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These deficiencies are to include personnel shortages, shortages

of critical skills, anct training needs.  In many cases,  ~owever,

the commanders had not reported these deficiencies, and managers

and decision makers, therefore, did not know the actual status of

the units.   As previously stated, many Reserve and National Guard

units arrived at the mobilization stations with large numbers of

non-deployable personnel; consequently, the Army had to transfer

the needed personnel from other units.   This was the case with

the Fort Carson thoracic surgeon team   which was selected for

mobilization based in part on its reported 100 percent personnel

strength.   If the unit status reports for this and other units

had been accurate, the Army might have either not mobilized that

unit or had the required personnel at the mobilization station

when the units arrived.


MANY PERSONNEL NOT TRAINED FOR WARTIME MISSIONS


Many doctors and nurses in active, Reserve, and National Guard

units had not been trained during peacetime to perform their

assigned wartime jobs.   In addition to lacking basic soldiering

skills, as previously mentioned, many doctors and nurses had not

participated in field training and were not familiar with their

unit's mission or field equipment.   In peacetime, Reserve and

National Guard units are required to train on designated weekends

and during a 2-week training exercise.   However, during these

weekend drills and annual training exercises, many Reserve and


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