Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
File: 971208_sep96_decls5_0014.txt
Subject = OPERATION DS AFTER ACTION REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Box ID = BX000078
Folder Title = 24TH ID AARS
Unit = XVIII CORPS
Parent Org = ARCENT
29) OBSERVATION: The speed of the brigades during
the attack prevented the traditional "leap
frogging" of the artillery. A solution was for
the DS battalion to travel in a formation with
three firing batteries abreast. Each firing
battery traveled in a wedge which facilitated
hasty missions.
20) OBSERVATION: During OPERATION DESERT STORM,
targets were generally task force developed --
hasty fires on targets of opportunity. In this
case, the NTC solution of top down fire planning
'may not always apply especially in fast moving
operations over vast distances.
21) OBSERVATION: There are too many different combat
tracked vehicles in a M109 direct support
battalion. A better solution is to have vehicles
with the same chassis such as the CATV and
command post vehicle.
22) OBSERVATION: :rn areas where improved
conventional munitions were used, -many -more
undatonated-munitions were found than were
expected. 2CM areas should either be placed off
limits or a timer must be placed in ICM bomblets.
G. ASSISTANT Z=SION ENGINEER
1) OBSERVATION: Most engineer equipment performed
extremely well during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.
However, the Army needs an off-.road capable HET,
some redesign of the ACE, and a relook at the CEV
and AVLB.
7) OBSERVATION: The E-force concept is valid and
has tremendous application for sustained desert
operations across -the entire spectrum of engineer
priorities. 3:t greatly enhances a mechanized
division's combat and combat support
capabilities.
Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search