24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 080596_jun96_decls21_0208.txt
Page: 0208
Total Pages: 253

Subject: 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT    

Box  ID: BX001437

Document Number:          2

Folder Title: 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT                                                             

Folder Seq #:        785

Unit: 24TH ID     

Parent Organzation: XVIII CORPS 








                                       UNCLASSIFIED
                                                                       06/C
                                     OMLS LONG REPORT

            1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 51976-12146 (00006), submitted by PROVOST
            MARSHALL, 24 ID, 870-5516, (912)767-5516.

            2. (U) No type OPN DESERT STORM NOTES conducted by 24 IN DIV
            on 05/20/91.

            3. (U) KEYWORDS: EPW, PRISONER OF WAR, MILITARY POLICE,

            4. (U) TITLE: DIVISION LEVEL ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR OPERATIONS

            5. (U) OBSERVATION: The execution of division-level enemy
            prisioner of war operations requires extensive resourcing of
            transportation and equipment not currently authorized by MTOE.

            6. (U) DISCUSSION: The doctrinal approach to EPW evacuation is
            through the use of "back-haul" transportation. The speed and
            intensity with which the division attacked precluded back-haul
            transportation from being a viable means of evacuation. A
            critical shortage of cargo trucks prevented transportation from
            being dedicated to the MP for EPW evacuation. The contracting
            for commercial trucks did not occur prior to the commencement of
            the ground war. MP were forced to rely on commandeered U.S.
            transportation, passing helicopters and captured enemy vehicles.
            Through the mission was accomplished, the lack of dedicated
            transportation hindered the MP effort to provide timely EPW
            evacuation from forward maneuver units. Military police had to
            compete with higher priorities for CL IV barrier material
            (concertina). Lighting systems, tents, blankets, food & water
            had to be procured for the operation of the division's EPW
            central collection point.

            7. (U) LESSON LEARNED:

                  1. current doctrine does not work. Extended lines of
nication, limited MSR's supporting multiple divisions, and
            mass surrenders of EPW prevented backhaul transportation from
            being effective during OPERATION DESERT STORM. Dedicated
            transportation assets (including airlift) must be included in
            planning factors for EPW evacuation.

                  2. Military police must have positive control over the
            transportation assets and equipment required to support EPW
            operations.

            8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Doctrine must be changed to reflect
            a more responsive means of EPW evacuation and support. Equipment
            necessary for EPW operations must be prepositioned with the
            military police. The addition of a transport capability organic
            to the unit will also be required.




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                                       UNCLASSIFIED

Document 253 f:/Week-22/BX001437/24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT/24th mech inf div operation desert storm after a:08029615062350
Control Fields 17
File Room = jun96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-22
Box ID = BX001437
Unit = 24TH ID
Parent Organization = XVIII CORPS
Folder Title = 24 MECH INF DIV AFTER ACTION REPORT
Folder Seq # = 785
Subject = 24TH MECH INF DIV OPERATION DESERT STORM AFTER A
Document Seq # = 50
Document Date =
Scan Date = 12-JUN-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-AUG-1996