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File: 082696_d50033_002.txt
flFTER ~CTION
ITEM: Target Intelligence Capabilities of the MEF
OBSERV~~TIONS: MEF G-2 provided inadequate targe~ validation and
target description intellegence services.
DISCUSSION: The Current Operations Target Section (Tgts)
validation process was set up to be telephonically provided by
MEF G-2. This situation proved generally workable until MEF
consolidated at Safaniya, then later at their field forward CP.
~s the prosecution of the air war commenced from its initial
stages, it became increasingly apparent that the MEF's ablity to
provide timely and accurate target intelligence ws not sufficient
to keep up with its plan for conducting battlefield preparation.
~~Initial targets were developed after months of~intelligence
gathering. Most of these targets were fixed sites. This was
;-~ consistent with the early strategy of isolating the battlefield.
5 the air campaign moved out of its initial stages, it became
easingly apparent that the MEF could not keep up with the
)~;~~require~e~t for reliable, timely target intelligence. The end
result was a JF~CC ~tO rich with Marine targets of questionable
validity It appeared targets were not being updated in a timely
* * or accurate fashion. These essential targets were nominated to
* ~F~CC Plans to hopefully be~ married up with JF~CC assets. Once
these targets reached the current ~TO they became a validation
********-* *~~ightmare. Typical validation dates were a week to two weeks
Priority' targets, placed on the MEF Target list because
~~of their importance to the MEF, were not updated using imagery
*~or other reliable assets. Valuable sorties were being wasted on
targets that simply were not there. ~ircrews did not get up to
* date information. This haphazard practice put them at peril as
* * we asked pilots to put their lives on the line for what we
described as essential missions, but that were in actuality
best guess estimates of a target that was once in the area. This
* * *~?~ - * * became painfully apparent when 8-52s were assigned to attack
Marine targets. The MEF simply could not provide the basic
**** information necessary to do good mission planning. This
****`* * requirement was emphasized over and over to the MEF. They
continued however to nominate targets for attack by 8-525,
continued to get them, and continued to neglect the need for good
* * * target information The Current Ops targeteers were forced to
find alternate means of~ validating targets. More than this, it
caused development of a system for identifying target
* intelligence on JFflCC sorties fragged against Marine targets
without relying on the MEF. Validation through J-ST~RS, ~S~RS,
and other theater-level assets became the norm vice the
exception. The target validation process was accomplished
locally via the 8-52 target intel section, CENT~F intel section,
3ST~RS, SYERS, Marines assigned to the local photo interpretation
s~ction, and most importantly, ~S~RS. While theoretically
these same ~ources of intelligence support were available to I
MEF, communications limitations prevented the timely provision of
such support, and turn-around to the MarLnO. ~lthough a MEF G-2
Liaison Officer was attached to the 513th MI Group, he was unable
)
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