176                                 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, I99~I99l


method of lay as a backup to celestial when stars were obscured by clouds or
oil smoke.    We established a declination station using PADS at the final
assembly area to ensure that aiming circles were as accurate as possible.
    Because speed was essential, howitzers were positioned in very close prox-
imity to each other, expediting the laying process.  This also simplified control
and provided a good, tight position, making it easier for the LAl company to
provide security.

                                  Security

    Company B of TF Shepherd provided a screen from the final assembly area
to the firing point and cover while the battery was in position. The night vision
and superb weapons capabilities of the light armored vehicle (LAV) were
invaluable.  They spotted enemy movement and provided covering fires as the
battery withdrew after its first raid. Additional security was provided by the .50
caliber and MKi9 machineguns mounted on the MlO9s.
    Providing another layer of security and adding to the combined-arms nature
of the raids was fixed-wing aviation from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. Under
control of Company B's forward air controller (FAC), EA-6B Prowlers jammed
Iraqi ground surveillance radars as soon as the raid force entered a radar
capabilities fan and continued jamming until the raid was completed. F/A- 1-8,
AV-8B and A-6E strike aircraft were on call to provide support if the raid force
ran into trouble and to attack certain targets in coordination with the artillery
when it was appropriate.  The F/A-i 8s were exceptionally valuable in a later
raid as we refined concepts and devised more innovative methods.

                          Meteorological Support

    We needed accurate meteorological data if our fires were to be effective. It
would have been very simple to "fly a Met" balloon in the position area near
Al Qaraah before the raid force departed, but the accuracy would have been
poor for two reasons.  Some of the raids were conducted as far as 70 kilometers
from Al Qaraah, and the raid force often departed as early as eight hours before
the scheduled firing times. The separation in both time and distance would have
rendered the Met useless.
    The solution was for the raid force to take the meteorological data system
(MDS) as far as the final assembly area, usually 10 to 15 kilometers from the
planned firing point.  In the assembly area, MDS set up and ran a Met, and
delivered the data to the battery fire direction centers (FDCs) before they
departed for the firing points.
    The only problem we encountered with Met was one instance when the MDS
tracking frequency was jarnmed as a Met balloon was being flown, causing us
to loose the top three lines of Met data. We confirmed the jamming was coming
from the Iraqis and devised procedures to work through the jamming should it
happen again.  We weren't jammed again on a raid, but interference with Met
frequencies was a common occurrence in several Marine Corps artillery units.