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File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0031.txt
Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Box ID: BX001301
Document Number: 3
Folder Title: OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq #: 4
Unit: 3D AD
Parent Organzation: VII CORPS
CB Command Broupt outdistanced our MSE coverage and PCM communication
systems. Node Center 61 followed 2d Bde as planned, dropped off a
remote RA6 at 0930, and by 1050 had a link to Node 60 and emplaced a
local RAU. Node Center 62 and 63 continued north with 2d Bde (See
diagram 4). Node 62 arrived on site at 1500 and linked to Node
Center 61 by 1540. At 1600, Node Center 14 was given a warning order
to move and jump forward of Node Center 63.
The Jump MAIN moved at 0600 with the maneuver brigades, drove to
Node Center 61, and was operational at 1600. The DMAIN moved at
1207, crossed the border at 1230, and marched continually for 70
miles, stopping at Node Center 62 at 0130l 26 Feb. DMAIN was
operational at 0230. In short, both the Jump MAIN and DMAIN moved
concurrently in an effort to catch up with the maneuver brigades
(something we always strive to avoid). Shortly after the DMAIN was
set, the Jump MAIN displaced at 0300 and followed the division moving
further north into OBJ CO" INS and co-located with Node Center 63,
arriving at 1530 hours.
To sum up, our DMAIN was unable to perform its mission essential
tasks the first 36 hours of the battle. Moreover, for 14 hours, the
Jump MAIN couldn't either. We did not effectively "leap frog" the
Jump MAIN and DMAIN to sustain effective communications with the
division, corps, and adjacent units as we planned.
This situation evolved at the worst of times, because at 1630, 25
Feb, LTG Franks and his staff flew to the DTAC, where General Funk
and Blackwell were located, and issued orders to execute Corps FRAS
h involved the attack of deep targets by artillery, MRLS,
close an support and attack helicopters. We had a pressing
requirement for deep operations planning and targeting as well as
future planning, but unfortunately our planners and deep targeting
cell in the DMAIN were in no position to perform their tasks or
communicate. Consequently, the tasks fell to the CG's operational
assistants, the close operations staff at the DTAC, and the
commanders of DIVARTY and 42d FA Bde whaiwere present. Fortunately,
we had.MSE-communication with the (32 and 83 at the Jump MAING and
were able to obtain deep targeting information imagery analysis, and
current intelligence from them. As an anecdote, and an amazing
.demonstration of MSE capability, we placed a call to LTG Yeosocl,,
ARCENT Cdr, in Riyadh, +or LTG Franks on MG Funk's tfobile Subscriber
Radio Telephone (KSRT) in his track. A clear connection from 100 km
into Iraq and a memorable event!
DAY 3 -
26 February 91
We-issued the order to execute our mission, associated with Corps
FRAS PLAN 71 at 0645 on the Division Ftl Command Net, including
supporting graphics, tracing grid coordinate to grid coordinate. At
0845, 26 Feb, two division planners were flown forward and tasked to
refine the order just given, develop a scheme of maneuver for the
9
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Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996