Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search

show of determination by the division.   Holland Smith's action
did not achieve that purpose.  Worse,  it created a controversy
which essentially ended Smith's career as a combat leader.

f.   Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, USA, the
administrative commander of Army units in the Pacific theater,
insisted that the Marine general was not justified in relieving
the Army division commander.   Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, the
commander-in-chief of the Pacific theater, essentially agreed.
The end result was the shifting of Holland Smith from his combat
command to an assignment as commanding general of Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific.

g.   The Smith-vs-Smith controversy affects Service relationships
to this day.   There has been an unwritten rule that a joint
commander will not summarily relieve an officer of another
Service.   Marines, even those who may have agreed with Holland
Smith's action on Saipan, have supported the unwritten rule.  It
protected some senior Marine officers from summary relief by
General William C. Westmoreland, the Army officer who had
operational control of all U.S. forces in South Vietnam.   Such
reliefs were handled quietly through the Marine, not Army, chain
of command.

h.   The Saipan-Tinian campaign also provides an excellent example
of the cooperation possible with joint doctrine.   In this case,
both the Army and the Marines used a common doctrine for
artillery.   This allowed the easy creation of a joint artillery
command structure which coordinated and controlled artillery
support to all American units.   Heading the organization was the
senior artillery officer present, who happened to be an Army
brigadier general.   Senior artillery commanders from both
Services met almost daily to iron out problems, and, as a result
of these meetings and other coordination,  enabled the assault
units to receive superb artillery support.

i.   This arrangement, successful though it may have been, did not
survive the Smith-vs-Smith affair.   As Marines and Army split
along Service lines, the ad hoc set-up became increasingly less
cooperative.   In the end, it foundered upon parochial issues.

1005.   KOREA

a.   The Marine Corps initially committed a single brigade to the
Korean War.   It consisted of a regimental combat team and an
aircraft group.   The latter flew two squadrons from World War II
vintage escort carriers and provided close air support to the
ground side of the brigade.   Marines on the ground benefitted
from the maturation of the air-ground team concept which the
Marine Corps had so long envisioned.   The aircraft group kept
fighter-bombers orbiting over the regiment and.could attack a
ground target within seconds of receiving a request.

                                1-4

Document Page: First | Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search