Aerospace Medicine Consolidated After-Action Report

File: doc08_07.txt
Page: 07
Total Pages: 38

DEPLOYMENT PHASE
* Iraq invaded Kuwait 2 Aug 1990. C Day was 7 Aug 1990, although selected
units were placed on alert prior to that date. At least 9 Wings were alerted by 8
August. Chart 1 reflects the initial deployment timing. Chart 2 depicts the units
which deployed aircraft or Squadron Medical Elements (SME's). In all, 43 active
duty SME's were deployed. Chart 3 lists the SME's in place at the peak of the
deployment. SAC deployed 31 of 78 assigned flight surgeons, and TAC 32 of 87.
The SME concept was validated. In most cases, the deployment of Tactical
and Special Ops aircrews with their SME's went smoothly and as planned and
practiced. In some cases flight surgeons teamed up to deploy a squadron with one
gathering optional equipment and providing briefings and the other making
his"'her personal preparations. AFISOC flight surgeons sat on the Wing "paring
and Tailoring" Committee to decide in advance priorities for limited airlift. In a
few cases, flight surgeons were included on ADVON teams. LII all cases, flight
surgeon involvement in planning facilitated initial employment. Some flight
surgeons were excluded from planning sessions due to inadequate security
clearances or unfavorable "need to know" determinations. This adversely
impacted their ability to make timely and perttnent recommendations.
In a few cases, the Wing deviated from its usual O-plan because "this is the
real thing". This often took the form of last minute changes in personnel or
deploying with greater than planned numbers of people. Limitations of airlift
found several SME's downsizing their ATC pallets on the flight line. Many flight
surgeons took advantage of pallets of opportunity, adding supplies to the life
support pallet or in one case, having pilots carry a hag of W fluids with them in
the cockpit. Several units were told they would not need their ATC. This was
universally bad advice, except to those SME's deploying late to well-established
bases where they were able to talk to SME's already in place.
Medical intelligence was adequate and accessible; however, frequently the
beddown location was unknown or even changed enroute. This also complicated
the question of immunization requirements. In addition to routine mobility
requirements, some early deploying squadrons gave meningococcal vaccine
which was not required at any Air Force locations, and malaria prophylaxis
which was only required in Oman. Headquarters guidance was available within
an acceptable period of time and recommended the 2 versus 5 cc dose of gamma
globulin to conserve stocks. Consideration was not given to whether aircrews at
risk of becoming POW1s should have different immunization requirements.
Many flight surgeons gave predeployment briefings to the maintenance and
support units and felt this paid great dividends in decreased morbidity on arrival
in the theater.
The actual time and date of departure changed frequently and the
recurrent "false starts" resulted in increased emotional stress for both airmen
and their families. Some crews were given Restoril (No-go pills) to prepare them
for an early departure time which then slipped a day. This sequence was
repeated several days in a row. Most TAO squadrons took off for the AOR in the
late afternoon.
Strategic aircrews had no organic medical support (SMz's). SAC, SAC-
gained, and Aeromedical Evacuation flight surgeons were deployed as
individuals and were severely disadvantaged in having to learn the missions and
to establish rapport and integrate with new units from scratch. These flight

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