ANTllOLOGY AND ANNOTATED BIBHOGRAP}iY                                      221


   We were never able to obtain secure communications support for our media
escorts.  Forcing them to transit the battlefield and rear areas, particularly at
night, without secure radios is just plain foolish.

   In most cases we should require that journalists bring their own commercial-
ly available 782 gear to enable them to live for extended periods of time in an
expeditionary environment.     At the same time, we need to be prepared to
provide them adequate shelter and items such as nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) equipment that would not be practicable for them to purchase.
Reporters don't usually expect VIP treatment, but as a matter of courtesy, they
shouldn't be relegated to living conditions inferior to those of the Marines
they're assigned to cover.

   Throughout the Gulf War most pool reporters were under pressure, either
actual or perceived, from their editors/producers to file stories every day, if not
several times a day.  We simply can't get them all to where the action is on a
daily basis.  At its best, the pool system was designed to have media preposi-
tioned with commands that are expected to move forward during combat and
remain with those units until hostilities break out.  We should make every
effort, as security and logistics permit, to get some reporters to any combat
action or other newsworthy event as soon as possible. But they shouldn't expect
us to shuttle them all over our area of responsibility every time there's some
activity they want to report.  Pool participants need to understand that move-
ment among command sectors requires close coordination and careftil control.
We won't just pile them into a vehicle and haul them to every hot spot.  To do
so would be capricious and hazardous.

   A reporter's rush to file can often lead to unbalanced, inaccurate reporting.
The closer that correspondents get to the front, the narrower their perspective,
both physically and psychologically.   Reporters are likely, and understandably,
going to make judgments about a battle in which they participate based on what
they experience and observe, but their conclusions may not be an accurate
assessment of the tactical situation.  In their zeal to file a report about some
exciting action to make deadline, they may not take the time to talk to a senior
commander or staff officer who can place their observations into the overall
context of the battle.  These distorted reports, when placed into worldwide
circulation, can play into the hands of enemy propagandists.  In the Gulf War
we were able to balance those reports by placing journalists with the command
elements of the divisions and some of the regiments where they could be
periodically briefed by commanders and senior operators on the bigger picture.

   Our escort officers were frequently caught in the middle when pool members
had conflicting needs.   We tried to be sensitive to the diverse requirements
among print and visual media and their various deadline constraints, but our
escort officers shouldn't have to arbitrate among journalists when they don't
agree.    In future instances of prolonged media pool coverage of combat