182                                   U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, I99~1991

    Target surveillance by RPVs and other assets showed the raid fires, with rare
exception, to be very accurate.   While the Iraqi target acquisition capability
grew more suspect, their frontline troops were being subjected to fires that were
accurate to a degree they couldn't comprehend.
    The coordinated counterfire effort between artillery and aviation displayed
in the fourth raid undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect on Iraqi artillerymen.
    Was it partially responsible for the complete inability of the Iraqis to mount
a counterfire threat or to mass fires later during the attack into Kuwait? This
question can only generate speculation, of course, but put yourself in the place
of the Iraqi rocketeers: they fired a counterbattery volley in response to our
artillery fires, and within seconds of their first and only volley, they were hit by
very effective aviation ordnance. Their morale undoubtedly suffered.
    It'll remain difficult to quantitatively measure the effects of these artillery
raids.  But there's no doubt that during Operation Desert Storm the previously
insignificant artillery raid became a very significant combat multiplier.