Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
File: 970107_apr96_decls13_0018.txt
Subject: DUSTY AGENTS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE PROTECTION
Unit: XVIII CORPS
Parent Organization: ARCENT
Box ID: BX000047
Folder Title: CHEMICAL INFORMATION
Document Number: 5
Folder Seq #: 35
SECRET
AST-266OZ-055-88
27 January 1988
the TMS-65 depends on the absence of dusty mustard agent. The Iraqis
enemy fire and is not expected to be obtained powder milling and liquid-
long. solid mixing equipment and itistal@d
them in the CW agent production
What is the- Drobabilit-v t US facility near Samar--a. Samples rp-
forces will be subjected to a dustv partedly taken from an Iraqi bomb
a@ent actack bv the Warsaw Fact and analyzed by third country parties
a=ies? (C) demonstrated the presence of H plus
ground silica gel or glass. This
(S) Since the likelihood of a chem- information, plus the existence of
ical agent attack on US troops by Iranian mustard casualties having
the Warsaw Pact troops is closely more severe lung damage with lesser
linked to the probability of a con- skin damage as compared to the major-
ventional attack in Europe, it must ity of mustard casualties examined,
be considered quite low. However, led to the conclusion that a d4f-
given the assumption of such a cou- ferent form of mustard had been
ventional attack, the employment of employed.
chemicals by Warsaw Pact forces is
considered quite likely. if the War- (S-NOFORN-WNI.NTET-) The only dusty
saw Pact forces perceived that they agent munition system reoorred to
an agent @t would offer date is the Iraqi bomb ment4@one .d
technical surnrise, could not be above. It was a 250-kg bomb
detected by fielded NATO CBW agent was most likely delivered by a . jet.
detectors, and presented the pros- aircraft. It contained R and silica
pect of defeating NATO Cz-W protec- or glass particles in the I- to
tive equipment, they would be much size range. It is reasonable to
more likely to use chemicals. Given assume that the 130- and 155-mm tube
the current state of NATO prepared- artillery and 122-= rocket ark:il-
ness, a dusty agent could provi'de lery, which the Iraqis have fitted
this option to Warsaw Pact forces. with chemical warheads, could also
if dusty agents are not in the Warsaw be used for delivery of dusty agents.
Pact inventory now, inaction on the The CW production facility near Sam-
part of NATO to correct deficiencies arra I-,as production lines for li, as
in dusty agent protection will only well as the nerve agents tabun and
invite their presence. saris. Other agents are also bein@
developed here. It is not known if
5. T'@ WORLD AWAR-@s AND c&PA- any R&D on dusty agents has been done
BILITL7S (U) at the Samar-@ location.
What dusty aeents are in chemical in- (S-NOFORN-WNINTE:L) The 'means by
ventories or are beinz develODed? (S) which the Iraqis obtained the dusty
agent technology Is not known fo@
OFORN) There is good evidence certain, but three possibilities
that Iraq has produced and 'used a exist, all of which relate back to
NOT R-VL@ABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGF-NCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED
DFCLASSW=
14 DOD DIR 5200 9
Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
Document 22 f:/Week-15/BX000047/CHEMICAL INFORMATION/dusty agents implications for chemical warfare p:010297184311120
Control Fields 17
File Room = apr96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-15
Box ID = BX000047
Unit = XVIII CORPS
Parent Organization = ARCENT
Folder Title = CHEMICAL INFORMATION
Folder Seq # = 35
Subject = DUSTY AGENTS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE P
Document Seq # = 5
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 02-JAN-1997