the mission was canceled, it was discov ered that it wasn't. ABCCC then realized they had confused tbe C-130 formation for a flight of fighters. RECOMMENDATION: Airborne tactical control systems have access to real time-intelligence data whicb could be valuable to tactical airlift crews, especially when ingressing enemy territory. Ensure tbat AWACS and ABCCC are thoroughly informed of tbe mission-scenario On immediate requests for airdrop/resupply, ALCC must ensure tbat the battlefield controI units are well aware of the mission. More interface between airlift and AWACS/ABCCC during operational exercises and Red Flag/Cope Thunder would belp both sides become better acquainted. Employing Airborne Command and Control proocedures during JBIC training would be anotber good avenue to pursue. . OBSERVATION: All airdrops were briefed to be communication-out. In actual practice, drop zone personnel (TAEO) attempted to give the formation VIRS instructions, however, prebriefed frequencies were not the same as those used by the aircrews. During daytime drops,[(b)(l) sec 3.4 b(4)] were used to mark the the point of impact. Unfortunately, all friendly Army vehicIes surrounding the DZ also carried an [(b)(1)sec(b)(4)] on their hood or top of the vehicles for fighters to easily distinguish as friendly. This greatly confused the aircrew as they tried to acquire the actual impact point among all the vehicles and panels. RECOMMENDATION: The method for controlling airdrops should be dictat- ed by thee tactical situation. Since tbere was no communication jamming, the threat was low, and visibilities were reduced, VIRS should have been considered as secondary if the crew failed to acquire the drop zone on tbe first pass. A signal other than [(b)(1)sec(b)(4)] should have been -used for the vehicles.
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