ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                           iss

   Our electronic warfare assets--for example, the Radio Battalion--worked very
well.  We also received a lot of information from Marine aviation.   They'd fly
a mission, and when they got back they'd immediately call the division's combat
operations center to report whatever they saw.     `That was close to real4ime
intelligence support.
   I guess that our biggest overall intelligence shortcoming was in building
Saddam Hussein and his forces into a monster that just wasn't there. Going into
the battle, this made us more gunshy than we should have been.   Certainly, the
Iraqis had more equipment and capability than any force we've ever faced.     But
the fighting spirit just was not there.  The individual foot-soldiers were badly
abused  by  their leaders--not  necessarily   their military leaders, but    their
government--and low morale was the result. I think their senior military leaders
knew what they were doing.      After we seized Kuwait City, we uncovered
several sand tables depicting their defenses that were incredibly detailed.  They
were fully prepared for us.   They had thousands of weapons and millions of
rounds of small-arms and tank ammunition--so they could have put up one hell
of a fight if they had wanted to. Their defensive areas were well organized, and
had they chosen to put their hearts into it, we would have had a real fight on
our hands.
   I guess it all boils down to the fact that the individual Iraqi soldier did not
measure up to, say, the North Vietnamese soldier.    The Iraqis were not ready
to die for what they believed in--whatever that was.
   And that's it in a nutshell.