Press Briefing 27 FEB 91

File: doc53_03.txt
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t-h air c.~rQP.~i9!: sL~ U~~'Jj h: woui `i I,c. lnca~~~~Ie oL r4vJ it c'~L tt COuflLC tiji
even if ic knew ~e mjdc it. There wore ome additicii~~l troo:J; ouL in L~is auea, i':.u~
they did not have the cJpability nor the time to ptit in t~0{? I~a~~'ier that had been
described by Saddam Ius~ein as an ~bsoluteiy ~rnoenetrab~e tank b~rrie that no one
w~uld ever get through. I believe those were his words.

So this was absolutely an extraordinary move. I must tell you, I can1t recall
any time in the annals of military history when this nur~~.er 0Ł forces have moved over
this distance to put themselves in a position to be able to attack. But what's rnore
important, and I thin& it1s very, very important that I make this point1 and that4-s
these logistics bases. Not only did we move the troops out there, but we literally
~noved thousands and thousands of tons of fuel, of aitmunition, of spare parts, of
water1 and of food out here in this area, because we wanted to have enough supplies
on hand so if we launched this, if we got into a slug fest battle, which we very
easily could have gotten into, we'd have enough supplies to last for 60 days. It was
an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give credit enough to.the
logisticians and the transporters who were able to pull this off, for the Superb
support we had from the Saudi Government, the literally thousands and thousands of
drivers of very national origin who helped us in this move out here. And of course,
great credit goes to the coimrnanders of these units who were also able to maneuver
their forces out here ~id put them in this position.

N ~ut as a result, by the 23rd of F~b~~ary~ what you found is this situation.
The front lines had been attritted down to a point where all df these units-were at
50 percent or below. The second level, basically, that we had to face, and these
were the real tough fighters we were worried about right here, were attritted to some
place between SO and ~5 percent. Although we still had the Kepublican Guard located
here and here, and part of the ~epublican Guard in this area -- they were very
strong, and the Republican Guard up in this area strong, and we continued to hit the
bridges all across this area to make absolutely sure that no more reinforcements came
into the battle. This was the situation on the 23rd of February.

Ishouldn't forget these fellows. That SF stands for sp~cial forces. We put
~pecial forces deep into the enemy territory. T[tey went out on strategic reconnais-
sance for us, and they let us know what was going on out there. They were the eyes
that were out there, and it's very important that I not forget those folks.

(Chart)

This was the rtiornin9 of the 24th. Our plan initially had been to start over
here in this area, and do e~~actly what the Iraqis thought we were going to do, and
that's take them on bead-on into their most heavily defended area. Also, at the san~
tirne, we launched amphibious feints and naval gunfire in this area, so that they
continued to think we were going to be attacking along this coast, and therefore,
fixed air forces in this position. Our hope was that by fixing the forces in this
position and with this attack through here in this position, we would basically keep
the forces here, and they wouldn't know what was going on out in this arca. I
believe we succeeded in that very well.

At ~;QQ o'clock in the morning, the Xarines, the ~st ~arine Division and the
2nd ~arine Division, launched attacks through the barrier systern. They were
acccr.p~nied by the U.S. Army Tiger Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division. ~t tbe sar'.
tirr~e, over here, two Saudi tas~ forces also 1aunch~d a penctration through th~s
barrier. But while they were doing that, at ~:OO o'clock in the morning over here,
the 6th ~rench Armored Division, accompanied by a brigade 0Ł the 82nd rirborne, also