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File: 971208_sep96_decls5_0020.txt
Subject = OPERATION DS AFTER ACTION REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Box ID = BX000078
Folder Title = 24TH ID AARS
Unit = XVIII CORPS
Parent Org = ARCENT
6) OBSERVATION: Unmasking procedures are
inadequate to support fast moving offensive
operations. The chemical school should
incorporate abbreviated procedures into FM 3-4
(NBC Protection).
7) OBSERVATION: The Chemical Downwind Message (CDM)
prepared according to doctrine at division level
may -not provide accurate data for subordinate
units spread out over a wide sector. 24 ID
developed a system which minimized this problem
by having the brigades collect their own data and
prepare their CDM.
8) OBSERVATION: Doctrinal guidelines are incomplete
for -the use of chemical persistency charts.
Procedures using daily mean trmperatu--o and wind
speed provide a more accurate prediction.
9) OBSERVATION: False alarms of the M8AI alarm
caused by low battery resulted in unnecessary
upgrade of unit protective posture. The M8AI
should have a low battery alarm / signal.
10) OBSERVATION: There is no serviceability data for
chemical protective overgarments worn beyond -
current time limits. Additionally, there is no
data on-the effects of rainwater on the
overgarments. Answers to these -types of
questions is of -the utmost importance to
commanders and staff.
11) OBSERVATION: The -technology exists for the Army
to procure individual soldier chemical agent
alarms. The Army should purchase these alarms to
improve unit preparedness to operate in a
chemically threatened environment.
E. DTV:ESXON.PROVOST MARSHALL
:1) OBSERVATION: 24 ID had difficulty transferring
EPW to corps military police. The Army should
relook military police doctrine to alleviate this
problem.
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