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File: 970107_apr96_decls13_0014.txt
Subject: DUSTY AGENTS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE PROTECTION
Unit: XVIII CORPS
Parent Organization: ARCENT
Box ID: BX000047
Folder Title: CHEMICAL INFORMATION
Document Number: 5
Folder Seq #: 35
..... -------
SECRET
kST-266OZ-055-88 DEC@SIFIEI>
27 January 1988 DOD DIR 520Q.q
agents as compared to the West. What concentration of du t" a@e t -a'l
Clearly there is a need to determine be achieved on the battl:field?"(U)r
the effectiveness of existing and de-
velopmental detectors against dusty (C-NOFORN) An aerosol cloud made up
agents. of particles. in the 0.5- to .3.0-tim
range can be considered to behave
(S-NDFORN) ' @tection is another ex- much as a cloud of vapor on the bar-
ample where our technical solut "a 'tlefield. Therefore, a study of the
of p--otec 'io prop ties of a munition that disse@
to various problems too inat:sr vapor should approximate the
against more modern or more toxic properties of a munition that disse@
agents may have sacrificed capabili- inates aerosols. Previous US studies
ties against older agents. H, and have shown that a liquid-filled 250-
therefore dusty H, will not be de- kg bomb disseminating vapor with a
tected by the current ligal alarm, 60% efficiency produces a concent=-a-
which uses the L'143Al detector unit. tiou x time profile downwind that is
ihe MS and M9 detector PaDers will
usually between 800 and 8000 mg-min/
detect H in liquid form with a raoid
m3. Areas near the bursting radius
response time, and the il256 kit w-'@ll can be subjected to 20 GOO mg,m4a/m3.
detect vaoors but requires a 10- Au October 1986 C.UEC estimate usim,
minute static exposure time. Ni t--o-
gen mustards will Dot be detected by parameters for a hypothetical bomz
filled witbl dusty mustard assumed
any of the above detection items. A t because powder is more difficult:
iitrogen mustard detectictl caoabilit-)r to disseminate than liquid, the
was included in the older H18A2.and dissemination efficiency would be
.M9A2 kits, which used detector tubes, reduced from 60t to 407. For these
but these have been withdrawn from calculations, the munition was as-
US forces' inventory. Consequently, sumed to be filled with an agent
a nitrogen mustard e,.noloyed as a consistiag of 35-4 H arid-65Z silica
dusty a@ent will not be detected by carrier. Correcting the vapor con-
fielded detectors. c--Utration x time profile for the
reduced dissemination efficiency and
(S) The potential lack o@- dusty the reduced agent in the mixture
agent delectability could result in results in Cts of 200 to 2000 mg'miri/
an attack that goes undetected until M3 with a maximum value at some
casualties are experienced among un- points of 5000 mg-mialm3.
protected personnel. If an agent
ve (C-NOFOELN) Tf multiple munitions
equipment may not be doaued quickly were used, the dissemination effi-
enough to prevent significant casual- ciency was improved, or tble agent-to-
ties. Such a possibility presents a carrier ratio was increased (the
commander with the unenviable choice United Kingdom @ recea l@ reported
of wearing protective 'equipment con- a 2 to I loading ratio of H on a com-
tiauously or riskin@ casualties from mercial silica), these Ct numbers
an undetected enemy attack. would increase.
NOT RFLZA.SA13LE M FOREIGN NATIONALS
10
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Document 22 f:/Week-15/BX000047/CHEMICAL INFORMATION/dusty agents implications for chemical warfare p:010297184311120
Control Fields 17
File Room = apr96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-15
Box ID = BX000047
Unit = XVIII CORPS
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = CHEMICAL INFORMATION
Folder Seq # = 35
Subject = DUSTY AGENTS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE P
Document Seq # = 5
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-JAN-1997