BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 18 JUN 91

File: 980715_sep96_sagwi1_0039.txt
Page: 0039
Total Pages: 128
Subject = BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT   18 JUN 91                            

Box ID = BX002441

Folder title = HQS 4-32 ARMORDED BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 18 JUN  1991                                         

Unit = TRADOC      

Parent = TRADOC      

         





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                              BAThJE DAMAGE ASSESSVZNT
                 EQs, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry                      1~I S
                                                                       4,.
                                                                      ••1,
                 A.  GENERAL DESCRXP¶tION OP TACTICAL SITUATION: on 26 rebruary 2991,
                 SAD was conducting a movement to contact against the Iraqi
                 Republican Guard Forces Command, specifically the Tawalkana Armored
                 Division, just shy of the northwestern Kuwaiti border. ; 4—i OAT was
                 conducting a moving screen on 3Afls southern (right) flank. 1/4-7
                 CAy was the lead ground troop; two platoons were arranged in depth
                 clearing the zone betweeh BAD and the screen line. One platoon was
                 on the screen line proper. Wbe lead platoon, 3/A/4—7 CAV, tas using
                 bounding overwatch by section. See enclosure Cl.
         
                 B.  KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY .SITUA!rION AND CERTAflQTY or rarr INFORMfl'ION:
                 Although A/4—7 CAY knew the general location of the taiealkaxaa
                 Annored Division (to within -approximately 10K) -prior to crossing the
                 LD, it did not know any enemy dispositions, orientation, or
                 composition. Just prior to making contact, 1)3—7 CAV vas told that
                 the bulk of the Republican Guards was in full retreat northeast
                 towards Basra and that SAD was not in pursuit. However,
                 dispositions and movement techniques remained unchanged.
         
                 C.  TERRAIN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS-PRECiPITZflON, DUST, SMOKE,
                 LIGHT CONDITIONS, DM'E, TIME, ETCt• Contact with the enemy was made
                 at approsimatlily 1530 b±sThflUreb.9l. Dusk was approaching, the
                 sky was overcast, and a sandstorm was blowing limiting naked eycO
                 visibility to tinder BOOm. Thermal sights increased visibility to
                 just under 1000 meters. Smoke was not a factor.
         
                 I). DYNAMICS OF IliTThACTION: The action was joined when 311/4—i CAV
                 gained visibility and engaged enemy troops at a range of between 300
                 and 400 meters. The Iraqi infantry initially returned snail a~s
                 fire. (I thl.nk that the enemy infantry, at least, were shooting at
                 1/4-7 CAVs muzzle flashes). Bath 2/A/4—7 CAY caine on line and
                 engaged troops and B~!Ps (BliP-i) at ranges from about 100 meters to
                 400 meters and tanks (T—72) at ranges of about 300 meters to 800
                 meters. We engaged with 70W2 and TOW2A, 25mm ~I and AP, 7.62
                 (COAX) and 155mm (DPICM). The Iraqi forces returned fire with small
                 arms, machine gun (12.7mm and 14.5mm), 73mm (B~{P-Z), EPGs, ATGM,
                 125mm sabot (T-72), and indirect fires. A/4-7 CA7~as in contact
                 for approximately one hour. See enclosures 2,3 & 4.
         
                 E.  RANGE OF ENGAGEHENT: See paragraph D.
         
                 F.  SENSOR INPORMAXION-SYSTEM USED: Enexny acquisition was achieved
                 with thermal sights only. The engagement was foueht entirely with
                 thermal sights.