COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 13 APR 91

File: 100896_sep96_decls8_0006.txt
Page: 0006
Total Pages: 31

Subject: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 13 APR 91            

Unit: 2ND MARDIV  

Parent Organization: 2 MEF       

Box ID: BX600014

Folder Title: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 2ND MARINE DIVISION 1 OF 10  JAN - APRIL 1991                                

Document Number:          3

Folder SEQ  #:          4


                             0      UNCLASSIFIED 0

             Based upon this, the division developed plans, to include
         training, for the passage of lines.(21) A movement plan was designed
         to support an orderly and rapid passage through the breach created by
         the lst Division. Under this plan, the times, routes and procedures
         to be used by the division's regiments and separate battalions were
         initially established.(22)

             Even as detailed planning for this concept of operations
         continued, questions began to arise among the division staff. The
         site chosen for the breach was at a point where the two defensive
         belts were about twenty kilometers &part. This distance, coupled
         with the width of the breach itselfe would obviously restrict the
         movement of the ISt Division as it emerged from the first breach,
         keeping it in the fire sack between the Iraqi defensive lines for an
         unacceptably long time.(23) The Ist Division's own plans called for
         a determination to be made, not later than 1300 on the day of the
         attack, if the second breach could be accomplished before dark. If
         not, the Ist Division would take up defensive positions for the night
         in the zone between the defensive belts. The second breach would go
         at first light on the following day. This could mean that the Ist
         Division might spend thirty hours or more attacking through both
         belts to complete the breaches. This was thirty hours in which the
         division would be a target to the indirect fire weapons employed by
         the enemy to cover his defensive lines. During this same time the 2d
         Division would be waiting in its attack positions, within range of
         Iraqi fire, but unable to influence the battle. The plan would have
         also required the two divisions to exchange zones as currently
est and
         advance to the east, and 2d Division would move around them to the
         west.

             As these considerations were discussed, it became apparent that
         there was a better solution to the problem of the breach. By
         reviewing the enemy's dispositions and concentrating upon the KEF
         objectives, it was discerned that the creation of a second breaching
         site would more rapidly accomplish the KEF's mission. After
         developing several courses of action, the division staff presented
         recommendations for changes to the KEP concept of operations. The
         resulting concept of operations proposed that ist Division would
         conduct their breach as originally planned, while the 2d Division
         would conduct a second breach further to the north and west in the
         vicinity of the UMM GUDAIR oilfield.(24) The area between the
         defensive belts was narrower (4 to 6 kilometers), which would allow a
         more rapid advance through the kill zone between the belts.(25)

             With the lst Division conducting its breach at the original site,
         it was in position to link up with the ATF, or seize ATF Objective A.
         Also, by extending the boundary between the divisions due north, the
         Ist Division would be responsible for securing NEF Objective B. The
         2d Division, after completing its breach, would continue its attack
         north to KEF objective A. (Over several weeks of planning, the
         designation of the KEF objectives changed several times. Those
         listed above are for the original objectives as shown in the MARCENT
         order. As finally set they were as follows: HEF Objective A, Al
         Jaber Airfield, in lst Division's zone; MEF Objective Di the key


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Document 31 f:/Week-35/BX600014/COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 2ND MARINE DIVISION 1 OF 10 JAN - APRIL 1991/command chronology for the period 1 jan to 13 ap:100196125355
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-35
Box ID = BX600014
Unit = 2ND MARDIV
Parent Organization = 2 MEF
Folder Title = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 2ND MARINE DIVISION 1 OF 10 JAN - APRIL 1991
Folder Seq # = 4
Subject = COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN TO 13 AP
Document Seq # =
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 01-OCT-1996