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File: 971208_sep96_decls5_0017.txt
Subject = OPERATION DS AFTER ACTION REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Box ID = BX000078
Folder Title = 24TH ID AARS
Unit = XVIII CORPS
Parent Org = ARCENT
2) OBSERVATION: Division multichannel nodes were
unable to keep pace with offensive operations.
During -the battle, single channel TACSAT was the
primary command and control communications link
for the division.
3) OBSERVATION: Adequate assets were not available
for requesting and controlling MEDEVAC aircraft.
Recommend that they be co-located with the
maneuver brigade command and control elements for
better communications and quicker response.
4) OBSERVATION: Combat service support units must
be equipped with redundant communications systems
capable of operating over extended distances.
DISCO.M relied on PCM multichannel to coordinate
with COSCOM and the forward support battalions.
In fast moving offensive operations over extended
distances, communication was not always reliable.
5) OBSERVATION: Division AM secure communications
needs revamping. only one Parkhill device is
available in each brigade and separate battalion.
The effect of this was overreliance on single
channal'TACSAT- Sufficient AM radios must be
available to have an adequate AM secure met.
6) OBSERVATION: The DMAIN Assistant Division
Aviation office (ADAO) aacks the proper
communications equipment. Multichannel is a good
system but not always reliable for timely
information flow. An FM secure is good for short
distances. A VHF system is preferrable due to
extended range capability. Current hand-held
radios are not adequate.
7) OBSERVATION: A medical communications-net should
be a permanent part of -the division SOP and
officially established through signal channels.
Battalion aid stations and medical companies
should have both AM and FM radio systems to
properly monitor and xequest MEDEVACS.
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