ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOrATED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                        1S7

ammunition supply point in Marine Corps history, and all the supplies I MEF
needed for the attack into Kuwait.

Proceedings: Seven days for a Marine division--that's a lot of ammunition.

Krulak: In this case, we're talking about seven days for two Marine divisions,
plus the Army's armored Tiger Brigade, which was operating with the 2d
Marine Division.  Those forces generate a very large ammunition requirement,
which made this staging operation one heck of a gamble on General Boomer's
part.  Why?    Because we were staging our ammo far forward of any Marine
ground forces.  But General Boomer wanted to ensure that he had his support
up where it would do him some good when the push into Kuwait began.      At the
time we started to build up Kibrit, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions were some
100 kilometers south of us. They did not come north until late January 1991.
North of Kibrit, all we had was a screening force of Saudis and Qatars.  At the
time of the Iraqi move on the abandoned coastal town of Khafji, we were still
the northernmost Marines in town, although Major General [William M.] Keys
and the 2d Marine Division were by then only ten miles or so to our south-
west.
   The Iraqi attack on Khafji was three-pronged, and we were in danger of
being attacked. I took every bit of ground defense I had and put it around the
ammo dump.     I felt that I could lose everything but the ammo. If we lost that,
our offensive capability would cease to exist. I called General Keys and he sent
up some reinforcements from the Tiger Brigade, who screened us for the next
few days while the Khafji fight was going on.  Those were interesting times, as
the Chinese might say. [EDITOR'S NOTE: "May you live in interesting times"
is regarded by the Chinese as a curse.]

Proceedings: So the Kibrit gamble paid off.

Krulak: The whole support problem was simple, as long as we were at Kibrit.
It was only 50 kilometers from the coast--handy for ammunition resupply.    In
addition, it had its own water source--a well of its own.  But things changed.
For the logisticians, the war didn't begin on G-Day--24 February--with the start
of the ground assault; it really began about three weeks earlier, when General
Boomer decided to breach the Iraqi defenses in two places with two Marine
divisions, instead of a single breach with one division.
   On or about 4 February, I went to see General Keys.         I had been his
assistant division commander at one time, so it was no big deal--I just dropped
by.    Entering his tent, I saw General Boomer, as well.   They were looking
intently at a map.
   General Boomer looked up at me and asked, "What would you think of a
twodivision breach?1,
   Well, I had thought about that possibility a lot, as had most of the general
officers out there. I went through the laundry list of reasons to do it: complicat-
ing the enemy's defensive problem by attacking on two fronts; avoiding a