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                       COMMAND AND CONTROL

    TOPIC:  The soldier usually does not get the whole story.

    OBSERVATION:   History has shown that sometimes the troops
are misinformed on the capabilities of a piece of equipment or
a unit1s capability to execute a mission in a specified time.
This misconception is enhanced by limits to training and
shortcuts in training to meet mission goals.  As an example,
Task Force Smith, which as a well-trained unit, was not told of
the inability of the 9~mm rocket to penetrate the frontal armor
of North Korean tanks.   Panic set in after rounds bounced off
the front of the tanks.   Another area of misinformation is
staff actions.   During training exercises, we approve actions
like movement requests and air support to enhance training or
the play of an exercise.   This may lead the subordinate to
expect it that fast during an actual conflict or war.  This
false perception can cause units major problems.

    LESSON LEARNED:   Command information programs which provide
the soldier realistic capabilities, information and solutions
are required.   TC 9~-l6 (Armor/AntiArmor Operations on the
Integrated Battlefield) is one source which provides capabili-
ties and solutions.   Soldiers need to know Explaining why
certain Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) are required
during training is another method of providing the soldier with
the information.   Tying the capability to TTP reinforces the
information.   An especially effective technique used on North
Africa was for all soldiers to fire their weapons at enemy
vehicles and equipment on training ranges to gain confidence in
the weapons and to see first hand the effects of the weapons on
the enemy vehicles and equipment.

    VIEWER NOTES:

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