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File: 082696_d50035_021.txt
control (OPCON) "through functional component commands when such
a command structure will enhance the overall capability to
accomplish the mission of the establishing commander."
e. Observations.
(1) All the Services maintain and employ aviation, albeit for
differing purposes. Accordingly, aviation or "airpower" is a
poor functional discriminator and in its broadest interpretation
would encompass all the Service air arTns, air defense forces, and
all possible employments. Said another way, air is a medium and
airplanes are instruments; how they are used--the objective of
their employment--are the functional discriminators. All
Services have trucks and engineers; as each puts them to
differing employment in support of their overall missions, there
would be little sense in consolidating all these instruments in
one Service or another.
(2) Historically, the primary components of warfare have been
continental warfare and naval warfare. In recent times,
strategic nuclear warfare can logically be added to the list as a
separately identifiable category. While the advent of aviation
has contributed significantly to all three, it has neither
abolished any of these categories nor created a clearly separable
warfare category of its own. This is clearly evident in naval
functions and organization. In continental warfare, consider the
Army (TRADOC)/Air Force (TAC) "air-land battle" concept, the Army
communications zone support for deployed Air Force units, and the
Army/Air Force collaboration for air defense and air-ground
operations which link these two Services together for operations.
The Air Force contributions to strategic nuclear warfighting
have been accorded Specified Command "single-Service" status,
clearly apart from joint organization for the conduct of war.
(3) Since roles and missions do not uniformly reflect either a
warfare or elemental orientation, there will be persistent
organizational discordance throughout the unified structure.
While this could be resolved on a case-by-case basis, the Air
Force doctrine infrastructure, which occupies an influential role
within Air Force operational planning, has waged an active
campaign over the years to adjust or create joint doctrine which
supports their own institutional doctrine and beliefs. Obvi-
ously, any organization which owes its existence to the idea of
the separateness of airpower will be sensitive to any concept
which folds aviation into the force as a whole.
(4) This organizational divergence surfaces primarily when
employing Air Force forces as part of an integrated air-surface-
subsurf ace organization in naval warfare and when employing
Marine air-ground task forces in continental warfare where air
operations are divided between the Army and the Air Force. Each
Service develops its internal organization, doctrine, and C2
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