CMD RPT ODS 25 MAR 91

File: 980811_sep96_decls12_0009.txt
Page: 0009
Total Pages: 19
Subject = CMD RPT ODS   25 MAR 91

Box ID = BX003208

Folder Title = 803 MED GROUP-COMMAND REPORT ODS

File Cabinet = Week-38

Parent Organization = HSC
























               Brigade) was unable to react quickly to provide guards to 'led
               Base America or to provide  guards to go with patients on TIC
               flights.
               (5) Transport of EPWfs to   and from the camp as well as
               transfer of EPW's to other  modioal facilities.

           These problems eased as the MP  Brigade and supporting MP
           Battalions came on line. some   degree of stability was established
           by the and of the second week.

           Translators. No translators were available until two weeks after
           t@ia first EVW patient was treated by the Group.
           Transfer to Saudi Control. Almost two weeks were recruited before
           the Sauai officials at the KKMC XODA Hospital were instructed by
           their chain to assume the EPW treatment  '/evacuation mission. zio
           assistance was provided by the 800th MP's to assist in the transfer
           of responsibility from American to Saudi control at this time.
           Hospital PI          The number of hospital beds in this location
           provea surrl:]i@!nngotor total admissions to date of approximately
           2200 patients. Except for short stay beds required at the EPW Camp,
           the 540 minimal care beds in our Evao Hospitals were not required.
           However, more critical care and intermediate care beds and staffizg
           care needed.
                The adaptation of the staff from an Evao Hospital into a fixed
           host nation facility was not a good match. A TDA hospital staff
           would probably have been more effective.
           Civilians. The MEDCOM OPORD had prepared us to cope with civilians
           onty s@econ@darilv (see Figure C). Iraqi civilians @osed some medical
           problems since ib@ hospitals did not have pediatricians, pediatric
           nurses or medical supplies. Early on, no one know how to discharge
           a recovered civilian or where to send those who required additional
           long-term care.
           M-Ro. sub-area I J14RO had difficulty communicating with the corps
           lffo-rs repeatedly because they initially did not got communications
           equipment and later because of equipment malfunctions. some forwazd
           deployed units perhaps frustrated by poor communications with their
           Madiciti brigade MRO'st simply evacuated patients unregulated.
                Inexperienced PAD personnel often did not understand medical
           terminology and confused messages as a result.
                Physicians and nurses did not understand the medical
           re ulating system. They failed to properly use Form 602 and
           fayled to request the level/location of care most appropriate for
           the patient.



             XITFORMATION AVAILABLE DURING THE PLANNING PHASE AND THEN GAINED
           1. Good planning was hampered by contradictory estimates of
           anticipated casualties that would arrive at KKMCI ranging from
Unit = OTSG        
Parent = HSC