CENTCOM NEWS BRIEF

File: DOC_81_CENTCOM_NEW_BRIEF_003.txt
Page: 003
Total Pages: 16
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the air carnpaign started,  he would be incapable of moving out to counter thia move,
even if be knew we made it.   There were sotne additional troops out in this area, but
they did not have the capability nor the tirre to put in the barrier that had been
described by Saddam Hussein as an absolutely impenetrable tank barrier that no one
would ever get through.    I believe those were his words.

      So this was absolutely an extraordinary move.  I musL tell you,    I can't recall
any ti~c in the annals of military history when this number of forces have inoved over
this distance to put themselves in a position to be able to attack.     But what's more
jrnportant, and I think it's very, very important that I make this point,   and that's
these logistics bases.   Not only did we move the trOOPS out there, but we literally
~noved thousands and thousands of tons of fuel, of ammunition, of spare parts, of
water1 and of food out here in this area, because we wanted to have enough supplie~
on hand so if we launShed this, if we got into a slug fest battle, which we very
easily could have gotten into, we'd have enough supplies to last for 60 days.     It was
an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give credit enough to the
logisticians and the transporters who were able to pull this off,   for the superb
~upport we had from the Saudi Covernrnent, the literally thousands and thousands of
drivers of very national origin who helped us in this rr~ove out here.   And of course,
great credit goes to the cornrnanders of these units who were also able to maneuver
their forces out here ana put them in this position.

          But as a result, by the 23rd of February, what YOU found is this situation
    The front lines had been attritted down to a point where all of these units were at
    50 percent or below.  The second level, basically, that we had to face, and these
 )  were the real tough fighters we were worried about right here, were attritted to some
    place between 50 and ~5 percent.  Although we still had the Republican Cuard located
    here and here, and part of the ~epub~ican Guard in this area  - they were very
    strong, and the Republican Guard up in this area strong, and we continued to hit the
    bridges all across this area to make absolutely sure that no more reinforcements came
    into the battle.  This was the situation on the ~3rd of February.

      I shouldn't forget these fellows.  That SF stands for special forces.   we put
~pecial forces deep into the enemy territory.  They went out on strategic reconnais-
sance for us, and they let us know what was going on out there.  They were the eyes
that were out there,  and it's very important that I not forget those folks.

(Chart)

      This was the mornin9 of the 24th.  Our plan initially had becn to start over
here in this area,  and do exactly what the Iraqi8 thought we were going to do, and
that's take them on head-on into their most heavily defended area.   Also, at the sarne
time, we launched amphibious feintS and naval gunfire in this area,  so that they
continued to think we were going to be attacking along this coast,  and therefore,
fixed air forces in this position.   Our hope was that by fixing the forces in this
position and with this attack through here in this position1  we would basically keep
the forces here,  and they wouldn't know what wae going on out in this area.  I
believe we succeeded in that very well

         At 4:00 o'clock in the morning, the Marines, the 1st xarine Division and the
2nd Marine Division,    launcbed attacks through the barrier systern. They were
~t~ompanied by the U.S. Army Tiger Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division.    At t?)e sar',e
t~itte,  over here, two Saudi task ~orces also launched a penetration through this
barrier.     But while they were doing that, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning over here,
the 6th ~rench Armored D~vision,   accompanie~ by a brigade of the 82nd Airborne,  also