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File: 120396_aug96_decls18_0009.txt
Subject: OPERATION DESERT STORM TASK ORGANIZATION TASK ORGANIZATION
Unit: ARCENT
Parent Organization: CENTCOM
Box ID: BX000473
Folder Title: COMMAND REPORTS 11TH ADA BDE AAR- 1 OF 3 PERMANENT DESERT SHIELD-STORM
Document Number: 31
Folder SEQ #: 1
strengths should be based on required strengths to influence more
immediate replacements.
The casualty reporting system may work great for divisional
units, but is extremely difficult for a separate brigade spread
over 325,000 square kilometers. When the brigade headquarters was
notified of a casualty, it was sometimes necessary to notify a
different PSC due to different PSCA servicing the battalion
involved. If DA had a question, they would call directly to the
battalion/brigade to get additional information.
PSCG were not well connected for information passing,
especially SIDPERS data. For whatever reason, Fort Bliss SIDPERS
Interface Branch did not receive any SIDPERS data or transactions
unless the unit mailed them directly to Fort Bliss.
2) Logistics (S-4). From a logistical perspective, the most
critical lesson learned was that the combat service support (CSS)
structure of the brigade was, and still is, non-functional. it
lacks the proper organization, manning, and standardized
procedures to plan and draw CSS on the area support concept as
well as manage the brigade's materiel assets correctly. This
shortfall is inclusive of supply, maintenance, and transportation
management. Unlike other separate brigades, the llth ADA does not
have a material management center (MMC), a separate support
battalion, or a separate functional CSS staff under the Brigade
S4.
The decentralized tactical operations doctrine that the llth
ADA Brigade employs further impacted on the brigade's ability to
plan and execute CSS plans. The dispersion and separateness
inherent to its tactical operations severely affected the
efficient implementation of routine CSS doctrine and procedures.
s
required in order to sustain the brigade. Among these were supply
and transport, material management action, and augmented
maintenance management sections.
The problem was further compounded by the brigade having a
dual role of providing protection to both corps and theater
assets. This doubled the work load on a staff that was not
resoureed to handle either mission. The support and austainment
of the combat force required creative, resourceful management by
an S-4 section functioning as both a planning and execution
organization.
3) Maintenance (Logistics Reporting Center). The most
important lesson learned is that the scope of the LRCs mission
during war is much greater than during peacetime. The need for
personnel, conniinication, and transportation assets during wartime
must be addressed and the requirements provided for in the unit's
MTOE. The LRC effectiveness would have been increased if the
required personnel and equipment had been available immediately
upon deployment of the brigade instead of piecemealed as the
13
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Document 13 f:/Week-33/BX000473/COMMAND REPORTS 11TH ADA BDE AAR- 1 OF 3 PERMANENT DESERT SHIELD-STORM/operation desert storm task organization task o:11229616374547
Control Fields 17
File Room = aug96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-33
Box ID = BX000473
Unit = ARCENT
Parent Organization = CENTCOM
Folder Title = COMMAND REPORTS 11TH ADA BDE AAR- 1 OF 3 PERMANENT DESERT SHIELD-STORM
Folder Seq # = 1
Subject = OPERATION DESERT STORM TASK ORGANIZATION TASK O
Document Seq # = 31
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 22-NOV-1996