OPERATION DESERT STORM AAR AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 6 MAR 91

File: 971208_sep96_decls8_0005.txt
Page: 0005
Total Pages: 13
Subject = OPERATION DESERT STORM AAR AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS  6 MAR 91     

Box ID = BX001706

Folder Title = OPERATION DESERT STORM AAR AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 6 MAR 91                                      

Unit = 2D ACR      

Parent Org = VII  CORPS  








           the squadrons flanks during periods of limited visibility and at
           night provided there were favorable winds. The lack of any
           significant enemy contact during first two days negated the use of
           either platoon. During the hasty defense at night an enemy recon
           element blundered into the two lead squadrons. This was initially a
           hasty contact in which the regiment was able to surprise and mass
           fires on the enemy. Because of the massed firepower and superiority
           of friendly weapon systems, smoke would not have had a significant
           impact as a combat multiplier during the engagement.

           2. Command and Control


             a. Smk/87 CM CO was    hampered by ineffective command and control
           dc4ring o4f4@mgive cover operations. Neither the chemical element at
           the RTOC, RTAC or JTOC   could quickly contact the parent unit to
           effect linkup with the   reserve squadron within the planned three hour
           refuel operation. Had    the commander co-located with the RTOC/JTOC It
           may have provided more   effective FM communication with the platoon,
           thus making it more responsive to on order missions. Additionally,
           if communications were not maintained with the platoon, the commander
           would have had the flexibility to move to the platoon to pass
           orders. The ISO could have maneuvered the headquarters and smoke
           platoon -Forward with RSS while the commander ensured mission
           requirements were accomplished for the smoke platoon.

             b. Commander, 172d CM CO (-) co-located with the RTOC and moved
           with the JTOC. Initially this was coordinated so the Regimental NBCE
           could have access to his organic MRT. This would have provided an-
           additional communication link with VII Corps and the two following
           divisions. Unfortunately, the nodes for the MRT were never effective
           once the Regiment crossed the LD. The company commanders' additional
           intent concerning co-location with the RTOC/JTOC was to assist his
           unit in damage control, vehicle recovery, and casualty assistance.
           He was able-to sporadic:ally-communicate with-all element:s_,pf._his
           unit.,-with-the-.flexibility to move to his platoons if needed.

             C. 87th CM CO lacks adequate secure FM communications with th6
           smoke platoon. The company command and smoke platoon only have the
           capability to monitor one secure FM net. This distracts from a fast
           moving offensive covering operation and degrades the company's
           ability to rapidly issue orders to subordinate units.

           3. Logistics

             a. Smk/87 CM Co is critically short required equipment for the
           fuel resupply squad. One five ton truck was dedicated to transport
           the basic load of fog oil (36 barrels) forward to the smoke platoon.
           There is no efficient and speedy means of transferring fog oil from
           the drums to the M1059's. As a result, had the linkup been
           accomplished, and the platoon was required to resupply with fog oil
           prior to a scheduled refuel halt, they would have lost contact with