BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 18 JUN 91

File: 980715_sep96_sagwi1_0069.txt
Page: 0069
Total Pages: 128
ubject = BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT   18 JUN 91                            

Box ID = BX002441

Folder title = HQS 4-32 ARMORDED BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 18 JUN  1991                                         

Unit = TRADOC      

Parent = TRADOC 

                              BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSXENT
         
         
            HQs, 4th Squadron1 7th Cavalry
         
         
            A.  GENERAL DESCRIPTION or TACTICAL SITUATION:  on 26 February 1991,
            3AD was conducting a movement to contact against the Iraqi
            Republican Guard Forces Command, specifically the Tawalkana Armored
            Division, just shy of the northwestern Kuwaiti border. ; 4-7 CAV was
            conducting a moving screen on 3AD's southern (right) flank.  A/4-7
            CAV was the lead ground troop; two platoons were arranged in depth
            clearing the tone between SAD and the screen line.  One platoon was
            on the screen line proper.  The lead platoon, 31A14-7 CAV, was using
            bounding over-watch by section. See enclosure *1.
         
         •  P.  KnOWLEDGE or ENEMY SITUATION AND CERTAnin OF THAT INFORMATION:
         -  Although A14-7 CAV knew the general location of the rawalkana
            Armored Division (to within approxirnately 10K) prior to crossing the
            LD, it did not know any enemy dispositions, orientation, or
            conposition.  Just prior to making contact, .A14-7 CAV was told that
            the bulk of the Republican Guards was in full retreat northeast
            towards Basra and that 3AD was not in pursuit.  However,
            dispositions and movement techniques remained unchanged.
         
            C.  TERRAIN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS-PRECIPITATION, DUST, SMOKE,
            LIGHT CONDITIONS, DATE1 TIKE, ETC:  Contact with the enemy was made
            at approximately 1530 lirs on 26 Feb 91.  Dusk was approachii~g, the
            sky was overcast, and a sandstorm was blowing limiting naked eye
            visibility to under 300m.  Thermal sights increased visibility to
            just undeY4OOO meters.  Smoke was not a factor.
         
            D.  DYNAMICs or' INTERACTION:  The action was joined when 3/A/4-7 CAV
            gained visibility and enjaged enemy troops at a raz;ge of between 300
            and 400 meters.  The Iraqi infantry initially rdtanied small arms
            fire.  (I think that the enemy infantry1 at least, were shooting at
            A/4-7 CAVs muzzle flashes).  Both 2/Al4-7 CAV came on line and
            engaged troops and BKPs (BliP-i) at ranges from about 100 meters to
            400 meters and tanks (T-72) at ranges of about 300.meters to 800
            meters.  We engaged with ToW2 and TOW2A, 25mm SET and AP, 7.62
            (CQAX) and iSSiam (DPICM). The Iraqi forces returned fire with small
            arms, machine gun (12.7mm and 14.Sinrn), 73mm (BMP-1), R?Gs, ATGM,
            125mm sabot (T-72), and indirect       fires." A/4-7 CAV was in contact
            for approximately one hour.  See enclosures 2,3 & 4.
         
            E.  RANGE Or ENGAGEMENT:  See paragraph D.
         
            F.  SENSOR INFORMArION-SYSTEM USED:  Enemy acquisition was achieved
            with thermal sights only.  The engagement was fought entirely with
            thermal sights.