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File: 082696_d50035_023.txt
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  (2)   FOFA doctrine is a subset of interdiction and in fact
falls under JCS Pub 3-03, Joint Doctrine for Interdiction,  in the
JCS publication hierarchy.  The Air Force component of USCINCEUR
(USAFE) has played the major role in bringing FOFA doctrine to
life although the Army component of USCINCEUR (USAREUR) has been
a spirited and enthusiastic participant in this project.

b.   Observations

  (1)   FOFA has been developed with a continental warfare flavor.
As such, FOFA has significant applicability on the plains of Eu-
rope and little applicability elsewhere with the possible excep-
tion of Korea where a limited form of FOFA might be possible.
The European community (both U.S. national and NATO) view FOFA as
the panacea to bring parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces
in a conventional war.

  (2)   Navy and Marine Corps planners and operators view the
emphasis on FOFA with some concern.   There has been little effort
to incorporate naval concerns in emerging FOFA doctrine although
FOFA proponents are guick to find a role for "naval assets" in
the "FOFA campaign."   In the past these FOFA proponents have
advocated the use of Navy and Marine Corps TACAIR--to include
Marine Corps attack helicopters--as assets which could contribute
to FOFA.

C.   Conclusions

  (1)   Marine Corps planners and operators should view the FOFA
concept as an option which might be used to conduct preemptive
strikes on known masses of enemy forces prior to the general
outbreak of hostilities when the locations of such enemy forces
are known and sufficient friendly forces to take them under
attack have been deployed to the theater.   After the general
outbreak of hostilities, U.S. forces will be handily engaqed at
the FLOT with few assets available to conduct FOFA.

  (2)   Air Force planners and operators view FOFA as the modern
day continuation of "Operation Strangle" of World War II and
Korea.   These interdiction campaigns did not cut back on the flow
of supplies to the Germans in World War II and the Chinese and
North Koreans in Korea.   The success of the Germans, Chinese and
North Koreans, and more recently the North Vietnamese,  in the
face of air interdictions indicates that such a campaign will
bring success only when coupled with ground operations.

3004.   TASK ORGANIZATION

a.   Background.  Marine forces are formed into Marine air-ground
task forces (MAGTFs)  for combat operations.  MAGTFs are combined
arms forces consisting of ground, aviation, and combat service

                               3-13


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