3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR

File: 081996_jul96_decls1_0174.txt
Page: 0174
Total Pages: 269

Subject: 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR                 

Box  ID: BX001301

Document Number:          3

Folder Title: OPORDS AND  COMMAND AND CONTROL                                                                 

Folder Seq #:          4

Unit: 3D AD       

Parent Organzation: VII  CORPS  







               hours Task Force 4-8 destroyed'an MTLB Armored Personnel Carrier (APC), a BRDM,
               and took 30 prisoners. On the Brigade's left, Task Force 4-18 destroyed tw6
               T-62 Tanks and two trucks. It seems the,tanks and trucks had inadvertently
               passed through their lines an a supply route.

                   About this same time our own radio intercept monitored an order from RGFC
               to the Tawakalna Division. The Tawakalnas were ordered to withdraw. Our
               Commanding General's orders followed at 1700 hours. Major General Funk
               assessed we were now exploiting a breakthrough - 2nd Brigade was to continue
               forward. Our S3, Major Chris O'Connor ordered the Battalion to prepare to
               march order. The Battalion rolled forward with the Brigade a few minutes
               later. We also directed 3-20 FA to march order some minutes later.


                   At about 1725 hours, both Task Force   4-8 and 3-8 Cavalry came in contact
               .with the enemy. 3-8 Cavalry started taking indirect fires, probably from 60mm
               mortars. They backed up about 100 meters. The battlefield was obscured by
               smoke and sand. They could not identify targets to their front. Task Force
               4-8 noted a moving truck and dismounted enemy soldiers. Two minutes later, at
               1727 hours, mortar rounds fell and the enemy damaged one tank with a rifle
               propelled grenade. One of the crew received a serious wound to the jaw. The
               Task Force immediately backed out of direct fire range.

                   The Fire Support Officer, CPT N. Perry Patton, initiated a call for fire on
               a target to his front at 1727 hours. The S3 directed the 3-20 FA to cease
               their march order and'emplace. The 3-20 FA remained at their location and
               prepared for action. Our policy during the attack was to fire an illumination
         round as the first round for each fire mission in an initial engagement. The
               intent was to be absolutely sure fires would not impact on friendly troops.
               Battery C fired the first illumination round for adjustment on target number
               YK6004 at UTM grid PU7lB2B9. Cpt Patton could not observe the first or second
               illumination round. A third was fired and observed. CPT Patton sent a
               correction of left 100 and add 500, Fire For Effect. By this time both 3-20 FA
               and 4-82 FA were laid on target. 4-82 FA fired 85 rounds DPICM, 3-20 FA fired
               120 rounds DPICM.

                   Ten minutes later, at 1737 h6urs, the direct fire battle was rejoined. 3-8
               Cavalry destroyed another T-62. Task Force 4-8 destroyed a BMP at 2000 Meters
               range. Task Force 4-8 then s  'ent its Scouts forward. Immediately to their
               front about 2 kilometers they identified a company of BMPs and a company of
               MTLBs reinforced with tanks. The Brigade Commander ordered the Brigade to come
               on line and establish a hasty defense. Task Force 4-18 destroyed a T-62 and
               four trucks. Mortar rounds continued to fall in Task Force 4-8 and Team W,
               Task Force 4-18 on Task Force 4-B's left flank. Our radar continued to emplace
               and cri           east.


                   Our           .Commander determined our general support, reinforcing Battery
               Al @qth Field Artille .(MLRS), commanded by CPT Leonard B. Tokar, was too
                                  . t@
                      " i@ "-        . Y-
               close to   e engagement. KLRS has an 8 kilometer minimum range and they were
               within 5 kilometers of the lead tanks. At 1752 hours, LTC Davis ordered them
               to the rear and prepare to receive fire missions. A-40 FA moved west in good
les in the brigade formation chose
               to follow. Apparently their occupants assumed the battle was not going well
               and a move to the rear was the most prudent action. once established in the
               vicinity of the R3, A-40 FA received a fire mission from the S-3 and fired 12




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Document 269 f:/Week-28/BX001301/OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL/3ad history of operation desert storm and spear:0816961333481
Control Fields 17
File Room = jul96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-28
Box ID = BX001301
Unit = 3D AD
Parent Organization = VII CORPS
Folder Title = OPORDS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = 3AD HISTORY OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND SPEAR
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date = 18-JUL-1996
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 16-AUG-1996