Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
File: 970207_aadct_005.txtMEDICAL LESSONS LEARNED DESERT SHIELD/STORM CATEGORY: TRAINING ISSUE ITEM #: SUBJECT: TRAINING-Total Force Integration BACKGROUND: There were instances of rank structure problems both from a clinical standpoint of reserve providers of care outranking active duty counterparts, and from an administrative standpoint of the best qualified individual not being in charge because active duty held all the command positions. DISCUSSION: The clinical rank structure inversion is a product of the limited command opportunities within the reserves and the population we recruit from. Older, more established physicians and nurses are attracted to the reserves and come in at higher rank. The position of the reserves is that these individuals are to be recalled to provide clinical services and are not expected to be in command or leadership roles. This position is not always understood by both the individual and active duty personnel. The reverse situation also occured in instances where reserve commanders were not allowed to command the troops they normally train with and command. ACTION RECOMMENDED: Reserve providers need continually reminders that their role in a call-up is clinical. Active duty personnel need to be sensitized to the fact that these reservists are experienced senior officers and should be treated with respect due their rank regardless of their lack of administrative roles. In regard to command positions, it should be recognized that for certain missions, the reserves probably have the most experienced and best qualified commanders.There should be a more flexible policy that would allow the best qualified officers to be in charge whether they are active or reserve. Mobilized units should be commanded by their own senior staff whenever possible. SUGGESTED OPR(s), OCR(s): SGH COL KOENIGSBERG [(b)(2)]
Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search