24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 080596_jun96_decls21_0024.txt
Page: 0024
Total Pages: 253

Subject: 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT    

Box  ID: BX001437

Document Number:          2

Folder Title: 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT                                                             

Folder Seq #:        785

Unit: 24TH ID     

Parent Organzation: XVIII CORPS 









          2) The National Training Center provides an excellent means of training for
       combat in the desert. DESERT STORM raised several areas where additional
       emphasis is required:

           - Massed artillery fires by battalions versus plecemealed by batteries;

           - C3 over greatly extended distances, and;

           - Exercise entire DISCOM versus only one FSB to stress the logistics
       and DISCOM internal C2 systems.

        C. OPERATIONS

          DESERT STORM validated the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI), formerly
       known as E-Force. The concept calls for the addition of an engineer regiment to
       the heavy division. Commander, 36th Engineer Group, served as the Division
       Engineer. One combat engineer battalion was assigned to each maneuver
       brigade - 5th Eng Bn (1 st Bde); 3rd Eng Bn (2nd Bde); 299th Eng Bn (1 97th Bde).
       During the rapid attack to the Euphrates, the battalions performed the critical
       task of identifying, marking, and improving over 500 kilometers of combat trails
       through the Division attack zone.

        D. EOUIPMENT

          1) GPS and LORAN navigation devices are absolutely essential for land
       navigation in the desert environment. DESERT STORM confirmed the
       requirement for vehicles to be fielded with an integrated position locating system.
       24th ID(M) has fielded LORAN to platoon level and GPS to company level. Of the
       two systems, GPS proved more accurate overall.

          2) Wheeled vehicles such as CUCVS, 5,000 gallon tankers, 2 1/2 trucks,
       and S&Ps had difficulty negotiating over rough desert terrain. These vehicles
       proved to be inadequate and were not able to keep up with the forward combat
       units In the rapid offensive operations that characterized DESERT STORM.
       HMMWV's and HMMETS (both fuel and cargo varieties) should replace these and
       other forms of less mobile wheeled vehicles.

) must be 100% mobile and
       self-deployable. In order to accomplish this, each FSB should be equipped with
       at least ten heavy equipment transporters (HETS) to carry material handling
       equipment (MHE); and ten M-93l.A2 tractors with M-872 trailers.





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Document 253 f:/Week-22/BX001437/24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT/24th mech inf div operation desert storm after a:08029615062350
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001437
Unit = 24TH ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq # = 785
Subject = 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER A
Document Seq # = 50
Document Date =
Scan Date = 12-JUN-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-AUG-1996