Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
File: 120396_sep96_decls2_0012.txt
Subject: DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT
Unit: 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization: ARCENT
Box ID: BX005554
Folder Title: ARMY EOD IN DESERT STORM VOL 3 542 EOD CONTROL TEAM
Document Number: 4
Folder SEQ #: 3
b. Mission Support
Key problems seem to be MP support at incident sites. There just doesn't seem to be
enough of them to go around. Site security was usually provided by ourselves. 5th
SFG provided it for us when we worked with them.
Guides to different sites were not available. You learn to be very flexible in
finding were you actually need to go and be.
Maps were a problem; they were just not always available. The only times maps were
readily available was when we were attached with 5th SFG and at Camp Freedom.
c. Communications
(1) Radio - Radios we came with were adequate for the first mission, but
later as areas of responsibility grew, the radios did not have the range, hence
inadequate overall.
(2) Telephone - TACS system did not have the phone to give us so we could talk
secure, otherwise it worked well. Autovon on the TACS system was pipedream even
though we had it authorized. We had to use commercial outside the military channels
in order to call to CONUS for official use. Commercial phone system we had at our
CP did not allow us to call anywhere except in the local area. This proved to be a
hindrance when we needed to conduct business on a commercial only access area.
(3) COMSEC - We had all authorized equipment and really no problems except for
replacing the Y-cable. These proved to be in short supply. It would have been nice
to have KY-13's for each team, but not really necessary.
d. Command and Control
We think overall the 542d EODCT was great. They allowed us to do our mission. A
rare commodity these days with the art of micro-management we have seen of late from
the top down. We thought having EOD Group in Riyadh did not allow them to get the
If they had to be there, then they should have
satellite elements out. We felt decisions were made in the afterthought mode when
things needed to be up front. Mission decisions were being made directly to us and
we would ask our EODCT about it and they knew nothing about it. This type of command
and control severely disrupts the system.
e. EOD Tools
The biggest default was not having EUD particular explosives on hand when we
arrived in country that FORSCOM said would be here. Later when we did get stocks of
explosive and used them, you could not replenish what you did use. X-ray film also
proved to be in inadequate supply. The other tools mentioned or comments are
already stated above in paragraph
Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
Document 28 f:/Week-42/BX005554/ARMY EOD IN DESERT STORM VOL 3 542 EOD CONTROL TEAM/desert storm after action report:11229616375156
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-42
Box ID = BX005554
Unit = 22D SUPCOM
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = ARMY EOD IN DESERT STORM VOL 3 542 EOD CONTROL TEAM
Folder Seq # = 3
Subject = DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT
Document Seq # = 4
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 22-NOV-1996