218                                  U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991

            reports flagged for possible ground rules violations. As
            a result, our pool journalists are getting bolder in incorp-
            oration of operational information in their reports, and
            our escort officers are increasingly reluctant to flag the
            material. I realize the JIB and the Pentagon are sensitive
            to charges of censorship. I think we're much better off
            erring on the side of censorship than gambling with
            operational security.

     The problem with this approach was that far too few reports were being
contested and "flagged" up to higher authorities.     This was clearly evident
during DESERT STORM when only five pool reports were submitted to the
Pentagon for resolution, and just one of those was changed before being cleared
for release.

                     K-Day to C-Day: Filtering the Pool

     Just prior to K-day (what the locals called President Bush's 15 January ul-
timatum date), the Marines and the Army each received an 18-member media
pool.   We divided ours among the two divisions and the 1st Force Service
Support Group/Direct Support Command.
     Because air strikes dominated the early phases of DESERT STORM, spe-
cial trips for "quick reaction pools" of six to seven journalists were set up
through the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing Public Affairs Office to our air bases in
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.  Meanwhile, those reporters attached to ground units
filed  reports on the preparation for the land attack,    artillery raids, mine
breaching exercises, and logistical buildup.
     Post-war media reviews critical of the pool system have frequently cited the
Khafji engagement as an example of failure to effectively employ pools to cover
combat.   This accusation is inexplicable since we were successful in taking our
pools to Khafji on the first and subsequent days of the Iraqi incursion there.
Among media that filed reports on the Khaf'ji battle from the outset included
NBC-TV, CBS Radio, the Washington Post, the London Telegraph, and United
Press International.  Photographers from Reuters, Time, and the Associated
Press recorded the action visually with images that were widely used by news
magazines and wire services.  The critical reports may have stemmed from our
initial restrictions in limiting media to the forward edge of Marine Corps
positions outside the city, which at the time was defended by Arab coalition
forces that did not want media in their sector.  When our escorts were cleared
to take reporters into the Saudi sector, they were turned away by Iraqi mortar
fire.
     By G-day (24 February) our pool with ground units had swelled to more
than 30 members.    All four major television networks, the three wire services,
the major news magazines, and several leading newspapers were then represen-
ted in the Marine Corps pool.  They were poised along the front with our task