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       -- The absolutely essential requirement for confirmatory analyses at
       two CONUS facilities under strictly maintained laboratory control including at
       least one non-DOD laboratory if the evidence is to be provided to the NCA for
       decision making.

       - On 3 Jan 91, tri-service representatives met at the Army Surgeon
       General's Office to discuss the OSD(AE) request. The Air Force was represented
       by LtCols Falkenheimer and Wright. AF/XOOTM was unable to attend and asked
       LtCol Falkenheimer to represent them. The representatives agreed that the
       OSD(AE) request could not be recommended primarily because only well-
       established, well-recognized laboratories such as USAMRIID, Porton (UK), and
       the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, GA, would be able to
       withstand the intense, worldwide scientific scrutiny which would follow
       allegations of confirmed BW attack by Iraq against allied forces in the Middle
       East. Other arguments against the OSD(AE) request include:

       -- The saving of 1 to 2 days (sample transport time to USAMRIID) made
       possible by having the capability in the AOR is of little significance since
       confirmation by a non-DOD laboratory would require transport of specimens to
       laboratories out of the AOR and no truly rapid definitive confirmation is
       possible. Definitive confirmation of Botulinum toxin requires up to 4 days
       (depending on concentration in the sample) and most organisms at least 2 days.

       -- The primary role of the Army and Navy Forward Labs (AFL/NFL) is
       testing of medical samples to support patient care, not analysis of
       environmental samples. The labs have limited personnel and reagents and could
       rapidly be overwhelmed. They should have sufficient capability to support
       medical and operational commanders in the AOR by providing confirmation of BW
       agents in medical samples and selected (max. 100/da.) positive environmental
       samples from BW detectors.

       - The tri-service recommendations were briefed to MajGen DelRosso, Space
       and Special Weapons Director for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
       and Plans, who concurred and on 4 Jan 91 briefed OSD(AE)'s Deputy Assistant
       (Chemical Matters) who non-concurred.
       - On 4 Jan, 1530 hours, MajGen DelRosso requested that flag level
       representatives of each Service Surgeon General meet with him at 1400 in room
       3C630 at the Pentagon to discuss a rebuttal strategy to present to OSD(AE).
       USAF/SO, SG2, SGH1&2, and SGHR were briefed on MajGen DelRosso's request and
       MajGen Sanders agreed to attend on behalf of AF/SG.
       (U) RECOMMENDATION

       Support the position that, although no truly "irrefutable" confirmation of BW
       use is possible (since charges could be made for example that the DOD "spiked"
       the samples), confirmatory testing of suspected BW samples be conducted as a
       minimum at USAMRIID, Porton, and the CDC to insure the results provided to the
       NCA can withstand the intense worldwide scientific scrutiny sure to result from
       allegations of BW use by Iraq. The AFL and NFL capabilities projected by 15
       Jan 91 should be adequate to support medical and operational decision making in
       the AOR.
 
                                                                                                                  Jan 91/WS File
      LABCONF.PP
                                                      

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