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File: 082696_doc1_031.txt
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               An army with a chemical warfare (CW) capability has the ability to employ

               chemical weapons to supplement its conventional firepower and tactics.
               The agents of concern are blister (mustard gas, lewisite), blood

               (hydrogen cyanide), and nerve (tabun, sarin, VX).       The differences

               between these agents are militarily significant and are explained below.


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               weapons have to harm friendly forces as easily as they do those of the

               enemy, and the effectiveness of defensive measures.       Iraqi use of CW in

               the Gulf War showed that this was a Eurocentric view, inapplicable to

               conflicts in less developed areas.       Although the casualties caused by

               chemical munitions were probably less than those that would have been

               produced by a comparable weight of explosive munitions, chemical weapons

`    )         were found to have two significant effects In the context of Third World

               conflicts.  First,       they were a force multiplier in that they were

               instrumental in preventing Iran from massing its forces for the

               long-awaited "final offensive."        Second, chemical attacks often had a
               disastrous effect on the morale of the largely unprotected Iranian

               troops.   (It may even be speculated that Iraqi threats to hit Iranian

               cities with chemical weapons were a factor in pushing Iran into accepting

1              a cease-fire in July 1988.)        Furthermore,  the successful use of CW
               against the Kurds in late 1988,       the first time in decades Kurdish

               guerrillas were forced to flee their territory, demonstrated the utility

               of chemical weapons in a counterinsurgency context.


11             The Iraqi experience with CW was watched closely by other Third World

               states facing similar security threats.       Many concluded that chemical
               weapons could have military utility for them as well.


               (*) Condensed from original article appearing in,       "Chemical Weapons in
                   the Middle East:       Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya," Marine Corps Gazette,
                   July 1990, by Andrew Rathmell.


i              gb/wicw/a                                   1


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