COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 13 APR 91

File: 100896_sep96_decls8_0002.txt
Page: 0002
Total Pages: 31

Subject: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 13 APR 91            

Unit: 2ND MARDIV  

Parent Organization: 2 MEF       

Box ID: BX600014

Folder Title: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 2ND MARINE DIVISION 1 OF 10  JAN - APRIL 1991                                

Document Number:          3

Folder SEQ  #:          4


                                 UNCLASSIFIED 0


       attempt to out his way out of a tightening noose. Losing control of
       his troops, this movement became a rout, and his army was destroyed.

           our equipment was certainly an important factor in this
       operation. in every engagement, our equipment proved superior to the
       enemy's, and was even more effective against his than we had
       originally anticipated. We used our weapons svstems cruite literally
       to their limitsi and they never failed us.










                                         The global positioning system (GPB)
       proved especially valuable in maneuvering in this desert environment.
       The new mine rakes, received just days before G-day, were far more
       effective than the older mine plows in clearing and proofing the
       lanes through the minefields.

           We had the enemy beaten on three levels; strategically,
       operationally and tactically. On the strategic level, he seemed to
       be unable to comprehend the third dimension of combat, airpower. By
       abandoning the skies to us, he gave us the ability to strike him at
       all levels of his command and control, to attack and destroy his
       supply lines and equipment, and to reduce his first-line troops to
       the lowest levels of effectiveness. operationally, he was not able
       to react in any effective manner to our attack, due to our surprise
       and speed of maneuver. Tactically, the physical and moral
       destruction of his frontline troops made our attack more effective
       when it came.

           In these ways, the operation was a vindication of the warfighting
       philosophy developed by our Corps and outlined in FMPX-L and FMPM-2.
       It should be remembered, however, that this philosophy of maneuver
       warfare is essentially a reaffirmation of the principles by which we
       have always fought. whether fighting as a MEP, MEB or MEU, it is our
that remains decisive. The best plans and
       the most advanced equipment are useless unless commanders at every
       level ate aggressive, decisive. flexible and fully prepared to act in
       accordance with their commander's intent. That our Corps has been
       able to develop a generation of leaders with these attributes
       reflects highly upon the training programs of the past ten years.
       The victory gained by this division was won not just in the deserts
       of Kuwait, but in the professional schools which prepared our Marines
       for this operation.

           The paragraphs which follow describe the actions and
       accomplishments of this division from the initial arrival of the
       division in Southwest Asia to the conclusion of operations in Kuwait.


                                         11-2


                                    UNCLASSIFIED

Document 31 f:/Week-35/BX600014/COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 2ND MARINE DIVISION 1 OF 10 JAN - APRIL 1991/command chronology for the period 1 jan to 13 ap:100196125355
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-35
Box ID = BX600014
Unit = 2ND MARDIV
Parent Organization = 2 MEF
Folder Title = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 2ND MARINE DIVISION 1 OF 10 JAN - APRIL 1991
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 13 AP
Document Seq # =
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 01-OCT-1996