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 **** UNCLASSIFIED **** 					36 

Radar Systems) or AWACS (Airborne Warning and Command System).  The SCUDBUSTER team would then fly to the coordinates and attempt to acquire  a visual through the Forward Looking Infrared system (FLIR) of the LANTIRN system or a radar image. If the pilots received a positive identification, they attacked. (54)

	(U) On other occasions, they merely attacked coordinates. As stated previously, most of these anti-SCUD missions took place at night, primarily because most of the SCUDs (now mounted on mobile Launch vehicles) were kept concealed during the daylight hours and only came   out to fire their missiles at night. The Iraqis then changed their location as rapidly as possible, so as to avoid destruction from exactly the kind of SCUD hunting missions which made up much of the 69 TFS's work during the Gulf War. The problem with the night attacks centered on lack of confirmation of a kill. The pilots struck the target area, but unless they witnessed secondary explosions, they were unable 10 be certain if they 01 the target itself. This lack of feedback led 10 considerable frustration among the pilots. (55)

	(U) On 26 January, the 69 TFS flew twenty-five sorties in support of Operation Desert Storm. (56)

	(U) At 1466 hours (L) on 27 January 1991, Rex flight (Capt Mark Clemons, Capt Mike Holloman, Lt Col Jay Taylor and Capt Scott Patton) joined with nineteen other aircraft and conducted a strike against a munition storage facility West of Baghdad.    Using low drag K-4s, the 69th executed an extremely successful attack and according to Lt Col
 Taylor,"... we hammered them..." (57) The planes returned to A1 Minhad in time for the Beer Tent to open, here the pilots gathered and hoisted one

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