VII CORPS DESERT CAMPAIGN AFTER ACTION REPORT

File: 970815_sep96_decls60_0020.txt
Page: 0020
Total Pages: 21
Subject = VII CORPS   DESERT CAMPAIGN  AFTER ACTION REPORT                

Parent Organization = ARCENT      

Unit = VII CORPS   

Folder Title = MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND HISTORICAL REPORTS-16TH CSG  2                                        

Document Number =          1

Box ID = BX000311









                                          HISTORICAL REPORT
                                 COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS SECTION
                                      16TH CORPS SUPPORT GROUP


           August - October
               On the second of August SSG(P) Goin joined the 16th CSG as the
           C-E Section NCOIC. Between the 18th and 25th of October, PFC
           Pulley, PFC Corley, PV2 Stewart, and PV2 Meyer were assigned to the
           16th CSG.


           November
               on the fourth of November, CPT Call arrived in Germany and
           became the new Group C-E Officer. The 16th CSG received
           notification of deployment to Saudi Arabia on the eighth of
           November. SSG(P) Goin was promoted to SFC on the ninth of November.
           During November the C-E section spent its time verifying equipment
           serviceability and status. With the addition of SGT Compton and SGT
           Gray on the 21st of November the C-E section finally became
           complete. All personnel were new at their jobs, unfortunately no one
           in the section had ever been to the field with the 16th CSG.
           Personnel continuity did not exist. During the preparations for
           deployment the 16th CSG fielded Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE).
           various members of the Group staff received training on the new MSE
           equipment. Little did we know that no MSE capable Signal Battalion
           would ever support us in Operation Desert Shield. CPT Call attended
           a coordination meeting at the 2nd COSCOM headquarters. initial
           communications plans were discussed and equipment shortage lists
           submitted. At this Point in time, no fixed task organization
           existed and therefore we could not formalize a definite
           communications Plans. Finally, we loaded our equipment on the
           trains for movement to the port.


           December
              December found us performing CTT training in order to prepare
           for the desert environment. we conducted communications equipment
           training on equipment borrowed from other units. The C-E section
           deployed with the main body to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. While living
           in the port, we continued to coordinate and plan for communications
           at Log Base Alpha (LBA). The initial plan called for the 16th CSG
           to have 7 subordinate battalions supported by 2 different signal
           nodes. This signal support did not provide TASS service to all our
           units. The shortage of signal assets prevented additional nodes
           being assigned to the 16th CSG. The proposed solution to the
           problem involved siting each battalion within a 2 mile radius of the
           signal node or the switchboard site. This idea was rejected as not
           being tactically sound. The C-E section deployed to LBA with the
           advance party. Initial set up of communications was confusing and
           frustrating because of the lack of wartime SOls and unreliable TASS
           service. We did fulfill our section's mission by setting up the Log
           Base Alpha FM net, coordinating TASS support, and installing
           internal telephone lines. Unfortunately, the 16th CSG received only
           one signal node. Only the 16th CSG, 4th Trans Bn, and 101st Ord Bn
           received TASS support. The 26th Sig Bn provided our TASS support. We
           did not receive dependable service until the Ist Sig Bn replaced the
           26th Sig an. Many units in the Log Base were upset by the shortage
           and/or lack of TASS lines. This problem occurred because units did
           not have access to Host Nation telephone support and none existed