24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 080596_jun96_decls21_0206.txt
Page: 0206
Total Pages: 253

Subject: 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT    

Box  ID: BX001437

Document Number:          2

Folder Title: 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT                                                             

Folder Seq #:        785

Unit: 24TH ID     

Parent Organzation: XVIII CORPS 







                                          UNCLASSIFIED
                                                                              06/0-
                                        JULLS LONG REPORT

             1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 51976-03583 (00005),      submitted by PROVOST
             KARSHALL, 24 ID, 870-5516, (912)767-5516.

             2. (U) No type OPN DESERT STORM NOTES conducted by 24 IN DIV (M
             on 05/20/91.

             3. (U) KEYWORDS: MILITARY POLICE, RESERVE COMPONENT,

             4. (U) TITLE: RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE

             S. (U) OBSERVATION: Reserve component military police training
             does not adequately prepare soldiers to conduct law enforcement
             operations.

             6. (U) DISCUSSION: Although the main focus of training in the
             reserve component should be on the tactical aspect of
             deployment, there remains a need for reserve components to
             remain proficient in the forms and records required to perform
             the law enforcement mission. Few of the soldiers and many of
             the supervisors were not familiar with the basic forms required
             when completing an initial investigation of an incident. It was
             apparent that the training focus had been on survival skills and
             team tasks which involved employment of the MP platoon and
             @ad. Individual soldier tasks were deficient. Junior NCO
             training does not appear to have been a priority in the area of
             leadership development. Leadership skills of the SGT's and
             SSG's were marginally acceptable in the majority, which required
             a micro-management of soldiers at the SFC/LT level.

             7. (U) LESSON LEARNED:

                   1. Reserve component training is almost exclusively
             geared to tactical operations.

                   2. NCO development in the reserve component is not
 range.

             S. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: NCODP for Reserve Components should
             place more emphasis on the mid-grade NCO. Specifically,
             training should include leadership techniques which can be used
             to maintain a workable senior to subordinate relationship.
             Decision making and problem solving should also be stressed.
             Reserve component military police at all levels need to maintain
             proficiency in the preparation and/or review of paperwork
             associated with law enforcement. The Military Police Report (DA
             Form 3975) and the Traffic Accident Report (DA Form 3946) were
             the most significant training weaknesses.



                 (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS


                                            Page - 8

                                          UNCLASSIFIED

Document 253 f:/Week-22/BX001437/24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT/24th mech inf div operation desert storm after a:08029615062350
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001437
Unit = 24TH ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq # = 785
Subject = 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER A
Document Seq # = 50
Document Date =
Scan Date = 12-JUN-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-AUG-1996