180                                   U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

    A very unlucky group of Iraqis had just driven into the target area when
Battery Q's rounds impacted on the second target.  The dual-purpose improved
conventional munitions (DPICM) destroyed three vehicles and caused two others
to disperse very rapidly.  One hapless Iraqi drove across the border intO Saudi
Arabia and into Company B's machinegun fire. We couldn't believe the success
we were having but decided to cut it short when mortar rounds started falling
on the friendly side of the berm near Battery S. We shifted Battery Q's fires to
a third target, a suspected D-30 battery, and as S Battery withdrew, the FAC
with B Company called in a pair of F/A-i 8s with Rockeye bombs on the brigade
CP and the police post just for added security.
    We had agreed early-on that enemy incoming would be cause to abort the
mission, at the battery commander's discretion.   The assets were too valuable
and the ground war hadn't even started yet; we could raid again another day.

                   Raid 2: Police Post at Umm Hujul

    This was really not an artillery raid but an LAl raid with artillery in direct
support, or as it came to be known, the "drive-by shooting." The same division
fragmentary order that established the 5/11 as the raid force also tasked 5/11 to
be prepared to support TF Shepherd in any raids it might execute.    The raid on
the police post at Umm Hujul was such a raid.
    Considerable Iraqi activity had been noted near the police post, and the raid
was intended to disrupt enemy activity, spoil his intelligence-gathering efforts
and discourage any further buildup in the area.  The concept was very simple.
TF Shepherd slipped up to the border and fired on the police post with mortar
and 25-mm cannons while 5111 isolated the objective area by firing on an enemy
position behind a low ridgeline just to the east of the post. The police post and
adjacent positions were heavily damaged, and the raid force received no return
fire from the Iraqis.

                   Raid 3: SIGiNT Near Umm Gudair

    Iraqi signals intelligence (SIGINT) and ground surveillance radars in the
vicinity of the Umm Gudair oil field were the target of this raid.  Battery T, the
Ml lOA2 battery, and Battery Q, an M198 battery, had the mission. We needed
DPICM for these targets, but one was outside the range of the M109 and M198.
The 22,500-meter range of 8-inch DPICM, as compared to the 17,500 meters
of the M109 and M198, proved invaluable here as well as later in the ground
campaign.
    I was a little concerned about the Mi lOA2 as a raiding piece.     Its slower
rate of fire and longer emplacement times meant the battery would be in position
longer and, thus, at a greater risk from counterfire.        However, the larger
payload of the 8-inch as compared to the 155-mm DPICM meant the battery
could fire fewer rounds and achieve equal or greater effects.  Also, by this time,
we started to question the Iraqi counterfire capability.